More on Lee’s Orders to J.E.B. Stuart, June 1863: A Prelude to Gettysburg

I received a large amount of positive feedback on the article “The Failure of Mission Command: J.E.B. Stuart’s Ride in the Gettysburg Campaign June 25, 1863.” I expand on it here with focus on orders.

In the 26 June 2025 article, “The Failure of Mission Command: J.E.B. Stuart’s Ride in the Gettysburg Campaign June 25, 1863,” I covered as Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart departed from Salem Depot, Virginia, with vague orders from General Robert E. Lee and Lieutenant General James Longstreet, setting in motion a controversial maneuver during the Gettysburg Campaign.

Stuart’s decision to ride around the Union Army, rather than maintaining close contact and screening with Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, exemplifies a critical failure of Mission Command, particularly in the absence of a clear Commander’s Intent. Finally, Robert E. Lee was one of the premier practitioners of Mission Command. Yet, the highest form of professionalism, also requires detailed understanding of your subordinates. It is not a free for all.

The Strategic Context

Following the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville in May 1863, Lee sought to capitalize on his army’s momentum by raiding into Pennsylvania (most historians are wrong to use the term “invade”. Lee had no intention to occupy Northern territory. His intent was to raid for supplies while defeating the US Army of Potomac on northern territory (this will be the subject of a future article)).

His objectives were multifaceted: to relieve pressure on war-ravaged Virginia, live off the North’s resources, threaten major cities like Philadelphia and Washington, and bolster the Northern peace movement. By June 3, Lee’s army began moving north from Fredericksburg, Virginia, reorganized into three corps under Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and A.P. Hill, with Stuart’s cavalry division tasked with screening the advance and gathering intelligence.

Stuart, known as the “eyes and ears” of Lee’s army, had a reputation for bold raids, having twice circumnavigated the Army of the Potomac in 1862. However, his recent performance at the Battle of Brandy Station on June 9, 1863, where Union cavalry under Alfred Pleasonton caught him off guard, had bruised his reputation. As Lee’s army advanced into Pennsylvania, Stuart’s primary mission was to screen the right flank, monitor Union movements, and provide timely intelligence. Yet, the orders he received allowed him to pursue a more ambitious course, leading to his absence during the campaign’s critical early days.

The Orders: June 22 and 23, 1863

Lee issued two key sets of orders to Stuart on June 22 and 23, 1863, both routed through Longstreet, who added his own input. These orders, preserved in historical records, reflect a combination of specific directives and discretionary latitude that Stuart interpreted as authorization for his raid. Below are the transcripts of the orders, drawn from primary sources, including the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion and Lee’s correspondence.

June 22, 1863: Lee’s Initial Orders to Stuart

On June 22, as Lee’s army moved through Maryland toward Pennsylvania, Lee wrote to Stuart from his headquarters, outlining the cavalry’s role in the campaign. The orders were sent through Longstreet, whose First Corps was positioned near Culpeper, Virginia, close to Stuart’s cavalry.

Transcript of Lee’s Order (June 22, 1863):

Head Quarters, Army Northern Virginia
June 22, 1863
Major General J.E.B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry:
General,
I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General Longstreet, with the information from your scout. I judge the enemy is moving northward, and that the best use you can make of your cavalry is to cover our right flank, watching the enemy closely, and reporting promptly all his movements. If General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell’s troops, collecting information, provisions, &c. Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army. As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving towards Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left can judge, from their movements, what their destination is, and act accordingly, keeping in view the necessity of guarding our rear and the passes as long as the enemy’s cavalry are kept south of the Blue Ridge. Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.
I am, very respectfully and truly, yours,
R.E. Lee, General

Longstreet’s Endorsement (June 22, 1863):

Longstreet forwarded Lee’s orders to Stuart with an additional note, emphasizing the potential for a raid to disrupt Union supply lines. His endorsement reflects his strategic preference for leveraging Stuart’s cavalry to harass the enemy while screening the army’s advance.

