Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s 90-day task force is not merely auditing curricula—it is mandating the full, uncompromising adoption of Outcomes-Based Learning

"United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has ordered a 90-day review of the U.S. war colleges to remove what he describes as "toxic ideology" and refocus the curriculum on 'warfighting'"

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s 90-day task force is not merely auditing curricula—it is mandating the full, uncompromising adoption of Outcomes-Based Learning (OBL, officially termed Outcomes-Based Military Education or OBME in Joint policy) across every senior service college.

This is the methodological engine that will drive the shift from Industrial-Age conformity and ideological distraction to a warfighting culture centered on Mission Command, Maneuver Warfare (3GW), and the ability to prevail in 4GW hybrid conflicts.

What is OBL?

Outcomes-Based Learning (OBL) is not merely a buzzword. It is a rigorous, evidence-driven framework already codified in DoDI 1322.35 Volume 1 (26 April 2022) and CJCSM 1810.01 (originally 2022, with updates). This framework mandates that every military education program must prove—through direct and authentic assessments—that its graduates possess the demonstrable skills and knowledge the nation requires for success in combat.

OBL was also a proven learning methodology successfully implemented in several Army programs between 2006 and 2012 (e.g., 198th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning and various Centers of Excellence under Adaptive Leader Methodology pilots). Despite glowing articles, reports, and conferences praising its results in building adaptive leaders who excelled in critical thinking, decision-making under uncertainty, and initiative—outcomes directly tied to higher performance in complex operations—the Army’s “GS (Government Service or Federal employees) Mafia” ultimately defeated and dismantled it, eliminating most of the experts who championed the approach.

A similar effort emerged in the USMC Training and Education Command (TECOM) around 2018–2021, but it too was defeated and buried by the same entrenched “GS Mafia” resistance, including the firing of the OBL Consultant. Traditional PME at the Army War College (and its sister institutions) has long operated on an input-based and Industrial-age model: scripted lectures, PowerPoint marathons, “train-to-the-test” exams, seat time, and grades that certify completion rather than mastery. This mirrors 2GW attrition warfare—centralized, linear, process-obsessed.

Hegseth is ordering the opposite: backward design from crystal-clear warfighting outcomes. The focus moves from “what was taught” to “what graduates can execute under fire.” The result will be officers who generate tempo, shatter enemy cohesion, exercise disciplined initiative, and win in chaotic, multi-domain environments—precisely the professionals needed to understand, fight, and win 4th Generation Wars.

Core Philosophy: From Inputs/Scripts to Demonstrated Outcomes: Outcomes-Based Learning (OBL) defines program success by what graduates can know (cognitive domain), value (affective/attitudinal domain), and do (psychomotor/performance domain) upon completion. These outcomes are explicitly aligned with the National Defense Strategy and the institution’s warfighting mission.

Examples of Current PME (Input/Industrial-Age/2GW Method) vs. OBL

Under the traditional input-based model still dominant at many institutions (pre-full OBME compliance), a typical USAWC strategic studies seminar proceeds as follows:

Faculty deliver a scripted 90-minute PowerPoint lecture on topics such as Clausewitzian theory, joint doctrine, or the National Defense Strategy (as well as many Cultural Marxist subjects that Secretary Hegseth wants gone!).

Students passively absorb content through assigned readings, engage in structured Q&A, and demonstrate “mastery” via end-of-course multiple-choice exams or 10-page papers graded primarily on factual recall, proper citation, and coverage of mandated topics. Success metrics include attendance (“seat time”), completion rates, and cumulative GPA.

Curriculum is forward-designed around covering prescribed content and logging hours. This linear, centralized approach mirrors 2GW attrition warfare, producing conformist officers skilled in process but often unprepared for the friction and decentralization of real combat.

In stark contrast, OBL backward-designs from warfighting Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs). The same seminar transforms into experiential exercises:

Students confront ambiguous 4GW hybrid-threat scenarios in Tactical Decision Games (TDGs), free-play wargames, or command-post exercises (CPXs). With minimal initial information, they must rapidly design maneuver plans, issue orders under time pressure simulating uncertainty, and adapt to injected friction (e.g., cyber disruptions or non-state actor interference).

Facilitators (combat veterans) observe performance and conduct After-Action Reviews (AARs) focused on decision quality. Mastery is assessed via calibrated rubrics called Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) measuring outcomes such as “generates and maintains tempo,” “exercises disciplined initiative within commander’s intent,” and “adapts to 4GW friction.”

