Developing and Sustaining Adaptability (and Agility)? What are they?
This will be a continual series to answer a list of great questions to "A Detailed Road Map to Assist Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's Massive Undertaking of Reforming US DoD"
How does the the U.S. Military create (in Army/USMC terms, but applies to all services) strategic corporals, strategic lieutenants, strategic majors and strategic colonels? How do we grow and enable (sustain) adaptive and agile leaders? The trick, and first act of reform, is to instill a culture (“a learning organization” that is “culturally adaptable enough”) that is different than the one now. It’s one where thoughtful risk taking is encouraged.
Learning organizations consistently gain knowledge from successes and failures. Their first cultural reaction to reasonable mistakes is not “Who is to blame?”, but rather “What can we learn from this?” As long as an error was not made in the act of stupidity and or being lazy, neglect. The act is instead trying something different, that will be beneficial to the organization allowing it to evolve with its ever changing environment, in well thought out experiments. In case of a failure, those leading the change, have an ability to explain in their terms why it happened the way it did, and finally, how they are going to not repeat the same mistake again-how to improve it.
“Adaptability” is a somewhat elusive term, and its meaning can vary between two extremes. Adaptation can be dynamic or passive: it can either shape or be shaped by the situation, as necessary to maximize the advantage. Innovation and being able to “think on one’s feet” and improvise are prerequisites for dynamic, not passive, adaptability. Therefore, to develop dynamically adaptive leaders, the U.S. Military must develop innovative ones first, which is a very tall order and suggests why the “journey” to adapting a new personnel system will be time consuming and less than straightforward.
According to Kristopher Floyd, Founder and CEO, TeamMate AI, who stated this in November 2018, the difference between agility and adaptability is as follows,
“The agility quotient measures one’s ability to position oneself in the optimal situation. Notice how there is no consideration to time in that definition, except for the requirement that the agile practitioner is in the optimal situation [implied: all of the time].
The adaptability quotient, however, is loosely described as the ability to adapt in a fast-changing environment. The adaptability quotient is excellent, but it does have one fatal flaw: to adapt is to be reactionary. Time is too heavily involved and dictates when the adapter is in optimal situations, which is by definition: not always.
Agility is the will and ability to change, the execution of change, and the Quality exhibited during the act of change. Changing states in a poor manner can result in survival, but it cannot be said to be a sublime maneuver. Agility is not simply a response to changing conditions; it is concerned with the initiation of state-change, whether it is in response to external stimuli or in response to an internal drive to cause adaptation in some other system(s).
The difference between the external and internal initiators of change, as described, may be a head-scratcher for many – but it is not a head scratcher for the advanced jiu jitsu player, who executes agility in his hypnotic flow, causing his opponent to react, adapt, react, adapt, again and again – until a mistake is made – the trap is set, and a submission takes hold.”
In sum, and based on my examination of thousands of hours of military history campaigns and battles, I agree with Kristopher Floyd, “adaptability survives, and agility thrives!” Adaptability is long term, while agility (which can exist in today’s Industrial age organization) is short term. My friend and mentor, Dr. Chet Richards sums it up as following, “Agility” is adaptability with a time dimension, that is, the ability to adapt more rapidly to new situations than can competitors or opponents.
Developing innovative, agile and adaptive leaders forces two very basis questions: What leader attributes should U.S. Military development efforts (accessions, selections, promotions and professional military education) address, and how is the U.S. Military going to grow them? In short, supporting the adaptive and agile force envisioned for Mission Command suggests reassessment of the existing personnel management systems, which were created for linear warfare supported by mass mobilization during the Industrial age.
To be “culturally adaptable enough,” be open to different ways of thinking, encourage the sharing of information and best practices, learn from both positive and negative experiences, and set aside time for learning and innovation. Organizations that value continuous learning by developing adaptive members:
1. Purposefully recruit, then screen/test talent that brings a unique set of experiences that are new to the organization and allow them to promote a different way of thinking (that means moving from an “up or out” to an “up or stay” promotion system). The culture realizes that each individual brings a different set of skills, experiences and personalities that in a sum make up great teams. Success is defined less by promotions and positions, than by the overall contribution each individual makes to the organization.
2. Send Servicemen and women (henceforth known as Servicemen) into the field to observe concepts, ideas, and equipment in use and bring that knowledge back to planning, design, product, or engineering teams.
3. Encourage and reward knowledge sharing across and within functions.
4. Require post mortem facilitated, rank-blind, and blunt After Action Reviews (AARs) to capture lessons learned to inform future actions.
4. Invest in professional military education (PME) evolving and innovative learning methodologies to ensure that front-line up to strategic level leaders have the competence and confidence to learn, change, and adapt.
And finally, 5. Review all policies, regulations and laws that may inhibit adaptability, as well eliminate those that encourage careerism and risk aversion over those that promote moral courage, professionalism and adaptability.
The emphasis is on evolving toward the practice and culture of Mission Command. The essence of this approach is to ensure that the U.S. Military leads through “Auftragstaktik”, a Prussian (German) word that implies that once everyone understands the commander’s’ intent (two levels up), then people are free to and indeed duty-bound to use their creativity and initiative to accomplish their missions within the intent, adapting to changing circumstances. Within such an environment, teams will largely self-organize within the doctrinal framework to accomplish the mission.