Head Quarters, First Corps,
June 22, 1863
Major General J.E.B. Stuart:
General,
I forward the enclosed letter from General Lee, which explains itself. I think that the sooner you cross into Maryland, after tomorrow, the better. The movements of Ewell’s Corps are as indicated in General Lee’s letter. I shall move via Warrenton, keeping rather to the eastward, and expect to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown or above. I hope to cross the river day after tomorrow. If you can get through by moving around their army, it may be that you can operate so as to draw off some portion of the enemy’s cavalry or create alarm in their rear, which would be of great advantage to us. Keep me advised of your movements and intentions.
Very respectfully,
James Longstreet, Lieutenant General

June 23, 1863: Lee’s Follow-Up Orders

On June 23, Lee sent a second letter to Stuart, prompted by updated intelligence and a desire to clarify his expectations. This letter reiterated the discretionary nature of Stuart’s mission while emphasizing the need to maintain contact with Ewell’s corps.

Transcript of Lee’s Order (June 23, 1863):

Head Quarters, Army Northern Virginia
June 23, 1863—5 p.m.
Major General J.E.B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry:
General,
Your letters of 1:30 and 2:30 p.m. have been received, with the information from your scouts. General Longstreet informs me that he has forwarded you my letter of yesterday. I will repeat that if General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy’s movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One of the main objects of your expedition is to gain intelligence of the position and movements of the enemy, for the benefit of this army. If you find that the enemy’s army is moving northward, and that you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, you are authorized to do so, and cross the river east of the mountains; but you must move on after crossing, and communicate with General Ewell, who is now at or near Carlisle. In either case, whether you cross east or west of the Blue Ridge, you must keep in communication with this army, and report frequently. The enemy’s movements must be closely watched, and all information promptly forwarded. I rely upon your diligence and discretion in the execution of these orders.
I am, very respectfully,
R.E. Lee, General

Longstreet’s Additional Note (June 23, 1863):

Longstreet again added his own guidance, reinforcing the idea of a raid to disrupt the Union rear while urging Stuart to act swiftly.

Head Quarters, First Corps,
June 23, 1863
Major General J.E.B. Stuart:
General,
I send you General Lee’s letter of this evening, which gives you the general plan. I think that your passage around the enemy’s rear, if it can be done without hindrance, will create confusion and draw off some of their forces, which would be of great benefit to us. If you can move rapidly, you may be able to operate on their lines of communication between Washington and their army, which would cause them great alarm. I hope to cross the Potomac tomorrow or next day, and you should aim to cross as soon as practicable. Keep me informed of your progress and any intelligence you gain.
Very respectfully,
James Longstreet, Lieutenant General

Analysis of Orders

Lee’s orders to Stuart were a blend of specific instructions and discretionary latitude, reflecting his trust in Stuart’s judgment but also introducing ambiguity. The key points of the orders were:

Primary Mission: Stuart was to screen the army’s right flank, monitor Union movements, and provide intelligence, particularly regarding the Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph Hooker (replaced by George G. Meade on June 28). He was to maintain contact with Ewell’s corps, which was advancing toward Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Discretionary Authority: Lee permitted Stuart to take three brigades and attempt to pass around the Union army “without hindrance,” damaging their supply lines and communications before crossing the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. This option was contingent on Hooker’s army remaining inactive or Stuart’s ability to move unopposed.

Communication: Stuart was instructed to keep in communication with Ewell and Lee, reporting frequently on enemy movements and collecting supplies for the army.

Longstreet’s endorsements amplified the discretionary aspect of the orders, emphasizing the potential benefits of a raid to disrupt the Union rear. His suggestion that Stuart “operate on their lines of communication” and “create alarm” aligned with Stuart’s predilection for bold, independent actions. However, neither Lee nor Longstreet explicitly prioritized the raid over screening duties, leaving Stuart to interpret the orders based on his instincts and recent experiences.

Stuart, stinging from the embarrassment at Brandy Station and eager to restore his reputation, chose the more audacious option. On June 24, he took his three best brigades—under Brigadier Generals Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and John R. Chambliss—leaving two less experienced brigades under Brigadier Generals Beverly H. Robertson and William E. “Grumble” Jones to screen Lee’s army (two other brigades were available under Alfred Jenkins (with Ewell’s II Corps) and John B. Imboden’s Brigade would join the Army on July 3rd) . Starting on June 25, Stuart embarked on a counterclockwise sweep around the Union army, crossing the Potomac at Rowser’s Ford on June 28 and capturing a wagon train in Rockville, Maryland.

