The Future is Now
This is an ongoing series to support Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's reforms of DoD. Here we talk about the scientifically supported learning methodology Outcomes Based Learning or OBL.
“Training is what an army does most of the time when it is not actually fighting, and it is in training that the heart of an army’s culture lies. Training is where ideas are instilled and refined, and it is the best place to analyze how an army really thinks about things and behaves.”
Colonel Casey Haskins, June 2008
Outcomes-Based Learning (OBL) best supports Mission Command principles in that it operates on outcomes while subordinates select the appropriate way to achieve those outcomes. Results show that adaptive and innovative Servicemen and Servicewomen (here on Servicemen) and leaders who continually engage in problem-solving and learning have proven abilities to make timely decisions under stress.
In this case it would be DoD wide Service centers training centers that would define the outcomes for for the operational aspect of DoD as well as the resource parameters, and allow the training centers, units and their subordinates to figure it out. Current DoD learning methods teach Service members and leaders how to apply approved, doctrinal solutions to specific tasks, whereas OBL teaches them how to frame and solve problems, focusing on the results rather than the methods.
OBL seeks to shift leader training from a traditional construct that focuses on teaching doctrinally approved solutions to one that equips leaders with solid fundamental skills and builds expertise in critical thinking and problem solving. OBL is designed to develop leaders and organizations adept at framing complex, ill-defined problems and making effective decisions under stressful conditions with less than perfect information. From the instructor (teacher/facilitator) perspective, it seeks to encourage the trainer to teach rather than present, to coach rather than direct, to develop rather than instruct, to force the student to seek and find the answers.
OBL differs in that it focuses on the outcomes, not specific tasks, and the skills necessary for the Soldier and leader to accomplish the mission. With OBL there is more emphasis on small-unit (down to squad level) leadership, a much more varied operational environment and availability of much more situational information. These factors also extend the requirement for critical and adaptive thinking down to lower levels. As a result, our institutions will not only be conducting education but also training at the small unit level.
OBL represents an evolution of decades of experience in planning and executing “good training” and reflects bottom-up refinement and application of best training and education (Learning) practices within DoD. We know from implementation within some Army courses, directorates and schools from 2007-2012, that OBL improves instructor and faculty quality and focuses assessments on learning outcomes. It relies on the credibility and influence of experienced instructors and trainers who are accountable for instructional strategies and integral to assessment of outcomes achievement, rather than enforcement of external controls and processes. OBL is “learner centric” and requires increased importance to be placed on developing and rewarding quality instructors.
OBL can best be described as “developmental learning”—development occurs while training a military task. OBL is the intersection of training and education. The Outcomes-Based Instruction Model below outlines the three elements of an outcome: Tangibles, Intangibles and Context. Each element provides an essential component to the training and education to maximize the overall impact that the Soldier and leader will have on their unit due to their training experience. The Outcomes-Based Instruction Model provides an approach to leader development that employs “context-based, collaborative, problem-centered instruction” in accordance with the ALM 2015 framework to ensure development of 21st century leader competencies.
OBL provides this competitive learning advantage. OBL also has a direct linkage to the development of Profession of Arms essential characteristics (trust, military expertise, esprit de corps, service and stewardship). It provides guideposts for teaching leader skills and competencies critical to the development and certification of professional Soldiers and leaders who exercise “repetitive discretionary expert judgment.” A video on OBL was made by USMC Training and Education Command or TECOM in the spring of 2020. The video is here,
Today’s highly complex operations have underscored the importance of sound moral judgment and decision making at junior levels. According to the AOC,
“Junior leaders conducting operations guided by mission orders at the ends of extended lines of communications in noncontiguous areas of operations require the maturity, judgment and confidence to develop creative solutions to ill-structured problems and implement those solutions through effective action.”
Even with modern command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, the noncommissioned officer or junior officer on the ground sometimes has the best situational awareness and is more likely to make the best decision—but only if he or she is equipped, intellectually and culturally, to properly assess the situation and creatively arrive at the best solution.
The predecessor to OBL, OBT&E employed two innovative teaching techniques: the Combat Applications Training Course (CATC) and the Adaptive Leader Course (ALC). CATC was employed in the field for both marksmanship and land navigation, while ALC is classroom centric.
CATC developed individual Soldier tasks, while ALC focused on problem solving and development of strength of character; both techniques aim to develop effective decision making skills. As a means of demonstrating OBT&E and providing context for understanding OBT&E principles, the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) developed CATC, a field-based course in rifle marksmanship. It includes scenario based exercises that introduce teamwork and activities focused on problem solving. CATC is a catalyst for educating leaders and instructors about OBT&E.
Developed by Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Forward, ALC uses situational exercises through Dr. Bruce I Gudmundsson’s Case Method approach, as well as Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) in a tactical and operational environment to stress effective decision making and adaptability through experiential learning. The teachers are really facilitators, encouraging non-stop participation by students. Students took ownership of their own learning.
