Vandergriff analysis the article "Synchronizing Operations in Time, Space, Purpose: The Combined Arms Rehearsal and Commander’s Visualization" by LTC Darrell E. Fawley, III, Armor, Spring 2025

I must note that I have bias toward Darrell. He is a fine officer and did a great job as recent commander of one of the OPFOR Squadrons at NTC. We have also co-authored chapters on MC.

I analyze the article "Synchronizing Operations in Time, Space, Purpose: The Combined Arms Rehearsal and Commander’s Visualization" by LTC Darrell E. Fawley, III, from the perspective of my reform work, we need to consider my key principles and how they align or contrast with the methodologies described in the article. I am known for my advocacy of military reform, particularly in leadership development, training, and operational adaptability. My work emphasizes decentralized command, mission-type orders, adaptability, and realistic training to foster initiative and critical thinking among soldiers and leaders. Below, I evaluate the article through the lens of of my published reforms, focusing on leadership, training, and operational execution.

1. Decentralized Command and Mission-Type Orders

My reforms heavily advocate for mission-type orders, where commanders provide clear intent and allow subordinates the freedom to execute based on their initiative and situational understanding. This contrasts with rigid, top-down control, which I critique as stifling adaptability.

• Alignment with My Ideas: The article’s emphasis on the Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR) and the commander’s visualization strongly supports my principles. The commander’s intent, as outlined in the BTG mission (e.g., “buy time for the 802nd BTG” and “push the enemy east”), is clear and concise, providing a framework for subordinate units to align their actions. The CAR process, where participants “fight out the plan” on a terrain model or map, encourages dialogue and initiative. For example, subordinate commanders and staff officers actively engage in the rehearsal, moving pieces on the map and coordinating actions without excessive prompting from the BTG commander or S3. This suggests a decentralized approach where subordinates are trusted to interpret and execute the commander’s intent.

• Evidence from the Article: The commander’s visualization includes an “Expanded Purpose” and “Key Tasks” phrased in memorable, generalized terms (e.g., “Render the Enemy Deaf, Blind, and Mute” or “Attrit Inch by Inch”). These align with my preference for broad, intent-focused directives that allow flexibility in execution. The article notes that the BTG prefers “pithy phrases” to ensure compliance, which fosters a shared understanding while leaving room for subordinate initiative.

• Potential Gaps: While the CAR process appears decentralized during the rehearsal, the article does not explicitly discuss how much autonomy subordinates have during actual operations. My emphasizes that mission-type orders must be paired with trust in subordinates’ decision-making in the field. If the BTG’s operations revert to centralized control under pressure, this would diverge from my ideals. However, the article’s focus on rehearsing “actions on the terrain model” and the commander’s role in asking questions (e.g., “How long will it take?”) suggests an intent to empower subordinates.

2. Realistic and Adaptive Training

My work, particularly in books like Raising the Bar, Path to Victory and Adapting Mission Command, stresses the need for realistic, scenario-based training that challenges soldiers to think critically and adapt to uncertainty. I critique overly scripted exercises that prioritize rote execution over problem-solving.

• Alignment with My Ideas: The 11th ACR’s CAR methodology aligns closely with my emphasis on realistic training. The article describes two types of CARs: “out of contact” (pre-deployment, using a detailed terrain board) and “in contact” (during operations, using minimal resources like maps or small terrain models in inconspicuous locations). Both prioritize fighting the plan in real-time, simulating the enemy’s actions through the S2 and requiring participants to respond dynamically. This mirrors my call for training that replicates battlefield complexity and uncertainty.

• Evidence from the Article: The CAR’s structure, where the S2 acts as the enemy commander (e.g., “I am LTC John Jones, commander of 1-17 IN”) and briefs enemy actions, introduces an adversarial element that forces participants to think critically. The sequence of actions—detection, fires, protection, and maneuver—requires staff and commanders to integrate their roles in real-time, addressing my push for cross-functional training. The article also highlights the use of terrain models or maps to visualize the battlefield, which enhances situational awareness and decision-making, a key principle.

