"Parallel Evolution" to move DoD to Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command
This will be a series of articles over the next few weeks that define in detail what it will take to move DoD from the Industrial age to Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command.
In the last article we defined what Parallel Evolution is from my books Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Presidio Press May 2002 and 2nd edition in Create Space 2013), also located in my 2005 study to reform ROTC called Raising the Bar ( ), as well as the books Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War, (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform; 2nd edition, August 26, 2012) and Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow's Centurions, (Praeger, October 30, 2008).
What are the outcomes that define the course of action direction to move DoD from the Industrial age to Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command?
We will start with the foundation of our reform what are Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command, and what leadership traits must exist to operate under the culture of Maneuver Warfare (Mission Command is a subset). Then, we will define the necessary outcomes to begin the evolution from where our Defense Department is today to where it needs to be tomorrow and in the future.
Foundational Terms and Definitions
What is Maneuver Warfare? Maneuver warfare is a military culture that emphasizes rapid, flexible, and decentralized movements to outpace and outsmart the enemy, rather than relying solely on overwhelming force or attrition. It focuses on exploiting an adversary's weaknesses, disrupting their decision-making, and targeting critical vulnerabilities through speed, surprise, and adaptability. By prioritizing agility and initiative, maneuver warfare seeks to create and capitalize on opportunities to achieve decisive results with minimal resources, often using indirect approaches to disorient and defeat opponents.
What is Mission Command? Mission Command is a leadership philosophy, culture and command approach used primarily by military organizations (but can be employed successfully by any organization if given the right development methodology), emphasizing decentralized decision-making, trust, and initiative. It empowers subordinate leaders to execute tasks within the commander’s intent and established guidelines, fostering adaptability and agility in dynamic environments. By clearly communicating purpose, priorities, and boundaries, Mission Command enables rapid, effective responses to changing circumstances while maintaining alignment with overall objectives.
What Traits are required for Leaders/units to succeed? Leadership in Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command requires decentralized, adaptive, and trust-based guidance. Leaders must empower subordinates with clear intent, fostering initiative and rapid decision-making in dynamic, uncertain environments. This demands leaders with strength of character, which combine selfless service, intellectual agility, emotional resilience, and the ability to cultivate mutual trust, enabling units to exploit opportunities, adapt to chaos, and achieve objectives through independent, coordinated actions rather than rigid control.
Additionally, units, regardless of the type and purpose, must also be adaptive and agile. This only occurs if we move from an Individual Replacement System (IRS) to a unit manning system that enables unit cohesion. The USMC did an excellent study on unit manning and cohesion and its benefits in 2000 called “The Trust Study”. This study conducted under the leadership of then Brigadier General Jim Mattis, also consisted of Dr. Bruce I Gudmundsson, Dr. Jonathan Shay and Dr. Steven Canby, as well as myself.
Outcomes
To transition the Department of Defense (DoD) from an Industrial Age mindset to a culture of Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command, the DoD must achieve several key outcomes. These outcomes align with the principles of agility, decentralized decision-making, and adaptability, which are central to Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command. Below are the key outcomes, grounded in the principles outlined in military doctrine and strategic discussions:
Cultural Shift to Decentralized Decision-Making:
Outcome: Commanders and subordinates at all levels embrace decentralized authority, empowered to make decisions aligned with the commander’s intent without excessive oversight.
Rationale: Mission Command relies on trust, initiative, and the ability of lower echelons to act independently within the framework of shared understanding. This contrasts with the Industrial Age’s rigid, hierarchical command structures.
Actions:
Foster a culture of trust through a Professional Military Education (PME) that begins at accessions (entry level assessment of officer potentials) and basic training through senior level education that emphasizes empowerment over micromanagement.
Revise doctrine and policies to explicitly prioritize decentralized execution while maintaining accountability.
Encourage risk tolerance and learning from failure to break bureaucratic inertia this means tolerating and understand what failure means.
Enhanced Speed and Agility in Operations:
Outcome: Forces can rapidly adapt to dynamic, unpredictable environments, outpacing adversaries in decision-making and action (the OODA loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act).