ALC is also based on the latest learning work of Dr. Robert Bjork of UCLA. As of June 2012, OBT&E application has been explored in a variety of programs of instruction (POIs) throughout the Army. It was successfully implemented for a few years at the following learning institutions: Fort Benning (Georgia) Army Reconnaissance Course—designed using OBT&E principles including curriculum development and instructor preparation; Fort Huachuca (Arizona) Intelligence Center of Excellence—implemented OBT&E in the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B and the Captains’ Career Course; Fort Leonard Wood Missouri) Maneuver Support Center of Excellence—integrated OBT&E in selected Military Police, Engineer and Chemical branch courses; Fort Sill (Oklahoma) Fires Center of Excellence—incorporated OBT&E in the Noncommissioned Officer Academy’s Army Basic Instructor Course and attempted to establish OBT&E as the standard throughout the Center.
Its most significant impact will be at the beginning of a leader’s development, at the Cadet/candidate levels. The Department of Military Instruction at the United States Military Academy, West Point, (New York)—revised the cadet training curriculum to incorporate OBT&E (OBL) principles. A few Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs have also successfully integrated the OBT&E approach. These examples can provide TRADOC useful context regarding the advantages and challenges of including OBT&E in the current training and education system, particularly as it looks to implement ALM 2015.
Where is OBL today?
Once the agents left, fired, retired or moved on, the revolution died down after 2012. It reignited for a brief period in USMC TECOM from 2018-2022 under the leadership of Major General William Mullens, but when he retired it also died out without a high level champion. Where it does exist in a few courses, usually concealed by a top cover of a false curriculum that confirms to old school Industrial age learning methodologies for inspection purposes, it lives on. Once the threat of higher level inspections are gone, then the OBL based curriculum comes out of hiding, but it only hangs on by a thread, as the Schools of Education, which teach the services education officers, remain stuck in the Industrial-age.
The first act at reforming DoD by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth must begin in Professional Military Education (PME) at all levels by the purging of those institutions by the dominance of Cultural Marxists, as well by the implementation of OBL.
Next: “Note Invented Here, The Challenges”
Notes:
I am indebted to the friendship, leadership and visions of Colonel Casey Haskins, (US Army retired), Sergeant Major Morgan Darwin (US Army retired), Major General William Mullens (USMC retired and now deceased), Colonel Dan Wittnam (USMC), and Dr. Bruce I Gudmundsson.
Casey Haskins, “A Good Answer to an Obsolete Question,” unpublished paper, United States Military Academy, June 2008), p. 3.
This comment brought high praise from trainers and educators from Army Centers of Excellence, 1 May 2012, Army Learning Conference, Fort Eustis, VA.
Discussions with COL Casey Haskins, Director, Department of Military Instruction (DMI) at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 24 July 2011. See also, Haskins, “A Good Answer to an Obsolete Question.” OBT&E tends to blur the lines between training and education; the methodology, as the original name implies, was intended to apply to both operational (training) and institutional (education) domains.
Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptive Leaders to Deal with the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2006), pp. 83–118.
Saul Magana, “Revised ‘ABIC’—Army Basic Instructor Course,” Fires Center of Excellence, Intellectual Warrior’s Conference Briefing, 13 April 2011. E-mail from Mr. Magana to author, 21 March 2011. Also based on discussions with Mr. Magana, 1–3 May 2012. Mr. Magana has been instrumental in developing the ABIC at Fort Sill, OK, based on OBT&E principles.
E-mail from Saul Magana to author, August 2011. 66 Department of the Army, The Army Leader Development Strategy, Draft, 25 November 2009, p. 10.
Ibid., p. 9. 68 U.S. Army, “Study of Professionalism” (study, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, West Point, NY, 2011–2012).
Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525- 3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 19 August 2010, pp. 10–11, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/ tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf.
The AWG has also developed CATC Courses for land navigation, urban operations and Soldierfirst-responder.
Vandergriff, Raising the Bar; COL Casey Haskins refers to ALM as the classroom version of OBT&E.
Dr. Robert Bjork, “Why the Way the Army Learns is Backwards,” unpublished briefing to General William Wallace, TRADOC Commander, at the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Psychology in August 2006.

Alcoholics can’t drink themselves sober. It’s been tried.
“The first act at reforming DoD by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth must begin (<fixed it) at all levels by purging” ______ALL
CTCs can stay.
The word Doctrine must be exterminated. Any use of this word will ignite the Eternal Flame of American Religiosity which burns forever, all the more so for being utterly unconscious. The best one can hope for is smoldering, or that something else is burning.
TRADOC DELENDA EST.
Or at least the DOC part. 💨🔥
Trying to teach Salafi to eat Pork soup with a knife doesn’t work any better than with a spoon~ they cannot “reform”. They must as Koba said in 1938 be “reassigned.”
(Not that far, but certainly moved out downrange).