Formative feedback loops enable immediate remediation—students repeat scenarios that are always evolving and different until they demonstrate synthesis and adaptation across cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains. This cultivates the 3GW culture of Maneuver Warfare and the agility required to prevail in 4GW, as repeatedly evidenced in pilots and advocated by reform theorists.

OBL decentralizes instructional authority: Rather than enforcing rigid, top-down scripted lesson plans, it empowers facilitators (not traditional instructors) to select and adapt teaching methods that best enable students to achieve the required outcomes. This mirrors commander’s intent in military operations—facilitators receive clear end-state objectives (the “what” and “why”) and are granted professional freedom in determining the “how.”

In exchange, they are held strictly accountable for ensuring students demonstrably meet those outcomes through valid, authentic assessments. Outcomes (like Commander’s intents two levels up) are written in measurable, action-oriented language using Bloom’s Revised Taxonomy verbs (e.g., “design,” “execute,” “adapt,” “synthesize”). Programs limit themselves to 3–6 high-level Outcomes to keep the system manageable and assessable. Every course, exercise, and staff ride is reverse-engineered to support those PLOs via subordinate Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs).

The official comparison (drawn directly from CJCSM 1810.01) is stark:

Aspect Traditional (Input-Based) vs OBL (Outcomes-Based Learning) Focus: Topics covered, hours logged, slides shownStudent mastery of specific performance outcomes, Assessment Summative grades, multiple-choice, papers, Formative + summative; direct, authentic performance, Feedback End-of-course only Continuous loop with remediation and improvement, Curriculum DesignForward (content → test)Backward (desired warfighting behavior → everything else),Evidence of Success Completion & GPA Pre- and post-graduation performance in real operational environments

This framework has been mandatory for all Military Education Institutions (MEIs) since 2022, with a structured 6-year certification cycle. Hegseth’s task force will compress and purify that timeline—ripping out any PLO, course, or assessment not directly tied to lethality, adaptability, Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command.

Step-by-Step Implementation Details (Accelerated for Warfighting)

1. Develop Mission-Driven, Warfighting-Centric Outcomes supported by Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs)(not checklists but guidelines) (Milestone 1–3): Begin with the USAWC mission: produce strategic leaders who win wars through landpower in joint, multi-domain operations. Align explicitly to Joint Learning Areas (Strategic Thinking, Profession of Arms, Continuum of Competition/Conflict/War, Security Environment, Strategy & Joint Planning, Globally Integrated Operations).

Current USAWC Institutional Learning Outcomes already point in the right direction (e.g., “Think strategically and skillfully develop strategies,” “Apply intellectual rigor and adaptive problem solving to multi-domain, joint warfighting”). Under Hegseth these will be sharpened and narrowed:

• The graduate designs and executes maneuver plans that generate tempo, exploit enemy disintegration, and collapse will to fight through decentralized Mission Command in fluid 3GW and 4GW scenarios facilitated through field exercises and free play force on force wargames.

• The graduate integrates 4GW hybrid threats into planning, preserving moral and informational superiority while maintaining U.S. will.” Outcomes must be mapped to every core course and elective using the IRMA model (Introduce, Reinforce, Master, Assess). Non-warfighting content (gender/genocide analytics, whiteness studies, DEI leadership modules) is excised entirely.

2. Backward-Design the Curriculum (Outcomes Drive Everything): Once Outcomes and Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) are locked, redesign flows backward:

• What authentic performance demonstrates mastery?

• What exercises, readings, and experiences build the required knowledge/skills/attitudes?

• What faculty development ensures instructors can facilitate rather than lecture? At USAWC this means dramatically increasing wargames, command-post exercises (CPXs), tactical decision games (TDGs), historical staff rides with decision-forcing elements, and live simulations. Scripted seminars and recycled PowerPoint blocks are minimized. Experiential Learning Model (ELM) phases—concrete experience, publish/process, generalize, develop, apply—are emphasized, with heavy weight on “apply” in dynamic, uncertain scenarios. Decision-forcing cases (where students propose solutions to historical dilemmas before learning the actual outcome) replace passive lectures, fostering the reflective practice essential for adaptability.