• Potential Gaps: While the CAR is realistic within the rehearsal context, the article does not discuss how the 11th ACR incorporates after-action reviews (AARs) or iterative learning, which I consider critical for adapting training based on lessons learned. Additionally, the reliance on pre-planned elements like Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and target lists (e.g., AB1001) could risk becoming overly scripted if not balanced with opportunities for subordinates to deviate based on new information. I advocate for injecting unexpected variables into the CAR to better prepare units for chaos.

3. Leadership Development and Initiative

At the heart of my reforms focus is on developing leaders who foster trust, encourage initiative, and prioritize mission accomplishment over bureaucratic compliance. I critique the Army’s tendency to produce risk-averse leaders who adhere to rigid processes based on a zero defects officer and NCO evaluation, promotion and selection systems.

• Alignment with My Ideas: The article’s description of the commander’s role in the CAR reflects my vision of leadership. The commander sets the tone through visualization, focusing on purpose, key tasks, and end state rather than micromanaging. By asking questions and verifying that subordinate schemes nest with the overall plan, the commander fosters a collaborative environment that encourages initiative. The article’s note that the best CARs involve commanders “fighting and coordinating actions on the map with little prompt” suggests a culture of trust and empowerment.

• Evidence from the Article: The commander’s visualization avoids extraneous details (e.g., motivational speeches), focusing instead on translating intent into a shared operational picture. This aligns with my call for leaders to communicate clear intent and trust subordinates to execute. The inclusion of risk assessment (e.g., “limited mobility” or “dusty conditions”) demonstrates a proactive approach to leadership, addressing potential challenges while outlining mitigation measures, which I would endorse as fostering resilience.

• Potential Gaps: The article does not delve into how the 11th ACR develops junior leaders or NCOs during the CAR process. My emphasizes that leadership development must extend to all levels, particularly empowering NCOs to make decisions. While company commanders and staff officers participate, there’s no mention of platoon leaders, squad leaders, or NCOs actively engaging in the rehearsal, which could indicate a top-heavy focus. I push for broader inclusion to build initiative at lower echelons.

4. Adaptability to Time-Constrained Environments

I continually argue that modern warfare requires units to adapt quickly to dynamic, time-constrained environments, criticizing overly bureaucratic planning processes that hinder responsiveness.

• Alignment with my Ideas: The article’s emphasis on the CAR as a tool to mitigate “incomplete or rushed orders” in short planning horizons strongly aligns with my focus on adaptability. The 11th ACR’s commitment to conducting CARs in person, even under time pressure or in austere conditions (e.g., in a wadi or garage), demonstrates a pragmatic approach to ensuring synchronization without being paralyzed by imperfect planning.

• Evidence from the Article: The BTG’s ability to conduct “in contact” CARs with minimal resources (e.g., a map or small terrain model under camo nets) reflects adaptability to operational realities. The article notes that the CAR is the “most important aspect” of planning and preparation, prioritizing synchronization over exhaustive orders, which aligns with my critique of bloated planning processes. The structured yet flexible CAR script (e.g., enemy action, detection, fires, protection, maneuver) ensures rapid integration of assets while allowing for real-time adjustments.

• Potential Gaps: While the CAR process is adaptable, the article does not address how the 11th ACR handles significant deviations from the rehearsed plan during execution. I emphasize that units must be trained to adapt when plans fail, which requires a culture of improvisation. If the CAR overly focuses on rehearsing a single course of action, it could limit flexibility in the face of unexpected enemy actions, a point I would critique.

5. Critique from My Ideas Perspective

While the article’s methodologies align well with my reforms, there are areas where I offer constructive criticism:

• Over-Reliance on Rehearsal Structure: The detailed CAR script, while effective for synchronization, could risk becoming a checklist-driven process if not carefully managed. I warn against rigid adherence to procedures, advocating for training that prepares units for ambiguity. Introducing more unscripted elements or “free play” scenarios into the CAR could enhance adaptability.

• Inclusion of Lower Echelons: My focus on empowering junior leaders and NCOs suggests that the CAR should involve more participants from lower levels. The article’s focus on commanders, staff officers, and specialty platoon leaders may overlook opportunities to develop initiative among platoon and squad leaders.

