From Attrition to Adaptation: Reforming U.S. Military Culture for the Generations of Modern War by Donald E. Vandergriff October 28, 2025

In sum, excising bloat isn’t austerity—it’s inoculation against defeat. A lean, merit-driven force, steeped in 3GW adaptability, can deter 4GW chaos and win peer wars.

Begin Vandergriff Analysis:

In the looming great-power competition with China, the U.S. military stands at a cultural crossroads. Decades of peacetime inertia have entrenched a mindset ill-suited for the fluid, decentralized conflicts that define our era. Drawing on the foundational theories of generations of warfare—pioneered by William S. Lind and echoed in my own work on leadership development—this analysis examines how entrenched “bloat” in officer ranks and awards systems perpetuates a Second Generation (2GW) culture, blocking the transition to a Third Generation (3GW) force capable of prevailing in Fourth Generation (4GW) warfare.

Only by excising these cultural tumors can we restore a warfighting ethos that honors the legacies of leaders like Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, preparing us for the peer-level clashes ahead.

The generations of warfare framework, first articulated by Lind in his seminal 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” provides a lens to diagnose this malaise. Lind, alongside co-authors like Colonel Keith Nightengale and Captain John F. Schmitt, described warfare’s evolution as dialectical shifts driven by technology, society, and tactics.

First Generation (1GW) warfare, born from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, relied on line-and-column tactics suited to smoothbore muskets and rigid state armies.

Second Generation warfare emerged from World War I’s trenches, emphasizing firepower, attrition, and centralized control—hallmarks of the French and American militaries post-1918.

Third Generation, the German Blitzkrieg of World War II, shifted to maneuver, initiative, and psychological dislocation, bypassing enemy strengths to collapse their will.

Fourth Generation, as Lind elaborated in his 4th Generation Warfare Handbook (co-authored with Lt. Col. Gregory A. Thiele), transcends state-on-state battles, blurring lines between combatants and civilians, war and politics, through non-state actors, cultural subversion, and low-intensity networks.

These are not mere tactical evolutions but cultural paradigms: 2GW prizes order and predictability; 3GW demands adaptability and decentralized decision-making (mission command); 4GW requires cultural resilience and hybrid integration.

The U.S. military, despite its technological edge, remains mired in 2GW culture. As I argued in Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (2002) and Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture (2019), this stagnation stems from personnel policies that prioritize careerism over competence. Officer bloat—now over 110,000 active-duty officers, a ratio of one per 5.5 enlisted personnel—creates bloated headquarters, stifling initiative.

My 2010 Army Capabilities Integration Officer Bloat Study, validated by historians, revealed redundant layers that ballooned from post-Vietnam reforms, fostering risk aversion and “check-the-box” leadership. Awards bloat compounds this: “end-of-tour” ribbons, once rare markers of valor, now number in the dozens for flag officers, diluting merit and echoing Soviet-era pageantry.

Generation of Warfare, Core Culture, U.S. Military Alignment,Key Flaws in Current System:

2GW (Attrition/Firepower): Centralized control, rigid hierarchies, massed firepowerDominant U.S. paradigm (e.g., methodical planning in Iraq/Afghanistan)Officer bloat creates micromanagement; awards incentivize compliance over innovation

3GW (Maneuver/Initiative): Decentralized execution, speed/surprise, mission commandPartial adoption (e.g., Marine Corps experiments)Bloated ranks suppress junior initiative; participation awards erode merit-based trust

4GW (Decentralized/Hybrid):Blurs war/peace, state/non-state; cultural/psychological focusEmerging threats (e.g., PRC gray-zone ops, insurgencies)Careerist culture ignores non-kinetic skills; bloat diverts focus from adaptability

The points above illustrates the mismatch:

A 2GW force, laden with bureaucratic fat, cannot pivot to 3GW’s fluid maneuvers or 4GW’s shadowy networks. Lind warned that without cultural reform, Western militaries risk “elegant irrelevance” against adaptive foes.

Echoing this, retired Lt. Col. Asad “Genghis” Khan—whose combat command of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines in Afghanistan exemplified 3GW grit—has critiqued modern leadership for favoring optics over outcomes. Khan, a Pakistani-American Muslim officer who hunted bin Laden and integrated cultural intelligence into operations, embodies the decentralized ethos Lind champions.

In his post-retirement analyses on platforms like YouTube, Khan decries “double standards” where generals evade accountability for strategic failures (e.g., the 2012 Camp Bastion attack) while tactical leaders face relief for minor command climate issues. His relief in 2004 for “rough” leadership—despite beloved troops and effective ops—highlights how 2GW risk-aversion punishes the bold initiative essential for higher generations. Khan’s nickname evokes the original Genghis, whose meritocratic hordes mastered maneuver through loyalty and speed, not ribbons—a 3GW precursor Lind would applaud.