3. Authentic, Rubric-Driven Assessments MoEs (The Heart of OBL): Assessments must mirror operational reality as closely as possible. Direct measures dominate: observed performance in wargames, after-action reviews focused on decision quality, initiative, risk acceptance, and tempo generation. Rubrics are calibrated across faculty for validity and inter-rater reliability (e.g., analytic rubrics scoring “generates and maintains tempo,” “exercises disciplined initiative within commander’s intent,” “adapts to 4GW friction”).

Formative assessments provide immediate corrective feedback; summative assessments (including USAWC’s existing comprehensive oral examination and Strategic Research Requirement) become program-level proofs of OBL attainment. External validation—surveys and performance data from combatant commands, CTC rotations, and first assignments—closes the loop. Grades remain for courses, but PLO mastery is tracked separately at the program level.

4. Faculty Transformation and Continuous Improvement: Faculty become facilitators and warfighting mentors—combat veterans and maneuver theorists first, academics second. Professional development includes rubric calibration workshops and training in OBT&E principles (ownership through discovery, 70% basics mastery + 30% adaptive application). Despite mountains of evidence—from Army OBT&E (OBL) pilots (2006–2012) showing measurable gains in leader adaptability and from historical precedents like Prussian reforms enabling 3GW innovation—entrenched bureaucrats (in uniform, Government Service employees, civilian professors) resisted because of their own comfort and job security or “we have always done this way!” mentality. OBL demands they shift from comfortable “sage on the stage” roles to accountable facilitators; many prioritize tenure and process over lethality.

The assessment-feedback-improvement loop is mandatory: biennial effectiveness reports analyze data, identify gaps (e.g., “graduates struggle with decentralized execution in 4GW”), and drive curriculum changes. Programs must demonstrate measurable improvement over time.

5. Reporting and Certification (Accelerated 90-Day + Ongoing): Under normal Joint policy, programs follow a 6-year cycle with six milestones leading to full OBL certification: OBL and MoE approval, assessment-plan review, conditional certification briefing, two-year data collection, four-year application, and final six-year validation. Hegseth’s task force collapses this—requiring immediate PLO rewrites, purged syllabi, and warfighting-only assessments within 90 days, followed by rapid pilot implementation in the 2026–27 academic year. Annual compliance reports and biennial effectiveness reports continue to the Undersecretary and Joint Staff J7, but with a lethal focus: evidence that graduates can win wars.

Alignment with Hegseth’s Warfighting Vision

This is precisely the methodology required to escape 2GW conformity and build 3GW/4GW professionals. OBL’s emphasis on adaptability, initiative, and authentic performance directly cultivates Mission Command culture. Repeated “reps and sets” in uncertain wargames develop the OODA-loop agility John Boyd and William Lind described. By purging grievance studies and forcing every outcome toward lethality, the Army War College will finally produce commanders who can out-think peer adversaries building carrier-killer systems and non-state actors waging hybrid wars.

The clock is running—90 days for the audit, then relentless execution. Outcomes-Based Learning is not optional; it is the foundation for victory. America’s senior officers will no longer sit in seminars on systemic oppression while adversaries study maneuver. They will train, assess, and prove they can win—because the nation demands nothing less.

Author Biography:

Donald E. Vandergriff is a retired U.S. Army Major, award-winning author, dynamic speaker, and pioneering educator who has relentlessly challenged conventional military thinking for over three decades. He has authored 13 books and more than 150 articles, profoundly influencing Mission Command and maneuver warfare. His works have been translated and are actively used by Taiwan and Ukraine, reflecting their global impact on military reform and adaptive leadership. His latest work, the gripping military fiction series Reforging the Sword, delivers a stark vision of national defeat, institutional reckoning, and the hard-won rebirth of a truly adaptive fighting force. Through his highly acclaimed Outcomes Based Learning (OBL) workshops, Vandergriff teaches leaders across military, law enforcement, first responder, and private-sector organizations how to authentically implement Mission Command and master John Boyd’s OODA Loop—using immersive problem-solving games instead of PowerPoint. Where theory ends, Vandergriff begins: forging faster, bolder, more decisive leaders ready for an uncertain world. He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net.

Endnotes:

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 1810.01, Outcomes-Based Military Education Procedures for Officer Professional Military Education, 1 April 2022, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%201810.01.pdf. This manual provides the detailed procedures, milestones (1–6 over six years), and comparisons between traditional input-based education and OBME, emphasizing PLO mastery through formative/summative authentic assessments to support warfighting adaptability and Mission Command.

