Why We Failed: Lessons Learned from trying to Reform DoD

This is an ongoing series to support Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's reforms of DoD. Here we talk about the lessons learned from trying to reform DoD just over a decade ago.

[Author Note: This oncoming series is from a Marine Corps Gazette article, “Warning to TECOM: Why we failed learning from the past reform efforts” in the JAN 2020 issue. This article got a lot of attention by then TECOM Commander, Major General Bill Mullen. It was read widely, but still did not allow a small group of reformers to succeed at evolving how Marines learned to the next level. The prevailing establishment of the GS mafia (including Senior Executive Service (SeS) employees, either got rid of us by waiting out the few senior Marines that provided top cover for us]

Beginning the article,

The effort to reform Marine Corps training and education (learning) currently underway at TECOM under the leadership of MajGen William F. Mullen, III, as well as the broader vision of our Commandant, Gen David H. Berger, with which it is aligned, draw much inspiration from the reform of the Prussian Army during the Napoleonic Wars.

There are also, however, relevant lessons and insight that can be drawn from the recent experience of the U.S. joint force. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), for example, has attempted reforms that closely parallel those underway at TECOM.

Both history and recent experience provide us with a stark warning:

We will fail if we do not manage expectations across the entire Marine Corps. For reform to be successful, we must develop a coherent strategy that can be operationalized into campaign plans with achievable goals and a sufficient level of detail to achieve them.

Secondly, TECOM must lead from the front by clearly communicating our strategy to the entire Marine Corps. Every Marine, from the general officer to the new recruit, must understand where we are going as a Service and how training and education are going to take us there.

As new accessions begin their training with innovative learning methods, they must be able to transition smoothly into the Fleet where they will continue to learn through these methods. They cannot move from modern leadership development methods during entrylevel training (Recruit Training, OCS, TBS, School of Infantry/Marine Combat Training, etc.) to something that is different in the Fleet, which may be disorienting and disappointing.

We must foster an environment where Marines are rightfully excited to join the ranks and are not sorely disappointed by a “say-do” gap between what they learned in their initial training and what they experience in the Fleet. Marine’s hearing one thing during their initial training and experiencing another in the Fleet nurtures a culture of cynicism where the motivation is sapped from our future leaders.

We must ensure that the methods Marines learn during training are the same, or at least complementary, to those employed in the Fleet. If we teach one thing in the schoolhouse and practice another in the operational forces, we will fail in our effort to improve the warfighting culture of the Marine Corps.

Next from “Why We Failed…”, The Industrial Age.

Notes:

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, War‑ fighting, (Washington, DC: June 1997).

2. MajGen William Mullen, Commander’s Guidance to TECOM, (Quantico, VA: Training and Education Command, July 2018).

3. John P Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Busi‑ ness Review, (1995), available at https://hbr.org.

4. Maximillian Uriete, “Terminal Lance: Meet the Fleet, Number 540,”Terminal Lance, (June 2019), available at https://terminallance.com.