Evolving US Cyber Command: From 2nd to 3rd Generation Warfare Culture for 4th Generation Execution

At every discussion I facilitate, I get questions from the audience on how to move Cyber to Mission Command and Maneuver Warfare (2GW to 3GW to fight 4GW).

The United States Cyber Command, established to defend and project power in cyberspace, operates within a rapidly shifting global landscape where traditional notions of warfare are being redefined. Its current organizational culture, rooted in the hierarchical and mechanistic principles of 2nd Generation Warfare (2GW), emphasizes centralized control, standardized procedures, and overwhelming force. While effective in conventional military contexts, this approach struggles to address the fluid, decentralized, and ideologically driven nature of modern conflicts, particularly those associated with 4th Generation Warfare (4GW).

To remain relevant, Cyber Command must transition to a 3rd Generation Warfare (3GW) culture—characterized by adaptability, maneuver, and decentralized decision-making—while developing the capacity to execute 4GW operations, which blend kinetic and non-kinetic actions, exploit information, and engage non-state actors. This article explores the challenges of this evolution and proposes a pathway forward, drawing on historical military transformations and contemporary cyber warfare dynamics.

Understanding the Generational Divide

To appreciate the necessary cultural shift, it’s essential to distinguish between the generations of warfare. 2GW, epitomized by the industrialized warfare of World War I, relies on massed forces, rigid hierarchies, and attrition-based strategies. Cyber Command’s current culture reflects these traits through its emphasis on standardized protocols, top-down command structures, and a focus on defending critical infrastructure against state-sponsored cyber threats. This approach excels in scenarios requiring coordinated, large-scale responses but falters against agile adversaries employing unconventional tactics.

3GW, emerging in the interwar period and perfected during World War II’s blitzkrieg, prioritizes speed, flexibility, and initiative at lower echelons. It seeks to outmaneuver opponents by disrupting their decision-making processes, often bypassing fortified positions to strike at vulnerabilities. A 3GW culture within Cyber Command would empower operators to make real-time decisions, adapt to emerging threats, and exploit fleeting opportunities in cyberspace, where attacks unfold in milliseconds.

4GW, by contrast, transcends traditional battlefields, integrating military, political, economic, and informational domains to undermine adversaries’ legitimacy and cohesion. Non-state actors, such as hacktivist groups or terrorist organizations, often drive 4GW, leveraging social media, propaganda, and cyberattacks to influence perceptions and erode trust. For Cyber Command, executing 4GW requires not only technical prowess but also a deep understanding of cultural, psychological, and societal dynamics—an area where its 2GW roots are ill-equipped.

Challenges of the 2GW Culture

Cyber Command’s 2GW culture manifests in several ways that hinder its ability to engage in 4GW. First, its centralized decision-making slows responses to cyber threats. In cyberspace, where attacks can propagate globally in seconds, delays caused by bureaucratic approvals can cede the initiative to adversaries.

Second, the organization’s focus on technical solutions—such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and malware signatures—neglects the human and ideological dimensions of 4GW. For example, countering a disinformation campaign requires understanding the target audience’s beliefs, not just blocking malicious IP addresses.

Third, Cyber Command’s reliance on standardized training and doctrine limits its ability to foster the creativity and interdisciplinary thinking needed to counter non-state actors who operate outside conventional frameworks.

This rigidity is compounded by a risk-averse mindset. 2GW cultures prioritize predictable outcomes, but 4GW thrives on ambiguity and surprise. Cyber Command’s hesitation to engage in offensive operations or experiment with unconventional tactics, such as psychological operations in cyberspace, stems from fears of escalation or unintended consequences.

Yet, adversaries like China and Russia routinely employ 4GW tactics, blending cyberattacks with information warfare to shape narratives and destabilize societies. Without a cultural overhaul, Cyber Command risks being outmaneuvered.

Building a 3GW Culture

Transitioning to a 3GW culture requires Cyber Command to embrace maneuver-oriented principles tailored to cyberspace. The first step is decentralizing authority. Just as 3GW armies empowered junior officers to make battlefield decisions, Cyber Command must grant cyber operators greater autonomy to respond to threats in real time. This could involve pre-authorized rules of engagement for specific scenarios, allowing teams to launch countermeasures without awaiting high-level approval. Such a shift demands trust in operators’ judgment, which can be cultivated through rigorous, scenario-based training that simulates the chaos of 4GW environments.

Next, Cyber Command must prioritize adaptability over standardization. In 3GW, success hinges on exploiting an opponent’s weaknesses rather than adhering to a fixed playbook. Cyber operators should be trained to think like their adversaries, anticipating how non-state actors might exploit social media, supply chains, or public infrastructure. This requires integrating red-teaming exercises into regular operations, where internal teams simulate 4GW tactics to expose vulnerabilities. By institutionalizing a culture of experimentation, Cyber Command can develop the agility to counter unpredictable threats.