• Continuous Learning: My emphasizes iterative learning through AARs and experimentation. The article does not mention how the 11th ACR captures lessons from CARs or actual operations to refine their process, which could be a missed opportunity to institutionalize adaptability.

What Does It All Mean?

The 11th ACR’s Combined Arms Rehearsal methodology, as described by LTC Fawley, aligns closely with my reform principles, particularly in its emphasis on decentralized command, realistic training, and adaptability. The CAR’s focus on clear commander’s intent, real-time plan fighting, and flexible execution under time constraints reflects my vision of a responsive, initiative-driven force. The commander’s visualization and collaborative rehearsal process foster trust and critical thinking, key tenets of my leadership philosophy.

However, there are areas for improvement from my perspective, including broader inclusion of junior leaders, incorporation of unscripted training elements, and a stronger emphasis on continuous learning. Overall, the 11th ACR’s CAR process represents a practical application of many of my ideas, demonstrating how his reforms can enhance operational effectiveness in a modern military context. To fully realize my vision, the 11th ACR could further empower lower echelons and integrate more dynamic, unpredictable scenarios into their rehearsals.

Begin LTC Fawley’s article:

https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Armor/Armor-Archive/Spring-2025-Edition/Synchronizing-Operations/fbclid/IwY2xjawL6NoJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHuzV1QVJlsbHbF-PcrK-5ShQU9siFr265gpHgEtJlB5cV7iTXtJApQHcDMfq_aem_92XVobhX_r_Pm2kkncrZOw/

Synchronizing Operations in Time, Space, Purpose

The Combined Arms Rehearsal and Commander’s Visualization

By LTC Darrell E. Fawley, III

Article published on: April 1, 2025 in the Armor Spring 2025 Edition

Read Time: < 15 mins

The Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR) ensures synchronization of assets and units in time, space, and purpose to enable the commander’s intent. Additionally, it ensures all commanders and staff officers understand the details of the operation and their responsibility within it. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) conducts in excess of 24 CARs per year and has found that the CAR is the most important aspect of the planning and preparation cycles for a given operation. Given a short planning horizon, the Regiment, represented by the Brigade Tactical Group (BTG), will focus on the CAR to mitigate effects of incomplete or rushed orders. Regardless of the timeline, the BTG never fails to conduct a CAR in person. While such a short amount of planning is not ideal, the demands of operations sometimes make it so and this shows that a detailed CAR can mitigate many issues with planning. This article lays out the methodology 11th ACR uses to synchronize actions in time, space, and purpose using the CAR. The first half of the article focuses on the specifics of the commander’s visualization, while the second half describes the CAR itself.

BTG Mission and Commander’s Intent

Mission: The 801st BTG conducts a mobile defense between PL Debbie and PL Betty from 221800APR2024 to 250700APR2024 in order to allow the 802nd BTG to establish a deliberate defense in the Central Corridor. O/O the 801st BTG counterattacks along Axis Iron in order to deny the enemy an ability to consolidate for an attack into the Central Corridor.

Commander’s Intent

Expanded Purpose: The purpose of this operation is to buy time for the 802nd BTG. Critical to this operation is preventing the enemy from establishing a screen along PL Mike. This is critical because a screen would prevent an integrated counterattack. We seek to push the enemy to the east and then fix them before counterattacking south through Siberia.

Key Tasks:

1. Render the Enemy Deaf, Blind, and Mute: Defeat their reconnaissance, destroy their command posts and mission command systems, and destroy or degrade their information collection systems forcing them to fight disaggregated.

2. Attrit him inch by inch: Mass the effects of drones, fires, aviation, and maneuver to force the enemy to take ground at extremely high costs. We don’t care about any of this ground but we want him to think we want it all.

3. Keep the Road Open: Push the enemy off to the east so that the counterattack has a route south through Siberia. Block in the center; give way in the east.