Consequences of Stuart’s Decision

Stuart’s raid, while initially successful in disrupting Union supply lines, quickly became a liability. The captured wagon train slowed his progress, and encounters with Union forces, such as at Hanover, Pennsylvania, on June 30, further delayed him. By the time Stuart reached Carlisle on July 1, Lee’s army had already engaged Union forces at Gettysburg, unaware of the enemy’s strength or position due to the absence of Stuart’s cavalry. Stuart did not rejoin Lee until the afternoon of July 2, too late to provide critical intelligence during the battle’s first day.

The lack of cavalry reconnaissance left Lee reliant on incomplete information, notably from a spy employed by Longstreet, Henry Thomas Harrison, who reported the Union army’s proximity on June 28. This intelligence forced Lee to concentrate his forces at Cashtown, setting the stage for the unplanned battle at Gettysburg. Historians, such as Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi, argue that the blame for the Confederate defeat should be shared among Stuart, Lee’s vague orders, and other commanders like Ewell, who failed to link up with Stuart. Jeffry D. Wert notes that Stuart “acted injudiciously” but acknowledges Lee’s trust in granting him discretion.

Lee’s official report on the campaign expressed frustration, stating, “the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information.” While Lee did not formally rebuke Stuart, the absence of a promotion to lieutenant general alongside his corps command appointment on September 9, 1863, suggests a tacit acknowledgment of his misstep.

Longstreet’s Role and Historical Debate

Longstreet’s endorsements of Lee’s orders have fueled debate over his role in Stuart’s decision. His emphasis on a raid aligned with his strategic preference for defensive tactics and disrupting Union logistics, as discussed with Lee in May 1863. Some historians, particularly those influenced by the post-war Lost Cause movement, have criticized Longstreet for encouraging Stuart’s raid, arguing it contributed to the Confederate defeat. However, others, like Scott Bowden and Bill Ward, contend that Longstreet’s suggestions were consistent with Lee’s intent and that Stuart’s interpretation was the decisive factor.

The Lost Cause narrative, promoted by figures like Jubal Early, often scapegoated Longstreet and Stuart to shield Lee from blame. Yet, Lee’s orders, as evidenced by the transcripts, clearly granted Stuart the discretion to undertake the raid, and Longstreet’s notes reinforced this option without overriding the primary mission of screening. The ambiguity in the orders, combined with Stuart’s ambition, set the stage for the cavalry’s absence at a critical juncture.

What Does It All Mean?

The orders—Commander’s Intent—from Robert E. Lee to J.E.B. Stuart on June 22 and 23, 1863, transmitted through James Longstreet, were a pivotal moment in the Gettysburg Campaign. In terms of the doctrine of Mission Command, they were poor. Instead, intended to balance the need for reconnaissance with the opportunity to disrupt Union operations, the orders’ discretionary language allowed Stuart to pursue a raid that left Lee blind to Union movements.

The transcripts reveal Lee’s trust in Stuart’s judgment, Longstreet’s encouragement of a raid, and the resulting miscommunication that shaped the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. While Stuart’s decision to circumnavigate the Union army was within the scope of his orders, it underscored the risks of ambiguous directives in the fog of war, leaving a lasting legacy in Civil War historiography. In order to effectively practice Mission Command, Commander’s Intents must be well written, concise, and clearly define what the Commander wants to achieve as “the smoke clears.”

Notes:

1. Robert E. Lee to J.E.B. Stuart, June 22, 1863, in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1889), 913–14.

2. James Longstreet to J.E.B. Stuart, June 22, 1863, in Official Records, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 3, 914.

3. Robert E. Lee to J.E.B. Stuart, June 23, 1863, in Official Records, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 3, 923–24.

4. James Longstreet to J.E.B. Stuart, June 23, 1863, in Official Records, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 3, 924.

5. Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi, Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart’s Controversial Ride to Gettysburg (New York: Savas Beatie, 2006), 45–47.

6. Jeffry D. Wert, Cavalryman of the Lost Cause: A Biography of J.E.B. Stuart (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 252.

7. Robert E. Lee, “Report of General Robert E. Lee, C.S. Army, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia,” July 31, 1863, in Official Records, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 2, 305.

8. Scott Bowden and Bill Ward, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001), 128–30.