Interdisciplinary collaboration is another cornerstone of a 3GW culture. 4GW blurs the lines between military and civilian domains, necessitating expertise in sociology, psychology, and anthropology alongside technical skills. Cyber Command should recruit and train personnel from diverse backgrounds, creating cross-functional teams capable of designing operations that combine cyberattacks with information campaigns.

For instance, a team might disrupt a terrorist group’s online recruitment by simultaneously targeting its servers and flooding its social media channels with counter-narratives. This holistic approach aligns with 3GW’s emphasis on disrupting the enemy’s entire system, not just its physical assets.

Executing 4GW Operations

While a 3GW culture provides the foundation, executing 4GW operations demands additional capabilities. Cyber Command must develop expertise in information warfare, recognizing that cyberspace is as much a battleground for ideas as for code. This involves crafting narratives that undermine adversaries’ credibility while reinforcing trust in U.S. institutions.

For example, countering a foreign disinformation campaign might require not only technical measures to disrupt botnets but also public communications to expose the campaign’s falsehoods and rally international support. Such operations require close coordination with other agencies, such as the State Department and intelligence community, to ensure a unified message.

Moreover, Cyber Command must embrace offensive operations as a core component of 4GW. Rather than focusing solely on defense, it should proactively disrupt adversaries’ networks, supply chains, and propaganda efforts. This could involve deploying malware to disable a hostile group’s communication systems or manipulating data to sow distrust among its members. Offensive operations carry risks, including escalation and collateral damage, but a 3GW culture’s emphasis on initiative and adaptability can mitigate these through careful planning and real-time adjustments.

Finally, Cyber Command must engage with non-military stakeholders to succeed in 4GW. Private companies, which own much of the critical infrastructure targeted in cyberattacks, are key partners. By fostering public-private collaboration, Cyber Command can share threat intelligence, coordinate responses, and develop resilient systems that withstand 4GW assaults. Similarly, international alliances, such as NATO’s cyber defense initiatives, can amplify U.S. efforts by pooling resources and expertise.

Overcoming Resistance to Change

Cultural transformation is not without obstacles. Cyber Command’s entrenched 2GW mindset, reinforced by decades of military tradition, will resist decentralization and experimentation. Senior leaders accustomed to hierarchical control may view empowered operators as a threat to authority. To overcome this, change must be driven from the top, with commanders modeling 3GW principles through their actions. Publicly rewarding innovative solutions and tolerating calculated risks can signal that adaptability is valued.

Resource constraints also pose a challenge. Developing interdisciplinary teams and advanced training programs requires significant investment, which may compete with other defense priorities. Cyber Command can address this by leveraging existing military and civilian institutions, such as universities and tech companies, to provide specialized training and talent. Additionally, partnerships with allies can distribute costs while enhancing collective capabilities.

Finally, legal and ethical considerations complicate 4GW execution. Offensive cyber operations and information warfare raise questions about sovereignty, privacy, and proportionality. Cyber Command must work with policymakers to establish clear guidelines that balance operational effectiveness with adherence to international norms. Transparent communication about its mission and methods can also build public trust, countering narratives that portray cyber operations as shadowy or unchecked.

A Path Forward

The evolution from a 2GW to a 3GW culture, with the capacity to execute 4GW, is not a linear process but a continuous adaptation to an ever-changing threat landscape. Cyber Command can begin by conducting a comprehensive review of its organizational structure, identifying areas where centralized control stifles innovation.

Pilot programs that test decentralized decision-making in controlled environments can demonstrate the value of a 3GW approach without destabilizing existing operations. Simultaneously, investing in education and recruitment to build a diverse, adaptable workforce will lay the groundwork for 4GW expertise.

Historical military transformations offer inspiration. Just as the U.S. Army adapted to counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan by embracing flexibility and cultural awareness, Cyber Command can learn to navigate the complexities of 4GW. By fostering a culture that values speed, creativity, and interdisciplinary collaboration, it can position itself as a leader in the future of warfare, where cyberspace is both a battlefield and a frontier of ideas.

Notes

1. John R Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, Edited by Chet Richards and Chuck Spinney, (Washington, DC: Defense and the National Interest, 1986). https://www.dnipogo.org/boyd/patterns-of-conflict/

2. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 12–15.

3. William S. Lind, The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Petersburg, VA: Special Tactics, 2023).

4. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 28–33.

5. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 45–50.

6. Lisa Heidelberg, Dan O’Neill, and Lauren Landrigan, “Army R&D Integrating Cyber and Mission Command,” (U.S. Army, September 17, 2019) https://www.army.mil/article/227419/army_rd_integrating_cyber_and_mission_command.

7. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberspace in Peace and War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 102–108.

8. U.S. Cyber Command, Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for USCYBERCOM (Fort Meade, MD: U.S. Cyber Command, 2018), 6–8.