Rationale: Maneuver Warfare emphasizes speed, surprise, and exploiting enemy weaknesses, requiring forces to operate faster than the enemy can respond.
Actions:
Streamline command and control (C2) systems to reduce decision-making latency.
Invest in technologies like AI, real-time data analytics, and secure communications to enable faster situational awareness and response.
Manage unit cohesion (regardless of service and type) and Train units to operate in ambiguous, fluid environments with incomplete information.
Development of Adaptive and Creative Leaders:
Outcome: Leaders at all levels demonstrate critical thinking, creativity, and the ability to innovate under pressure, prioritizing mission accomplishment over adherence to rigid processes.
Rationale: Industrial Age militaries relies on top-down, standardized procedures, while Maneuver Warfare demands leaders who can exploit opportunities and adapt to chaos. Outcomes, Guidelines and Principles are used instead of checklists, regulations and policies.
Actions:
Reform professional military education (PME) to emphasize critical thinking, problem-solving, and Maneuver Warfare principles using the Outcomes Based Learning (OBL) learning methodology.
Using OBL methodology, incorporate scenario-based case method experiential learning and wargaming that reward initiative and unconventional approaches.
Promote leaders who demonstrate adaptability and willingness to delegate authority. Get away from the yearly cohort (farming/industrial age management) of leaders, beginning as cadets.
Integration of Multi-Domain Capabilities:
Outcome: Seamless integration of operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains to create dilemmas for adversaries and maintain operational tempo.
Rationale: Modern warfare requires synchronized, multi-domain effects to dislocate the enemy, a hallmark of Maneuver Warfare.
Actions:
Develop joint doctrine and training that prioritize multi-domain integration.
Invest in interoperable systems and platforms that enable cross-domain synergy.
Conduct regular joint exercises to build trust and coordination among services.
Robust Shared Understanding and Commander’s Intent:
Outcome: All echelons understand the commander’s intent, enabling cohesive execution of operations even in disrupted or degraded environments.
Rationale: Mission Command hinges on a clear, concise intent that guides decentralized actions, reducing the need for constant communication.
Actions:
Train leaders to articulate clear, outcome-focused intent rather than prescriptive orders.
Leverage technology to disseminate intent and situational updates across distributed forces.
Build redundancy in communication systems to ensure shared understanding in contested environments.
Institutionalized Learning and Adaptation:
Outcome: The copy; paste; and generate a continuous learning organization that rapidly incorporates lessons from operations and experiments.
Rationale: The Industrial Age DoD often resisted change due to bureaucratic inertia. A Maneuver Warfare culture requires constant adaptation to new threats and technologies.
Actions:
Establish robust “rank-blind” after-action review processes to capture lessons learned from exercises and operations.
Create innovation hubs or experimentation units to test new tactics, techniques, and technologies.
Encourage a feedback loop where insights from the field inform doctrine and policy.
Streamlined Acquisition and Resource Allocation:
Outcome: Agile acquisition processes that deliver capabilities to the warfighter at the speed of relevance.
Rationale: Industrial Age acquisition systems are slow and risk-averse, hindering the rapid fielding of tools needed for dynamic warfare.
Actions:
Reform acquisition regulations to prioritize speed and flexibility, such as leveraging Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs).
Empower program managers to take calculated risks in prototyping and fielding.
Align budgets with Maneuver Warfare priorities, focusing on mobility, lethality, and survivability.
Resilient and Redundant Systems:
Outcome: Forces can operate effectively in degraded or contested environments, maintaining mission effectiveness despite disruptions.
Rationale: Maneuver Warfare assumes operations in chaotic, high-threat environments where communications and logistics may be targeted.
Actions:
Develop redundant C2 and logistics networks to withstand cyber and kinetic attacks.
Train forces to operate with minimal reliance on centralized systems (e.g., “radio silence” operations).
Invest in hardening and dispersing critical infrastructure.
