My analysis of the "Pentagon sets up interservice counter-drone task force" by Nicholas Slayton of Task and Purpose, 6 July 2025
The new interagency group is being created in part because the military “cannot move fast enough in this space,” according to Gen. James Mingus, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. My response, can it?
To analyze the article on the Pentagon’s new counter-drone task force from the perspective of my work on reforming the Department of Defense (DoD), we need to consider my core arguments about military reform. My focus is on transforming the DoD’s culture, personnel systems, and operational approaches. My reforms emphasize adaptability, decentralized decision-making, mission command, and a shift away from bureaucratic, top-heavy structures toward agile, innovative organizations capable of responding to modern threats. Below, I’ll evaluate the counter-drone task force initiative through my work’s lens, focusing on its alignment or misalignment with my principles.
1. Adaptability and Speed in Response to Emerging Threats
I argue that the DoD’s bureaucratic inertia and rigid hierarchies hinder its ability to adapt to rapidly evolving threats. I advocates for structures that enable quick decision-making and innovation, drawing on historical examples like the German use of mission command. The article highlights the Pentagon’s recognition that it “cannot move fast enough” to counter uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), a threat that has grown urgent due to conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. The creation of a joint, interagency counter-drone task force, led by the Army, signals an attempt to address this gap by coordinating disparate service efforts and accelerating development from requirements to acquisition.
The task force’s formation aligns with my call for adaptability and faster responses to new threats. By centralizing coordination across branches and aiming for “rapid” acquisition, the DoD acknowledges the need to bypass traditional, slow procurement processes. Gen. Mingus’s comparison of UAS threats to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars suggests an intent to replicate the urgency of past counter-IED efforts, which I applaud as a step toward agility.
However, I critique the task force’s structure if it becomes another layer of bureaucracy rather than a truly agile entity. The article notes that “exact details on the task force and its makeup weren’t specified,” raising concerns about whether it will have the authority and flexibility to act decisively. Vandergriff’s emphasis on decentralized decision-making suggests he would prefer empowering smaller, cross-functional teams within units to innovate and deploy counter-UAS solutions, rather than relying on a top-down, joint organization that risks becoming mired in interservice rivalries or red tape.
2. Mission Command and Decentralized Execution
I am a strong proponent of mission command, where leaders provide intent and trust subordinates to execute creatively within that framework. This approach fosters initiative and adaptability at lower levels, critical for addressing dynamic threats like drones. The article mentions the Army’s push to integrate cheaper counter-UAS options into “small maneuver units” by 2026 and the Marine Corps’ deployment of prototype countermeasures for small-unit tactics. These efforts suggest a recognition that counter-drone capabilities must be distributed to frontline units, not just concentrated in high-cost systems like Patriot missiles or Navy Standard Missiles.
The focus on equipping small units with affordable, scalable counter-UAS tools aligns closely with my emphasis of a vision of empowering lower echelons. By enabling small maneuver units to counter drones directly, the DoD is moving toward decentralized execution, a key tenet of mission command. The Marine Corps’ prototyping for small-unit tactics further reflects the kind of experimentation and innovation I champion.
The task force’s joint, interagency nature, while necessary for coordination, risks centralizing authority in a way that could undermine mission command. I would argue that the task force should prioritize enabling units to develop and test their own solutions, with clear intent from leadership but minimal top-down control. If the task force imposes standardized solutions or delays fielding due to interservice negotiations, it could stifle the unit-level initiative that I advocate. Additionally, the lack of clarity on the task force’s “authorities” raises questions about whether it will truly empower decentralized innovation or revert to a control-oriented model.
3. Cultural and Personnel Reforms
My work heavily critiques the DoD’s personnel system, which I see as rewarding conformity and risk-averse careerism over innovation and bold leadership. I have called for a culture that promotes creative problem-solving and rewards officers who take risks to address emerging challenges. The counter-drone task force, with its “colorless pot of money” and focus on rapid acquisition, suggests an attempt to break from traditional funding and procurement silos, potentially fostering a more innovative environment.
