When Mission Command does not apply?The Israeli Air Force's Operation Focus (Moked); 07:45 AM on June 5, 1967

There are times, that only a professional force realizes, that a high level of harmonization (synchronization in French and US terms) must be achieved to accomplish a high level of surprise.

The Israeli Air Force's Operation Focus (Moked) at the outset of the Six-Day War in 1967, a meticulously planned and synchronized preemptive strike that crippled the air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. The operation's success hinged on precise timing and centralized control, which indeed contrasts with the decentralized, flexible nature of Mission Command.

Mission Command, as a military philosophy, emphasizes decentralized execution, where subordinate commanders are given clear intent and freedom to adapt to changing circumstances. It relies on trust, initiative, and the ability to act independently within the commander’s overarching goals.

However, Operation Focus required a level of synchronization that left little room for such flexibility. Every airstrike—targeting airfields, radar stations, and aircraft on the ground—had to occur near-simultaneously to maximize surprise and prevent Arab forces from scrambling their planes or mounting a defense. This demanded rigid adherence to a pre-set timeline, with waves of Israeli aircraft hitting targets across multiple countries starting at 07:45 AM on June 5, 1967.

The operation’s design prioritized:

• Surprise: Striking before Arab air forces could react, catching planes on the ground.

• Coordination: Over 250 aircraft, including fighters, bombers, and support craft, hit 18 airfields in Egypt alone within the first wave, followed by targets in Syria and Jordan.

• Timing: The initial wave was timed for early morning when Egyptian pilots were least alert, and radar coverage was minimal.

This level of precision required centralized planning and control, with detailed orders dictating targets, routes, and timing. Pilots and commanders had minimal leeway to deviate, as any delay or improvisation could disrupt the entire operation’s rhythm and alert the enemy. For example, Israeli aircraft flew low to avoid radar, followed strict flight paths, and adhered to exact strike times—down to the minute. This was not a scenario where a squadron leader could independently adjust the plan based on local conditions without risking the broader mission.

Mission Command being "put on hold" is apt here. The operation’s success depended on suppressing the decentralized initiative that Mission Command champions. However, it’s worth noting that Mission Command principles weren’t entirely absent. Once the initial strikes succeeded, Israeli forces transitioned to more flexible operations. Ground and air units exploited the chaos, adapting to evolving battlefield conditions, which aligns more with Mission Command’s adaptability. The initial phase, though, was a textbook case of centralized, synchronized execution.

To illustrate why Mission Command was less feasible for the airstrikes:

• Risk of Desynchronization: If one squadron struck early or late, it could alert Arab defenses, allowing them to scramble fighters or activate anti-aircraft systems.

• Complexity of Targets: Multiple airfields across different countries required precise sequencing to prevent any single target from warning others.

• Resource Constraints: Israel’s air force, though highly effective, was numerically smaller than the combined Arab forces. The plan relied on maximizing efficiency through surprise and destruction on the ground, not prolonged engagements where initiative might matter more.

In short, Operation Focus is a classic example of a military operation where the need for synchronization and surprise overrode the flexibility of Mission Command. It shows that while Mission Command is powerful in dynamic, fluid environments, certain operations demand a more rigid, top-down approach to achieve strategic goals. Once the initial objective—neutralizing Arab air power—was achieved, Israel could (and did) revert to more decentralized methods to press its advantage.