4. Preserve combat power: Use passive and active means to keep our combat power alive to kill the enemy.

Decisive Point: of two enemy companies IVO Snowcone as this will force the enemy futher east, delaying him by 24 hours, and enabling an effective counterattack.

End State: At end state, the 802nd BTG is postured to defend the Central Coordor, the 801st has pushed the enemy back to PL Debbie, the enemy is unable to resume offensive operations for 24 hours, and the 802nd controls PL Mike

Figure 1. BTG Mission and Commander’s Intent (U.S. Army)

The BTG employs two types of CARs: in contact and out of contact. During pre-deployment preparation, the out of contact CAR brings all hands together on a massive terrain board replete with relief and all graphics. Here, commanders, intelligence officers, fire supporters, specialty platoon leaders, etc. gather and fight out the plan. In contact, the task force uses a reduced method. The commander determines attendees with the minimum being the S2 shop, Fire Support Officer (FSO), S3, and commanders. The rehearsal occurs anywhere that is inconspicuous such as a well-covered wadi, a non-descript building, or even a garage. The terrain board at times is a large map the task force retains or a smaller terrain model with less detail. When done outdoors the task force erects camo nets to minimize overhead observation and disperses vehicles to look non-de-script.

The scene setter of the CAR is the Commander’s Visualization. This provides the framework for synchronization in time, space, and purpose. Therefore, we offer the following insight into a good visualization. The commander’s visualization is the commander’s opportunity to ensure everyone sees the fight like he or she does and to ensure the organization is focused on a single purpose. One error many commanders make is in using this space to motivate troops, put out notes, or other miscellanea. The commander should rather focus on translating his or her intent into a well understood overview of operations. This sets the tone for the operation. The format the BTG uses is:

Purpose: This is the expanded purpose of the operation and should closely mirror the operations order unless something has changed from its publication to the order. For example: “The purpose of this operation is to buy time for the 802nd BTG to establish an area defense around Razish to prevent the enemy from seizing the provincial capital.”

What Are We Trying to Accomplish: This can naturally flow from the purpose, but the intent is to talk about the major elements of what the unit must do. “We are trying to delay the enemy advance through a series of engagement areas to slow down his operations and extend his lines. We want to force him east to create a long line of control (LOC) vulnerable to attack which will set conditions for a counterattack and buy more time for follow on units to prepare their defenses.”

Key Tasks: These are likely similar to your operations order. Some commanders prefer very specific key tasks (i.e. “Seize Objective (OBJ) Colts”) while others prefer more broad key tasks (“Win the Counter Recon Fight”). We’ve found in the BTG that using pithy phrases that are easy to remember helps ensure compliance and we tend to use more generalized key tasks. For example:

• Key Task #1: Render the Enemy Deaf, Blind, and Mute – Prevent the enemy from seeing or talking. Kill the recon assets and missions command systems.

• Key Task #2: Attrit Inch by Inch – Make the enemy pay a high price for the terrain he gets.

• Key Task #3: Grab Him By the Belt: Get in close to neutralize the effect of air and artillery assets.

• Key Task #4: Deceive Him – Make it so the enemy doesn’t know where our counterattack is coming from.

End State: This is not different from the typical end state of any operations, laid out in Terrain, Enemy, Friendly, and Civilian considerations.

“At end state, the enemy will have lost two battalions worth of combat power, friendly forces are prepared to defend West of Phase Line (PL) Mike, the BTG retains Hill 760…”

Risk: The Army defines risk in terms of accident and tactical, more colloquially termed risk to force and risk to mission. However one defines it, it is important to spell out risk and mitigation measures. One way to consider risk is the Move-Strike-Protect framework. At all times, a unit can normally only do two well. For example, a defense requires loss of ability to move at scale.

“I see three areas of risk: 1. We are in Strike-Protect mode, so we are limited in mobility. We will employ a capable reserve, rehearsed, to return to offense and ensure we protect our flanks from Infantry. 2. We have limited ability to construct obstacles due to limited engineer assets. We will focus on survivability and use terrain and indirect fires to shape the enemy into our engagement areas. 3. We accept risk to our personnel due to the extremely dusty conditions. We will implement a 100-meter dust interval, enforce cleaning of windshields, and provide more time for movements to ensure no loss of personnel to accidents.”