My own contributions build on this foundation. In Raising the Bar (2006), I advocated rigorous accession standards and adaptive training to cull careerists, fostering a profession where officers earn promotion through demonstrated initiative, not accumulated accolades:

Officer bloat, I contend, arose from Vietnam-era expansions without contraction, yielding a “top-heavy” structure where O-5s and above outnumber needed tactical leaders.

Awards inflation mirrors this: Pre-WWII generals like Eisenhower wore sparse racks symbolizing valor (e.g., his Legion of Merit for D-Day); today’s equivalents hoard fivefold, per Fanell’s tally, incentivizing paperwork over warfighting.

Lind’s 4GW lens reveals the peril: In hybrid wars, cultural erosion—via politicized promotions—cedes the narrative to adversaries like the PLA, whose merit-based, tech-integrated force eyes Taiwan with 3GW precision.

Transitioning to 3GW demands mission command: Empower juniors to act amid fog, as in Boyd’s OODA loop, which Lind integrated into maneuver doctrine. Yet bloat enforces top-down control, breeding the “participation trophy” ethos Fanell lambasts.

For 4GW—where non-state threats like ISIS or PRC proxies erode legitimacy through information ops—a 3GW base provides resilience, but only if we prioritize cultural warriors like Khan over ribbon-chasers.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s mandate offers a fulcrum. His January 2025 confirmation pledge to trim senior ranks—echoing my bloat study—signals intent to redirect resources from HQs to warfighters. Hegseth, a Bronze Star recipient for kinetic service, not desk duty, must wield this aggressively:

Cap officers at historical ratios (e.g., WWII’s one general per 700,000 troops),

Mandate valor-only awards,

Enforce Nimitz’s “top three” rule.

Services have failed internally; War Department (WD) fiat is essential, as Secretary Hegseth has urged in congressional testimonies.

In sum, excising bloat isn’t austerity—it’s inoculation against defeat. A lean, merit-driven force, steeped in 3GW adaptability, can deter 4GW chaos and win peer wars. As Lind posited, future victory hinges on cultural dialectics; Hegseth’s scalpel can catalyze ours. The stakes: Not just ribbons, but the republic’s sinews.

Begin James E. Fanell’s article:

Restoring America’s Warfighting Ethos: Too Many Ribbons… Clean Up America’s Military Awards Program

23 October 2025

By James E. Fanell, retired Naval officer | American Greatness

As America faces the very real threat of an armed conflict with a peer competitor—the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—it is worth noting that since the fall of the Soviet Union, America’s military has been infected by a peacetime mentality deluged with grade inflation, careerism, and politics and, for the purposes of this article, an awards program that makes our senior officers and senior enlisted look like cheap, tin-pot military dictators.

After two years of bloody fighting in Gaza, President Trump made history, once again, by negotiating a pathway towards peace in the Middle East.

This past week, as the world witnessed President Trump and leaders of the Israeli government give speeches in the Knesset, one individual in the gallery stood out: the current Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper.

Wearing his service dress blue uniform, one could see that the admiral had seventeen rows of ribbons (up to 51 awards depending on what was under his lapel), Surface Warfare and Command pins, along with a Presidential Service Badge and CENTCOM identification badges; see his official photograph.

The admiral’s appearance, while lawful and within standards, does raise the issue of the Pentagon’s awards system, where America’s senior military officers are able to obtain, let alone wear, that many rows of ribbons, awards, decorations, and badges—the latter of which are worn throughout a career just for being assigned to a command.

In other words, how does the existing U.S. military awards program actively promote the Secretary of War’s call to restore America’s warfighting ethos? Unfortunately, the answer is that it does not.

While Napoleon is famous for stating, “A soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon,” today’s senior Flag and General Officer (FOGO) ranks remind those of a certain age of the way former Soviet Union marshals used to look with row upon row of medals or like we still see North Korean generals looking today.

The wearing of a chest full of ribbons by American military FOGOs arguably is the result of the “participation trophy” mentality that took root across the Department of Defense over the last 35 years since the fall of the Soviet Union.

This current awards system has now reached the point where it has become detrimental to good order and discipline—as it promotes self-recognition over service to the national defense.

Consider that FOGOs from the 1950s, 60s, and 70s received maybe one or two Legions of Merit (LOM) for 30-plus years of service, yet today the Commander of CENTCOM is wearing five LOM ribbons—and his career is far from over.

The result of these institutionalized “end of tour awards” and other participation rewards undermines the principle of a merit-based reward system that is based on courage under fire.

It is time to end this institutionalized erosion of the American warfighting ethos.

Or compare the image of Admiral Cooper with Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, as Chief of Naval Operations, arguably the single most important military officer responsible for winning the war in the Pacific during WWII.

As you will notice, Admiral Nimitz only wore his top “top three” awards, a practice that remained in the Pacific Fleet as late as 2015, at the time of my retirement.