2. Department of Defense Instruction 1322.35, Volume 1, Military Education: Program Management and Administration, 26 April 2022, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/132235_vol1.PDF?ver=1mKICMbRcNsQUXaPf5YUfw%3D%3D. This instruction establishes OBME policy across DoD MEIs, requiring programs to prove graduates achieve warfighting outcomes aligned with national strategy, bridging cognitive development and operational performance.

3. Kristin Mulready-Stone, “A New Form of Accountability in JPME: The Shift to Outcomes-Based Military Education,” Joint Force Quarterly 112 (February 2024), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Joint-Force-Quarterly/Joint-Force-Quarterly-112/Article/Article/3678739/a-new-form-of-accountability-in-jpme-the-shift-to-outcomes-based-military-educa/. This JFQ primer details the OBME transition mandated by OPMEP-F, with practical examples of misalignment in traditional assessments (e.g., Naval War College research papers) and the benefits of rubric-driven, backward-designed curricula for joint warfighting readiness.

4. U.S. Army War College, Academic Program Guide (Academic Year 2025). This guide outlines current Institutional Learning Outcomes and resident education programs, providing the baseline for sharpening under Hegseth’s OBME mandate to focus on 3GW/4GW maneuver and Mission Command.

5. Donald E. Vandergriff, The Outcomes Based Learning Professional Handbook: Training and Education Methods for Building Adaptive Leaders (Special Tactics Institute, December 2022). Vandergriff’s handbook codifies OBL/OBT&E principles with evidence from Army implementations (2006–2012), demonstrating superior adaptability, critical thinking, and cohesion before bureaucratic dismantlement; it includes tools like Adaptive Leaders Methodology (ALM) with TDGs for 3GW/4GW leader development.

6. CJCSI 1800.01G, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 15 April 2024 (superseding earlier versions), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%201800.01G.pdf. This policy directs OBME adoption, Joint Learning Areas, and alignment with warfighting across the competition continuum, explicitly supporting leaders who can prevail in hybrid 4GW environments.

7. USAWC Resident Education Program descriptions and Institutional Learning Outcomes, accessed via official program documentation. These provide the current framework being realigned under OBME to emphasize measurable performance in multi-domain, 3GW/4GW scenarios.

8. Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2006). This foundational work critiques Industrial-Age PME and documents early OBT&E successes in fostering adaptive junior leaders for asymmetric warfare, directly supporting the cultural shift to Mission Command.

9. William S. Lind and Gregory A. Thiele, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook (Kouvola, Finland: Castalia House, 2015). This handbook explains 4GW dynamics and argues that only a 3GW Maneuver Warfare culture—enabled by adaptive education like OBL—can prevail against decentralized hybrid threats; it builds on Lind’s earlier Marine Corps Gazette articles (1989, 1994).

10. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, “A Fourth Way in Professional Military Education,” War on the Rocks, October 2, 2018. Gudmundsson proposes decision-forcing cases and staff rides (drawn from historical Prussian models) as superior to lectures for developing reflective, adaptive leaders essential to 3GW innovation and 4GW success; see also his Substack The Tactical Notebook series on PME.

11. Donald E. Vandergriff, “The Industrial Age: Then and Now,” Substack post, April 2, 2025 (donvandergriff.substack.com). This article parallels Industrial-Age education with 2GW rigidity, advocating OBL as the path to 3GW/4GW professional development, with references to TECOM and Army pilot resistance.

12. William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” Military Review 84, no. 5 (September–October 2004): 12–16. Lind details the evolution to 4GW and the critical need for decentralized, adaptive education to cultivate OODA-loop agility and Mission Command—concepts directly advanced by OBL’s focus on demonstrated performance over seat time.

13. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989). This seminal history illustrates how decentralized, experiential education enabled 3GW emergence in WWI Germany; it serves as a historical model for modern OBL reforms in PME to foster similar adaptability.

14. “Outcome-Based Training and Education,” NCO Journal (Fall 2008), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2011-and-Prior/Outcome-Based-Training-and-Education/. This article reports on Army OBT&E pilots (including Vandergriff’s ALM workshops with TDGs), documenting gains in adaptability and initiative before bureaucratic reversal.

15. Donald E. Vandergriff, “The Future is Now,” Substack post (donvandergriff.substack.com). Vandergriff explicitly links OBL to Mission Command principles, showing how outcome-focused facilitation enables subordinates to select methods that achieve intent in chaotic 4GW environments.