Overview: Here, the commander should walk the terrain on the model or map and discuss how he or she sees the battle unfolding. “I believe the enemy will attempt a simultaneous push toward Siberia and Red Lake Pass. At 2100, troops will move north of the Whale Gap and probe our engagement area. 3-67 AR will push north into Siberia attempting to first seize the John Wayne Foothills and establishing a blocking position at the mouth of John Wayne Passs. Simultaneous to that, 3-15 IN will push toward Nabran and isolate it before clearing it. 2-69 AR with engineers will then pass 3-15 IN and attempt to seize Red Lake Pass using dismounts to clear the high ground to the east and west. 3-67 AR will push to the Siberian Ridge Line and establish a hasty defense. 2-69 AR will then push through and seize Forward Operating Base (FOB) Miami as a far side objective. After consolidation and reorganization, 2-69 AR will move to seize Snow Cone while 6-8 CAV attempts to push a screen line along PL Mike from PL Betty to PL Courtney. 3-15 IN will then isolate Barisu and attempt to seize the town from the north. In order to prevent this, we will use a Family of Scat-terable Mines (FASCAM) to push them into the eastern approach. What we need to do to counter this is act like an offensive line in pass blocking. Tiefort is our center and our defense along JW Foothills is our guard. Nothing gets through. Continue to push the enemy east. Our defense along Porta-Potty Wadi is our Tackle. We’re going to absorb the blow and push the attacking defensive end outside to provide time for our quarterback to throw. As we string them outside along a long LOC, we’ll fix with a counterattack and then send our reserve deep to destroy his Position Areas for Artillery (PAAs).”

Figure 2. 11th ACR Conducting a Combined Arms Rehersal Prior to Deployment (Photo by 11th ACR Public Affairs)

Once the commander provides their visualization, participants fight out the plan in real time and that fires and maneuver are synchronized with all assets supporting the plan. Generally, anything already covered in an order, confirmation brief, or back brief, is not covered again save the disposition and composition of forces to set the scene. Commanders do not brief, but rather fight their plans in concert with the BTG shaping operation. The S2 fights the enemy plan as if theywere the commander. In the offense, the BTG initiates action during the CAR. In the defense, the S2, acting as the enemy, initiates action. For example, when briefing an enemy battalion, an S2 rep might say: “My name is LTC John Jones, and I am the commander of 1-17 IN. I bring to the fight three infantry companies, a scout platoon, and a mortar platoon. I will [cross the] line of departure (LD) at 0600 and attempt to establish a foothold on John Wayne Foothills using A Company to clear the high ground to the west, C Company to establish a support by fire, and B Company to seize the objective.”

As this action takes place brigade- and battalion-level assets begin to fight against it. First, the BTG established how it detects the enemy action and answers priority intelligence requirements (PIR). For example, the scout platoon leader may say, “observation point (OP) 1 observes that movement through the Whale Gap, named area of interest (NAI) 5, and reports via Joint Capability Release (JCR) on the Task Force (TF) Battle S2 chat.” Then, the S2 may say, “That answers PIR #1. We now know the main avenue of approach.”

Next in the sequence is the fires fight. The Fire Support Officer (FSO) might say, “That triggers me to fire target AB1001 which is a Battery 6 fired from Alpha Battery with the task to disrupt the formation as it moves through the Whale Gap.” The Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) would discuss any response from fixed wing aircraft and the brigade aviation officer or liaison from the aviation element would then discuss and rotary wing response. The S2 may also discuss armed drones if available. Of course, this is only if fixed wing, rotary wing, or armed drones are to be used in this engagement. Rather than go around the horn and having staff officers and leaders brief “no change”, only those units or assets contribute to the portion of the fight in question chime in.