The task force’s emphasis on a unified funding pool and rapid development could create space for innovative leaders to push boundaries, aligning with Vandergriff’s call for a culture that rewards risk-taking. The Army’s $800 million budget request for counter-drone initiatives and the Navy’s pursuit of cheaper interception methods indicate a willingness to invest in new approaches, which Vandergriff would see as a positive shift if it encourages creative solutions over reliance on expensive, legacy systems.
I warn that cultural change requires more than structural or funding adjustments. If the task force is staffed by careerist officers focused on protecting service-specific interests, it could perpetuate the risk-averse culture he critiques. The article’s mention of “varying stages of progress” across branches hints at potential interservice competition, which I argue stems from a lack of cultural unity and shared purpose. Without personnel reforms—such as promoting officers who prioritize joint innovation over service parochialism—the task force may struggle to achieve its goals.
4. Cost-Effectiveness and Resource Allocation
Critiques of the DoD’s reliance on high-cost, complex systems that are unsustainable against asymmetric threats. I have advocated for simpler, scalable solutions that leverage technology and training to achieve strategic goals affordably. The article underscores the high cost of current counter-UAS methods, such as using Patriot missiles or Standard Missiles against cheap drones, and highlights the DoD’s push for “reliable and affordable” alternatives that can be produced at scale.
The emphasis on cheaper, scalable counter-UAS options strongly aligns with my principles. By seeking alternatives to costly air defense systems, the DoD is addressing the economic asymmetry of drone warfare, where adversaries use inexpensive UAS to exhaust expensive U.S. defenses. The Army’s and Navy’s efforts to develop affordable interception methods reflect the kind of resource-conscious innovation I advocate.
I caution against overcomplicating new counter-UAS systems, a common DoD pitfall. If the task force prioritizes high-tech, proprietary solutions over simple, field-expedient countermeasures (e.g., electromagnetic jammers or low-cost kinetic options), it could repeat past mistakes of overinvestment in unsustainable technologies. Additionally, the “colorless pot of money” must be managed transparently to avoid waste, a concern I frequently raise about DoD resource allocation.
5. Learning from History and Adversaries
My work stresses the importance of learning from historical and contemporary examples to inform reform. The article’s reference to the IED threat during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, as noted by Gen. Mingus, suggests the DoD is drawing lessons from past asymmetric threats to address the UAS challenge. The urgency driven by conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East further indicates an attempt to learn from adversaries’ use of drones.
The analogy to the counter-IED campaign aligns with Vandergriff’s emphasis on learning from past challenges. The rapid stand-up of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in the 2000s was a rare example of DoD agility, and the counter-drone task force appears to draw inspiration from that model. Studying adversaries’ drone tactics in Ukraine and the Middle East also reflects Vandergriff’s call to adapt based on real-world observations.
Learning must be continuous and decentralized, not confined to a single task force. Units on the ground, facing drone threats directly, should be empowered to experiment and share lessons learned, rather than waiting for top-down solutions. If the task force monopolizes the learning process, it could slow adaptation, contradicting Vandergriff’s emphasis on organic, unit-driven innovation.
What Does It All Mean?
From my perspective, the Pentagon’s counter-drone task force is a mixed bag. It aligns with his principles in its recognition of the need for speed, affordability, and small-unit empowerment, reflecting an attempt to adapt to a rapidly evolving threat. The focus on cheaper, scalable solutions and the analogy to the counter-IED effort suggest a willingness to learn and innovate, which I commend. However, the task force risks falling short if it becomes another bureaucratic layer, centralized authority, or fails to foster a culture of risk-taking and decentralized execution. I urge the DoD to ensure the task force empowers frontline units, promotes mission command, and prioritizes simple, sustainable solutions over complex, costly systems.
The task force should:
Grant clear authorities to act swiftly and bypass bureaucratic delays.
Empower small, cross-functional teams to prototype and field solutions.
Foster a culture that rewards innovative leadership over service parochialism.
Prioritize decentralized learning and adaptation at the unit level.
Without these adjustments, the task force may struggle to achieve the agility and effectiveness, despite its promising intent.