My analysis of the article, "Ukraine's defense industry says the fight against Russia has shown it that the West's approach to weapons is wrong" by Sinead Baker.

Ukraine's defense industry is urging the West to abandon its longtime fixation on high-end, expensive weaponry in favor of cheaper, mass-produced arms, the kind needed to survive a war of attrition.

Overview of the Article

The article reports that Ukraine’s defense industry, represented by Serhiy Goncharov, CEO of the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries, argues that the West’s focus on producing small quantities of high-end, expensive weapons is flawed for modern conflicts like the war against Russia. Key points include:

• Mass Over Quality: Ukraine’s experience shows that wars of attrition, like the one with Russia, require large quantities of “pretty good” weapons rather than limited numbers of cutting-edge systems. The high attrition rates of equipment and ammunition necessitate a constant supply of affordable, mass-produced arms.

• Western Missteps: The West’s fixation on advanced systems (e.g., F-35 jets, Abrams tanks) is less effective in a protracted conflict where Russia’s strategy relies on overwhelming numbers of troops and equipment, even if less sophisticated.

• Ukrainian Adaptation: Ukraine has shifted to producing simpler, cheaper systems like drones and has leveraged Soviet-era equipment alongside Western supplies, demonstrating flexibility in meeting battlefield demands.

• Broader Implications: European defense ministers and experts echo this view, suggesting the West needs to rethink its defense industrial strategy to prioritize scalability and resilience over perfectionism.

Our Reform Principles

My reform work, along with those of William S. Lind and Douglas MacGregor (listed in notes), critiques the U.S. military’s bureaucratic, top-down culture and its reliance on costly, complex systems. My key principles relevant to this analysis include:

1. Decentralized Decision-Making and Adaptability: I advocates for “mission command,” where lower-level leaders are trusted to make decisions based on intent, fostering agility and responsiveness. I argues that rigid, centralized systems stifle innovation and adaptability.

2. Human-Centric Training: My emphasizes developing adaptable, critical-thinking soldiers through scenario-based training, as opposed to rote, technology-dependent approaches. This aligns with my push for a culture of initiative over micromanagement.

3. Cost-Effective Systems: I criticize the U.S. obsession with expensive, high-tech platforms (e.g., the Future Combat System) that drain budgets and take years to develop, often at the expense of readiness and scalability. I have favored simpler, modular systems that can be produced quickly and in quantity.

4. Critique of Military-Industrial Complex: I, along with others have highlights=ed how defense contractors and bureaucratic inertia prioritize profit and job preservation over battlefield effectiveness, leading to bloated procurement processes.

5. Force Structure Reform: Along with myself, most reformers, calls for smaller, more cohesive units that prioritize maneuverability and flexibility over large, unwieldy formations reliant on heavy equipment.

My Analysis of the Article

The article’s arguments resonate strongly with mine, and others such as Lind’s and MacGregor’s reform principles, particularly in critiquing the West’s procurement and strategic priorities. Below, I break down the alignment and potential divergences:

1. Alignment with Cost-Effective Systems

The Ukrainian defense industry’s call for “a lot of pretty good weapons” instead of “a handful of excellent ones” mirrors my critique of the U.S. military’s fixation on costly, high-tech systems. In the article, Goncharov points out that high-end Western systems, while impressive, are not game-changers in a war where attrition rates are high and Russia’s numerical advantage dominates. For example, Russia’s loss of over 3,600 tanks and 8,000 armored vehicles since February 2022 highlights the need for scalable production to replace losses, something the West struggles with due to its focus on systems like the $10 million Abrams tank or $400 million F-35 jet.

I have long argued that programs like the Future Combat System (canceled in 2009 after billions spent) exemplify this flaw, diverting resources from more practical, affordable platforms. Ukraine’s reliance on drones, which are cheap, quick to produce, and effective (e.g., Operation Spiderweb’s drone attack on 41 Russian aircraft), aligns with my preference for modular, cost-effective technologies. I applaud Ukraine’s ability to innovate with “good enough” systems, such as retrofitting Soviet-era equipment or producing domestic drones, as a model for bypassing the West’s slow, expensive procurement cycles.

2. Resonance with Decentralized Adaptability

Ukraine’s success with drones and flexible tactics reflects my emphasis on adaptability and decentralized decision-making. The article notes that Ukraine’s defense industry has rapidly scaled up drone production and adapted to battlefield needs, often bypassing the bureaucratic delays that plague Western systems. This mirrors my concept of mission command, where units are empowered to innovate and respond to local conditions. For instance, Ukrainian soldiers using ground robots packed with explosives to target Russian positions demonstrate the kind of tactical initiative I champion.

In contrast, the West’s approach, as critiqued in the article, relies on centralized, top-down procurement that prioritizes long development timelines for complex systems. I argue that this stifles the agility needed in a dynamic conflict like Ukraine’s, where rapid adaptation to Russia’s attritional strategy is critical. I point to the U.S. Army’s slow adoption of unmanned systems (e.g., the LASSO UAS program only starting in 2025) as evidence of bureaucratic inertia, contrasting it with Ukraine’s nimble response.