Military culture that supports Mission Command takes time to develop and must be embraced across the entire spectrum of the military and practiced in every institution—operational and generating forces—while decrees from above cannot magically decentralize operations conducted by adaptive leaders. The personnel management system that would evolve out of Mission Command should encourage tomorrow’s Servicemen and leaders to impart creative freedom and authority upon their juniors—an unprecedented and largely underdeveloped step. And those juniors—officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and civilians—require relentless schooling, training and encouragement in preparing to wisely use that freedom under Mission Command.
The uncompromising goal of a new personnel system is to make each individual member of the U.S. military a person who—in character, capability and knowledge—is self-reliant, self-confident and dedicated to taking responsibility as a leader. he adaptation of Mission Command increases demands for responsibility and innovation at the NCO and junior officer levels and will force civilians to step up as well. It advocates a true meritocracy based on esotericism. These demands place a greater premium on (1) adaptability to emergent situations, (2) operating with and within joint, interagency and multinational organizations, (3) rapid responsiveness and (4) the mental and physical agility to capitalize on opportunities in the field.
Key to the U.S. Military’s adjustment is the ability of personnel systems to support developing and empowering adaptability in individuals for operations in the future complex environment. Additionally, these personnel systems must sustain the all volunteer force over persistent conflict and beyond. The increasing demands of lifelong service in the profession of arms will strain individuals and the personnel systems that support them. Systems and procedures that empower individuals under Mission Command are essential to encouraging continued service and professional development. Successfully encouraging such development will require innovative and flexible ways of using personnel, and Servicemen must expect to have careers different from those experienced by previous and current senior leaders.
An evolution in the way Servicemen are promoted, assigned and educated will bring about changes in the U.S. Military culture that will sustain the all-volunteer force in the future complex operational environment. Mission Command would operate in contrast to the environment the U.S. Military has known since the Industrial age. The centralized governance within the U.S. Military—that is, top-to-bottom control—is outdated. A culture such as Mission Command, gives more freedom for creativity, adaptability and innovation. It would better prepare the U.S. Military for future demands and also retain Service members who desire such freedom in uniform. Additionally, Mission Command would inevitably see a reduction in undue competition between officers and noncommissioned officers; with this shift, trust and flexibility would become more widespread throughout the institution.
The centralized personnel system currently ingrained in the U.S. Military can be applied effectively in a stable environment. However, because war is turbulent and unpredictable—particularly the type of war the U.S. has been and will be fighting—a centralized personnel system inadequately manages talent and is therefore less able to counter the often fast and unpredictable changes in the environment. Address the cultural ramifications that will evolve the U.S. Military personnel system that will be suited to support Mission Command because its members are managed and do self manage as professionals.
Notes:
I am indebted to Mr. John Tillson, formally of the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) for his work on the personnel system and defining adaptability and agility in context of the military. John is currently retired in Florida.
This piece is also based on many conversations with Dr. Chet Richards and from his numerous blog posts at https://slightlyeastofnew.com/.
Also see, Kristopher Floyd, Founder and CEO, TeamMate AI, who stated this in November 2018,
Dr. Ray Leopold, “Cooking the Books,” https://slightlyeastofnew.com, February 1, 2025
Dr. Chet Richards, “All Warfare is Based Upon…,” https://slightlyeastofnew.com, October 2024
I am indebted to my mentor and close friend Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, who I consider one of the world’s premier military historians. Bruce, among many incredible accomplishments, was the founder of the USMC School of Advanced Warfare (SAW) where Command and Staff College students do a second year of intense study to become proficient at operational art. Due to him him not backing down to the encroachment of Marine Corps University by the left, has been refused work in the very course he founded 30 years ago, SAW. Bruce continues to make contributions to other institutions through his mastery of the Case Method of learning. One only needs to go to his email and register for his weekly classes for free. One can also subscribe for free and a fee his “The Tactical Notebook” that has an incredible amount of resources for warfare, leading and teaching advanced techniques at


Leadership and responsibility.
May I BL; Trust has been shredded. Shredded.
It can by leadership be restored.
It’s difficult to find leaders who are willing to risk JAIL for the led, although they do exist.* Upon redemption of this chit of Honor they are of course-gone, jail or not. All have noted this happened. The War on Warriors was real, remains real and must be rooted out. SECDEF Hegseth has some writing on this matter.
Trust can still be restored.
However at the policy level with people-we are you know- who have any military experience or come from military families (80%) there need to be positive affirmed actions.
1) get JAG out of the TOC, in fact completely out of any matters not referred to them by Commanders.
2) Nothing short of heinous crimes (rape or equivalent) should ever be referred. Sorry, the discretion card is Shredded.
3) ROE should be banned from being mentioned once hostilities begin. Rules of Engagement are for troops on borders, ships at sea, planes in the air. Weak, selfish Commanders let lawyers in the Clinton era worm their way in, and ruin our morals. It worked.
4) Pardons all round for those lynched and betrayed to the braying media.
5) Rebuke of some nature for they who tossed their troops (or marines) to media packs.
No process or words will change minds, just deeds.
Get Trust back it all follows.
Don’t and NOTHING FOLLOWS.
Good luck.
*why you never know when one might be speaking…