Following this, the various protection elements talk. For example, and engineer battalion commander may say, “As the element approaches the John Wayne Foothills, it will come in contact with a 500 m antitank ditch located at MP 3214 5969.” The Air Defense Artillery (ADA) officer would discuss array-al of assets in the event the enemy is expected to employ aviation. Then, the Electronic Warfare (EW) officer would discuss any jamming or other effects arrayed against this threat. For example, “As the enemy battalion exits the Whale Gap they will encounter global positioning system (GPS) jamming until 0200.” All of this occurs only if any of these elements have a role in the portion of the fight being rehearsed.

Figure 3. Task Force Battle Conducts a Combined Arms Rehearsal in an Abandoned Tent (Photo by Author)

Maneuver comes last after the BTG and its enablers have shaped the fight. The Mechanized Infantry Battalion (MIBN) commander or the commander of the Mechanized Infantry Company (MIC) arrayed at John Wayne Foothills may discuss their direct fire plan. Keep in mind that all this is occurring on the map or terrain model. Commanders and staff orders move about the map; they do not sit back in chairs and brief. The very best CARs the BTG has executed ended up with commanders fighting and coordinating actions on the map with little prompt from the BTG commander or S3. At the end of this exchange, the S-2 assesses the enemy’s effect on combat power and the unit’s effect on the enemy. “I (S-2 as the enemy) believe you have lost one MIC and I lost a company of infantry and a platoon of tanks.”

When in the defense, it may be helpful for a commander to brief their engagement area development when discussing their establishment, though this can take away from the flow. If inclined, an example is: “I assess the enemy will uses axis of advance (AoA) 1 and 2. I assess the enemy will send two battalions along AoA 1, with one attempting to breach, and the other as the exploitation force. I intend to kill the enemy in EA Crush. I will emplace a turn obstacle from MP 1234 5678 to MP 1265 5690. I will have one company arrayed in BP 1, another in BP 2, and a third in an alternate BP [which the commander points out on the map or terrain model]. I have planned Target AB 1010 to destroy enemy moving along Route Eagles.” Commanders should brief their engagement criteria, disengagement criteria, and displacement criteria, with the final one including an assessment of time to displace and reestablish.

Rules

Orientation to the Terrain Board (A53)

Commander's Intent and Visualization (CDI) (see next section)

Initial Set

Enemy (5-2): Scenarios (including event), PAAs, C2, Forward Area Refueling Points (FARPs), other High-Payoff Target List (HPTL) targets, obstacles (defense)

Friendly (A53): fire (including start), Scouts, Observers (defense), C2

[Note: We find that having the A53 brief all friendly assets significantly reduces time on the front end of the CAB and prevents the CAB from turning into a back brief.]

Fight the Plan

When on Defense

Enemy Action: Briefed by 5-2 or A52: "I am LTC John Smith, commander of 1-1 IN BN. I have two mechanized IN companies and one tank company. I will move along Route Eagles..."

Who does IP (UAS recon aviation, scouts, etc.): "I observe four tanks entering EA Smith and report to Brigade 5-2 on channel 598: Are command net." [All proponents able to sense or observe this action explain how they detect and how they report.]

IP Answered, if any (5-2)

Fire Response:

Artillery (FSO): What targets are being fired and are there any triggers for special munitions?

Aviation (as appropriate)

Fixed Wing (JTAC)

Rotary Wing (Brigade Aviation Officer)

Armed unmanned aerial system (5-2)

Protection

Obstacles (IT Engineer or REB Commander): Where are the obstacles and what are their effects on the enemy?

ADA (Protection Officer): Where is the ADA and what is its engagement and disengagement criteria?

EW (Protection Officer): Is EW active at this time and what are their effects?

Maneuver: What is the ground commander doing to counteract the enemy? The commander should also brief triggers to occupy BPs and use internal fire support measures, such as mortar fire, sniper fire, direct fire, enemy, displacement criteria, and displacement criteria. (Commander should discuss if friendly abilities are at risk.)

S2 Adjudication: Following this action, the S2 should assess what Red and Blue forces have been destroyed or degraded and this should be kept in mind as the rehearsal progresses.

When on Offense:

Intel used to identify the enemy disposition, composition, strength, and course of action (COAs)? What assets detect this? How do we report information?