It is also worth pointing out that among Admiral Nimitz’s “top three” awards was his second ribbon, the U.S. Coast Guard Silver Lifesaving Medal, which he wore for personally rescuing a sailor who is believed to have fallen off the deck of a surfaced submarine. In other words, what mattered most to the warfighters of that era were undisputable acts of personal bravery or unit citations from combat action.

Lest it be thought this is just a problem for the U.S. Navy, take a look at the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Mark Milley, who is adorned with an array of ribbons, unit identifications, badges, and personal qualifications, or, as one retired officer noted, “just too much stuff.”

Compare General Milley’s uniform with that of five-star General Dwight Eisenhower, the man who successfully led the D-Day Landings at Normandy and the defeat of the Nazi warfighting machine across North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany.

Why does this problem with the Department of War’s award program need our attention? Because of Secretary of War Hegseth’s undeniable and aggressive efforts to prepare the Pentagon for a potential war with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—one that could start as early as next year—which will take everything we have with no distractions.

Some may ask, why does the Secretary of War need to take action? Can’t the services do this internally? Unfortunately, previous efforts to reverse this trend inside the services have failed. Therefore, the time has come for the Secretary of War to take action on a system that has clearly run amok.

Just as Secretary Hegseth has held those in uniform who are out of physical readiness standards (i.e., being too fat), he should also reduce the department’s “participation” awards, decorations, medals, and badges in order to restore the mindset of austerity and decorum where such recognition was rare and principally for acts of valor and courage.

My recommendation to the SECWAR is to address this issue head-on. Make it a new rule that when you are privileged enough to be selected as an Admiral or General, then you are authorized to only wear your top three awards—nothing else.

I’d also go so far as to recommend that the SECWAR allow these officers to choose their top three awards to wear—like Admiral Nimitz did—as it will reveal more about an officer’s character.

And if this rule is applicable to the FOGOs, then it should apply to all service members, as there are plenty of O-6s and E-9s whose wearing of ribbons, awards, and badges is also over-the-top.

While there may not be a war with the PRC in 2026, our best chance of deterring one is to be as seriously ready as Xi Jinping is making the PLA. That means that everybody in uniform must be focused on preparing to destroy the PLA, not spending time on writing up their end-of-tour awards package, holding endless awards boards or spending time on preparing dress uniforms for functions, as we saw in the Knesset last week.

Let’s keep our focus on the main thing—fighting and winning wars.

***

James E. Fanell served as a career naval intelligence officer whose positions included senior intelligence officer for China at the Office of Naval Intelligence and chief of intelligence for CTF-70, Seventh Fleet, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He is the co-author of the book Embracing Communist China: America’s Greatest Strategic Failure.

Bibliography:

https://starrs.us/restoring-americas-warfighting-ethos-too-many-ribbons-clean-up-americas-military-awards-program/?fbclid=IwY2xjawNt1dhleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHmLd1Kl_NAuyfpXK8rGNQpizrx_fyd0dtAd6-K8hNFHNMLxxRjiXyGVgzs0z_aem_r8joGLiRFLBfNj3-wn1T0w

Books

Lind, William S., Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Kouvola, Finland: Castalia House, 2015.

Vandergriff, Donald E. Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019.

Vandergriff, Donald E. Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002.

Vandergriff, Donald E. Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War. New York: Center for Defense Information Press, 2006.

Journal Articles

Lind, William S., Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson. “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 10 (October 1989): 22–26.

Online Articles

Fanell, James E. “Restoring America’s Warfighting Ethos: Too Many Ribbons… Clean Up America’s Military Awards Program.” American Greatness, October 23, 2025. https://starrs.us/restoring-americas-warfighting-ethos-too-many-ribbons-clean-up-americas-military-awards-program/?fbclid=IwY2xjawNt1dhleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHmLd1Kl_NAuyfpXK8rGNQpizrx_fyd0dtAd6-K8hNFHNMLxxRjiXyGVgzs0z_aem_r8joGLiRFLBfNj3-wn1T0w.

Vandergriff, Donald E. “From Attrition to Adaptation: Reforming U.S. Military Culture for the Generations of Modern War.” October 28, 2025. [Unpublished article; no URL provided in source material].

Unpublished or Internal Reports

Vandergriff, Donald E. “Army Capabilities Integration Officer Bloat Study.” Internal U.S. Army report, 2010. [Cited as validated by historians in Vandergriff’s article; no public URL or publisher specified].

Multimedia or Online Content

Khan, Asad “Genghis,” LTC (USMC ret.). Analyses and critiques of U.S. military leadership, accountability, and cultural issues (e.g., Camp Bastion attack, 2004 relief from command). YouTube videos and post-retirement commentary, ca. 2010–2025. [Specific titles and URLs not provided in source material; cited generally for post-retirement platforms].