3. Critique of the Military-Industrial Complex

The article’s implicit critique of Western defense industries, which prioritize high-margin, complex systems, aligns with our warnings about the military-industrial complex. We argue that defense contractors, supported by Pentagon bureaucracy, push for programs that maximize profit but fail to deliver timely, effective solutions. The article’s mention of European defense ministers urging a shift to mass production suggests a growing recognition of this issue, as does the example of Belgium’s defense minister comparing drones’ revolutionary impact to gunpowder.

I see Ukraine’s experience as a wake-up call for the West to reform its procurement system, reducing reliance on a few major contractors (e.g., Lockheed Martin, Boeing) and fostering competition from smaller, innovative firms capable of rapid prototyping. He might also highlight how Ukraine’s domestic production, supported by smaller defense budgets, exposes the inefficiency of Western spending, which often exceeds $700 billion annually in the U.S. alone yet struggles to match Russia’s output of 2 million artillery shells per year.

4. Human-Centric Focus and Force Structure

While the article focuses more on matériel than personnel, my emphasis on human-centric training and cohesive units can still be applied. Ukraine’s ability to integrate diverse systems (Soviet-era, Western, and domestically produced) suggests a flexible, adaptive force structure, which I endorse. My advocacy for smaller, maneuverable units aligns with Ukraine’s use of mobile, drone-supported teams to counter Russia’s larger, less agile formations.

However, the article notes Ukraine’s struggle with manpower shortages, stems from a lack of investment in training and retention systems like those we proposes. Raising the Bar and Path to Victory emphasizes “free-play” training to develop critical thinking, which could enhance Ukraine’s ability to maximize its limited personnel against Russia’s 440,000 new recruits in 2024. We caution that the West’s focus on technology over people risks neglecting the human element, a lesson Ukraine has learned through necessity.

5. Potential Divergences

While the article’s arguments largely align with reformers ideas, there are nuances where my perspective differ:

• Scale vs. Precision: The article emphasizes mass production to counter Russia’s numerical advantage, but while we favor cost-effective systems, we also value precision and quality in training and tactics. We argue that Ukraine’s focus on quantity should not come at the expense of developing elite, adaptable units capable of outmaneuvering Russia’s mass.

• Long-Term Sustainability: Our reforms focus on sustainable military cultures, whereas the article’s call for rapid mass production might prioritize short-term gains. I warn that Ukraine’s approach, while effective now, needs institutional reforms to avoid the bureaucratic traps that plague Western militaries.

• Technology Balance: While my critiques overreliance on high-tech systems, I don’t reject technology outright. I suggest that Ukraine’s drone-heavy strategy, while innovative, should be complemented by investments in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, which the article mentions only in passing.

Broader Implications for Western Militaries

From my perspective, the article’s findings validate our long-standing warnings about the U.S. and NATO’s strategic missteps. The Ukraine war exposes the limitations of a defense paradigm that prioritizes prestige projects over practical readiness. We argue that Western militaries should:

• Reform Procurement: Shift toward modular, scalable systems like drones and adopt faster, more competitive acquisition processes, as Ukraine has done.

• Embrace Mission Command: Empower lower-level leaders to innovate, as seen in Ukraine’s tactical adaptations, rather than relying on top-down directives.

• Invest in People: Prioritize training and unit cohesion to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources, addressing Ukraine’s manpower challenges.

• Challenge the Status Quo: Break the grip of the military-industrial complex by fostering innovation from smaller firms and reducing dependence on legacy contractors.

We also point to historical parallels, such as the U.S. Army’s post-Vietnam reforms, where lessons from a grinding conflict led to the development of more adaptive doctrines like AirLand Battle. Ukraine’s experience could spur a similar reckoning, but only if the West overcomes its institutional inertia.

Critiques and Counterpoints

While my principles align with the article’s critique, there are potential counterarguments:

• High-End Systems Still Matter: Some might argue that advanced Western systems (e.g., HIMARS, Patriot) have been critical to Ukraine’s defense, suggesting a balance between mass and quality is needed. I counter that these systems’ impact is limited by their scarcity and maintenance demands.

• Industrial Capacity Limits: The West’s ability to pivot to mass production is constrained by deindustrialization and supply chain issues, which the article notes but doesn’t fully address. My focus on cultural reform might not fully account for these structural barriers.

• Political Will: Implementing our reforms requires political courage to challenge entrenched interests, which may be lacking in NATO countries, as evidenced by their slow response to Ukraine’s calls for more aid.

Conclusion

The Business Insider article’s critique of the West’s weaponry approach, as articulated by Ukraine’s defense industry, strongly supports my reform agenda. Ukraine’s emphasis on mass-produced, affordable weapons and adaptive tactics validates his calls for cost-effective systems, decentralized decision-making, and a shift away from the military-industrial complex’s focus on expensive, complex platforms. I see Ukraine’s experience as a case study for why the U.S. and NATO must reform their procurement, training, and force structures to prioritize agility and resilience over prestige.