UAS

Aviation

Scouts

Other intel sources

Fires actions to shape the enemy

Aviation actions to shape the enemy

Fixed Wing

Rotary Wing

UAS

Maneuver

Actions at the PLDC, formation, order of movement

Engineer Efforts

Smoke

SOSRA as necessary

Maneuver plan 1 level down

Risk

Enemy Response (5-2)

S2 Adjudication: Following this action, the S2 should assess what Red and Blue forces have been destroyed or degraded and this should be kept in mind as the rehearsal progresses.

Decision Points (5-3): A note taker should track along the Decision Support Tool and announce when the unit has reached a decision point and the S-3 should recommend a COA to the commander.

Figure 4. Sample Script to focus on fighting versus briefing (U.S. Army)

In the offense, it is helpful for the commander to brief their transition from movement to maneuver at the probable line of contact. “I will SP from Attack Position Fury at 0200 traveling along Axis of Advance Blue. An advanced guard will lead with companies in column. We anticipate the PLOC being PL California. 500 m from PL California, elements will transition to platoons in wedge and transition to traveling overwatch…”

The commander’s role during the fighting portion of the CAR is to ask questions, such as “How long will it take?” and to make decisions that pop up during synchronization. Additionally, the commander verifies that subordinate commanders have nested their scheme of maneuver with theirs. The S3 with assistance from the FSO and S2 help the commander ensure his or her fighting products are nested across the board.

Steps 5 and 6 above will repeat as many times as the commander and S-3 feel necessary. Generally, the commander and S-3 agree upon what they will rehearse and assign each a turn. This may look like: counter-recon fight, fight in engagement area 1, fight in engagement area 2, and counterattack, as an example.

The methodology of the CAR laid out here ensures that commanders and staff officers are rehearsing actions on the terrain model or map rather than back briefing their plans and helps ensure efforts are synchronized in time, space, and purpose. Setting the scene for the CAR is the commander’s visualization and the method offered here has proven quite effective. Taken together, these techniques represent a great way to ensure operational success.

Acronym Quick-Scan

ACR - Armored Cavalry Regiment

ADA - Air Defense Artillery

AoA - Axis of Advance

BAO - Brigade Aviation Officer

BTG - Brigade Tactical Group

BP - battle position

CAR - Combined Arms Rehearsal

COA - courses of action

EW - Electronic Warfare

FARP - Forward Area Refueling Point

FASCAM - Forward Operating Base

FOB - Forward Operating Base

FSO - Fire Support Officer

GPS - global positioning system

HPTL - High-Payoff Target List

JCR - Joint Capabilities Release

JTAC - Joint Terminal Attack Controller

LD - Line of Departure

LOC - Line of Control

MIBN - Mechanized Infantry Battalion

MIC - Mechanized Infantry Company

NAI - named area of interest

OBJ - Objective

OP - Observation Point

PAA - Position Area for Artillery

PIR - Priority Intelligence Requirement

PL - Phase Line

TF - Task Force

UAS - Unmanned aerial system

Author

LTC Darrell Fawley is a Defense planner, Defense Planning and Capabilities Branch, International Military Staff, NATO, Brussels, Belgium. His previous assignments include commander, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA; professor of military science, Ohio University Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Athens, OH; executive officer, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; and executive officer, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, Fort Stewart. LTC Fawley’s military schools include the U.S. Army Ranger Course, Airborne Course, Air Assault Course, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course, Sniper Employment Leaders Course, Heavy Weapons Leader Course, Bradley Leaders Course, Combatives Level 1 and II, and the Combat Lifesavers Course. He has bachelor of science degree (major: Arabic and Spanish) from the U.S. Military Academy. LTC Fawley also holds a master of public administration degree (MPA) and a master of social science degree from Ohio University. He also holds master in military art and science degrees in “Art of War” and “Theater Operations” from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. LTC Fawley’s awards and badges include Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, the Expert Infantryman Badge, and the Combat Infantry Badge. He has authored one book, 4-31 Infantry in Iraq’s Triangle of Death(McFarland, 2019).