Implementation Considerations
Resistance to Change: Bureaucratic inertia and risk-averse leadership may resist decentralizing authority or adopting new approaches. Overcoming this requires top-down commitment from senior leaders and a cultural shift reinforced through promotions and incentives.
Learning (Self Development, Training and Education): Transitioning to Mission Command and Maneuver Warfare demands significant investment in learning embracing all its tools under Outcomes Based Learning (OBL), from how we facilitate in the classroom to moving to the field with small-unit exercises to large-scale joint wargames. PME must prioritize these concepts over traditional, attrition-based approaches that center around PowerPoint Lectures and memorization of processes and checklists.
Technology Enablers: While technology (e.g., AI, JADC2) is critical, over-reliance on it risks creating vulnerabilities. The DoD must balance high-tech solutions with low-tech, resilient alternatives.
Metrics for Success: Define clear metrics to assess progress, such as decision-making speed, unit initiative in exercises, or the ability to integrate multi-domain effects in wargames.
Conclusion
Achieving these outcomes requires a fundamental shift in mindset, from the Industrial Age’s focus on control, predictability, process with top down command and control and the constant demand for information up, in order to mass to a Maneuver Warfare culture of agility, trust, and adaptability. This transition demands sustained leadership commitment, investment in people and systems, and a willingness to embrace calculated risk. Exposure to Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command must begin in the beginning of each individual’s career regardless of what service or their commissioning source. By prioritizing these outcomes, the DoD can build a force capable of outthinking and outmaneuvering adversaries in the complex, multi-domain battlefields of the 21st century.
Next: “Raising the Bar ROTC Reform Study and Briefing”
Notes:
Donald E. Vandergriff, Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs 2nd Edition, (Charleston, SC: Create Space, August 2013).
Donald E Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal with the Changing Face of War, (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Cadet Command, April 2005). See at https://d-n-i.net/vandergriff/rotc/rotc.htm.
Donald E. Vandergriff, Manning the Legions of the United States and Finding Tomorrow’s Centurions, (London, UK: Praeger, June 2008).
United States Marine Corps, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Trust Study, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps, September 29, 2000).
William H Burns and Waldo Freeman, Developing an Adaptability Training Strategy and Policy for the DoD, (Arlington, VA: Institute of Defense Analysis, October 2008).

The only maneuvers to mention; Main Effort Personnel HR.
Supporting Effort; Building back our industrial base.
The rest aren’t details but dangerous distraction. Sorry. Doctrine in America means religion, well no religion can survive contact with reality. Almost no Americans can hear “Doctrine” without hearing the call of the Muzzein to prayer. Worse a few years ago we decided to spread our errors from the Officers to the NCO Corps, with predictable results. NCOs don’t have the nuance or room to nuance, NCOs have standards. So your actions in exercise including an OPFOR of 3 persons led by myself popping blanks and tossing a smoke grenade had me asked what the doctrinal basis for my 20 second defense was…
(Funny enough had I been told mount doctrinal defense I could have, I wasn’t… and NCOs can’t do nuance). No NCO can nuance as we operate machines, train and enforce standards.
The mere existence of doctrine for Ukraine war led to errors in estimates and then horrific execution.
1) The Russians didn’t act according to any doctrine initially except perhaps politics and some form of narrative magic 🪄 that Kiev would collapse (which it nearly did but was rallied by personal small group leadership against the attempted and failed coup de airport which fell flat). The Estimate error was the West’s that Kiev would collapse.
2) In the celebrated in advance Great Counteroffensive of 2023 the Ukrainians attempted maneuver warfare, call it AirLand Battle without the Air…. And racked up the worst casualty for ground taken since WW1, worse really (349 💀per square mile)
really with no historical parallel except “BlackAdder”.
I don’t want to be obstructionist however do know that 99.9% of anyone hearing DOCTRINE will hear The LAW of God. As most lack religious training they won’t know the Nuances. 💀 They will however tragically obey 💀 …
Now if we must do rituals to advance the cause very well 🙏🏻, let us not mistake the rituals are… magic stories.
In Casuistry,
T. O’Rouke Mada
Cardinal, Madrid.
Amen 🙏🏻