However, I caution that Ukraine’s approach, while effective in the short term, needs to incorporate long-term investments in human capital and institutional reform to remain sustainable. The article’s findings should serve as a wake-up call for Western militaries to heed reformers, lest they remain unprepared for future conflicts defined by attrition and rapid adaptation.

Notes:

1. See the article at https://www.businessinsider.com/wests-approach-weaponry-wrong-vs-russia-ukraine-defense-industry-2025-6?fbclid=IwY2xjawK3g8pleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETFmYmY3Uml5cTJGRmQ5SWVYAR7QJLpUT3Hyq5qCaH5bhfZ4iECRYXa4IPAgtjtxdwNJ8-5Jz1xrsUhn08ynew_aem_whupJumz-csyCV0T4j1T_A

2. Books and Articles by Donald Vandergriff

   1. Vandergriff, Donald E. Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002.

      • Relevance: This book critiques the U.S. Army’s bureaucratic personnel and procurement systems, advocating for adaptive leadership and organizational flexibility. His call for a “revolution in human affairs” emphasizes decentralized decision-making and rapid adaptation, aligning with Ukraine’s need for agile, innovative defense solutions over rigid Western systems. The book’s foreword by Douglas Macgregor reinforces its focus on institutional reform to support dynamic warfare needs.

   2. Vandergriff, Donald E. Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War. Wheaton, IL: Center for Defense Information, 2006.

      • Relevance: This book outlines my concepts for fostering adaptability in military training and leadership, emphasizing rapid decision-making and resilience in chaotic environments. It connects to Baker’s article by supporting the need for flexible, quickly deployable systems and personnel capable of innovating under pressure, as Ukraine has done with its drone-centric approach. The book is required reading at West Point, indicating its influence on military reform discussions.

   3. Vandergriff, Donald E. Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow’s Centurions. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.

      • Relevance: This is a critique the U.S. military’s Industrial Age personnel management and advocates for a system that produces adaptive, innovative leaders. This aligns with Ukraine’s shift toward domestically developed, practical solutions that bypass Western bureaucratic delays, emphasizing the need for human capital to support rapid technological adaptation.

      3. Books and Articles by William S. Lind

   1. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

      • Relevance: Lind’s seminal work on maneuver warfare emphasizes speed, adaptability, and decentralized command, which align with Ukraine’s need for agile, low-cost systems like drones over complex Western platforms. His critique of attritional warfare supports Baker’s argument that Western reliance on expensive, slow-to-produce systems is less effective in fast-evolving conflicts.

   2. Lind, William S., and Gregory A. Thiele. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Kouvola, Finland: Castalia House, 2015.

      • Relevance: This book expands Lind’s fourth-generation warfare (4GW) theory, focusing on non-state actors and decentralized, adaptive strategies. It aligns with Baker’s article by highlighting the effectiveness of Ukraine’s innovative, low-cost drone and electronic warfare tactics against Russia, contrasting with the West’s focus on high-tech, centralized systems. The book’s emphasis on rapid adaptation in chaotic environments mirrors Ukraine’s approach.

   1. Lind, William S. “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 10 (October 1989): 22–26.

      • Relevance: This foundational article introduces 4GW, arguing that modern warfare requires flexibility and innovation over traditional, resource-heavy approaches. It supports Baker’s point that Ukraine’s success with simpler, faster-produced systems challenges the West’s costly, bureaucratic weapons development model.

   4. Books and Articles by Douglas Macgregor

   1. Macgregor, Douglas A. Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

      • Relevance: Macgregor advocates for a restructured U.S. Army with smaller, more mobile, and adaptable units, critiquing the bloated, bureaucratic defense establishment. His ideas align with Baker’s argument that Ukraine’s lean, innovative defense industry exposes the inefficiencies of Western weapons systems, which are slow to produce and overly complex.

   2. Macgregor, Douglas A. Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

      • Relevance: This book calls for rapid transformation in U.S. military organization and technology to meet modern threats, emphasizing speed and adaptability. It connects to Baker’s article by supporting Ukraine’s shift to cost-effective, quickly deployable systems like drones, which contrast with the West’s cumbersome procurement processes.

   3. Macgregor, Douglas A. Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of Modern War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016.

      • Relevance: Macgregor examines historical battles to argue for strategic and organizational reforms, including a German-style general staff system to streamline decision-making. His critique of slow, bureaucratic Western military systems aligns with Baker’s point that Ukraine’s rapid innovation exposes flaws in the West’s approach.

   4. Macgregor, Douglas. “The Endless War in Ukraine.” RealClearDefense, April 22, 2022. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/04/22/the_endless_war_in_ukraine_828111.html.

   5. Relevance: Macgregor critiques the U.S. and NATO’s strategy of prolonging the Ukraine war through massive weapons shipments, arguing that this approach sacrifices Ukrainian lives without strategic gain. While controversial, his point about the limitations of Western weapons systems (e.g., their inability to decisively shift the battlefield due to slow delivery) aligns with Baker’s argument that Ukraine’s domestic, agile solutions are more effective.