Commander's Intent in Modern Combat: Applying Mission Command and Maneuver Warfare Across 3rd and 4th Generations
I get a lot of questions, even one last night while at dinner in the VFW, about good and bad commander's intents. This article hopefully clarifies and answers this question.
In modern warfare, the concept of Commander's Intent is pivotal for enabling decentralized decision-making, fostering adaptability, and achieving success in the chaotic and fluid environments of 3rd and 4th Generation Warfare (3GW and 4GW). Drawing from my 2019 book Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture and William S. Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook and The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook, this article explores the formulation and application of Commander's Intent across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It provides concrete examples tailored to the decentralized, initiative-driven nature of 3GW and the non-state, culturally focused dynamics of 4GW.
In two recent articles on the Gettysburg campaign's cavalry operations, I explained how poorly worded commander's intents and orders contributed to their defeat. The U.S. military struggles to craft effective intents and orders for Maneuver Warfare due to its entrenched 2nd Generation Warfare culture. While I believe top-down reforms are promising, they will take time to permeate the ranks. Here’s how I approach the art of writing a Commander’s Intent for clarity and success.
Understanding Commander's Intent in Mission Command and Maneuver Warfare
Commander's Intent, as emphasized by Lind and myself, is a clear, concise statement of the desired end state and purpose of a mission, enabling subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s vision. We underscore that mission command—a leadership philosophy rooted in the Prussian Auftragstaktik—requires commanders to articulate intent that empowers subordinates to adapt to uncertainty. Lind’s Maneuver Warfare complements this by prioritizing speed, initiative, and disruption over attrition, aligning with John Boyd’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop to outpace adversaries. In 3GW, characterized by infiltration and bypassing enemy strongpoints, and 4GW, marked by non-state actors and cultural attacks, Commander's Intent becomes the linchpin for cohesive action across all levels.
Key Principles of Commander's Intent
Clarity: The intent must be understandable to all subordinates, from squad leaders to battalion commanders.
Purpose: It articulates why the mission matters, tying actions to broader objectives.
End State: It defines what success looks like, allowing flexibility in how to achieve it.
Adaptability: It accommodates the chaos of 3GW’s rapid maneuvers and 4GW’s psychological and political dimensions.
Examples of Commander's Intent Across Levels of War
Below are examples of Commander's Intent at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, tailored to modern combat scenarios in 3GW and 4GW contexts. Each example reflects the principles from my focus on adaptive leadership and Lind’s emphasis on maneuver and disruption.
Tactical Level: Platoon in Urban 3GW
a. Scenario: A platoon is tasked with securing a contested urban neighborhood where enemy forces employ hit-and-run tactics, leveraging mobility to avoid direct engagements (3GW). The enemy uses small, dispersed units to disrupt coalition supply lines.
b. Commander's Intent: Neutralize enemy disruption of our supply lines to ensure freedom of movement for friendly forces in Sector Bravo. The neighborhood is secure, with enemy forces unable to conduct effective hit-and-run operations, and local civilians cooperating with coalition forces to report enemy activity. Identify and exploit enemy vulnerabilities (e.g., gaps in their movement patterns), maintain initiative through rapid patrolling, and build trust with locals to gain intelligence.
c. Application: The platoon leader, empowered by the intent, decides to forego a static checkpoint plan. Instead, squads conduct decentralized “recon-pull” patrols (a Lind concept), identifying enemy routes and ambushing them at weak points. One squad engages a local elder to secure intelligence, aligning with the intent’s focus on civilian cooperation. This flexibility disrupts the enemy’s OODA loop, a hallmark of 3GW success, without requiring micromanagement.
d. Source Influence: Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook emphasizes “surfaces and gaps,” encouraging leaders to exploit enemy weaknesses. Vandergriff’s training model in Adopting Mission Command supports this by fostering adaptive thinking through Outcomes-Based Training and Education (OBT&E).
Operational Level: Battalion in Hybrid 3GW/4GW Conflict
a. Scenario: A battalion operates in a region where a state-backed militia (3GW) and insurgent groups (4GW) coordinate to destabilize a allied government. The militia uses conventional tactics, while insurgents target civilian morale through propaganda and terror.
b. Commander's Intent: Stabilize the region to enable the allied government to extend governance and counter enemy influence. The militia’s ability to conduct coordinated attacks is degraded, insurgent propaganda is neutralized, and the local population supports the allied government’s legitimacy. Disrupt militia command and control, counter insurgent messaging through information operations, and secure key infrastructure to demonstrate government control.
c. Application: The battalion commander delegates authority to company commanders to execute missions within the intent. One company targets militia communication hubs using rapid, combined-arms maneuvers, disrupting their operational tempo (3GW focus). Another company partners with local media to broadcast government successes, countering insurgent narratives (4GW focus). This dual approach reflects Lind’s advocacy for combined arms and Vandergriff’s emphasis on cultural adaptability in mission command.
d. Source Influence: Lind’s New Maneuver Warfare Handbook highlights the need for cultural awareness in 4GW, while Vandergriff’s case study of the 4th Armored Division in WWII (Adopting Mission Command) illustrates how decentralized execution achieves operational goals.
Strategic Level: Task Force in 4GW Counterinsurgency
a. Scenario: A multinational task force confronts a global insurgent network using 4GW tactics, including cyberattacks, propaganda, and proxy militias, to undermine Western influence in a critical region.
b. Commander's Intent: Undermine the insurgent network’s global influence to restore regional stability and protect Western strategic interests. The insurgent network’s ability to inspire and coordinate attacks is crippled, regional allies are strengthened, and public support for the insurgency is eroded. Neutralize insurgent leadership, disrupt their financial and cyber networks, and empower regional allies through training and resources.
c. Application: The task force commander issues broad intent, allowing national contingents to tailor actions. U.S. forces conduct targeted strikes on insurgent leaders, while British units train local forces to secure borders. A cyber team disrupts insurgent online propaganda, aligning with 4GW’s focus on cultural and psychological domains. This strategic flexibility, rooted in mission command, ensures unity of effort despite diverse tactics.
d. Source Influence: Lind’s Four Generations of Modern War (The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook) defines 4GW’s non-state challenges, advocating for psychological disruption. Vandergriff’s Adopting Mission Command stresses training leaders to think strategically, as seen in his Adaptive Course Model (ACM).
Training for Effective Commander's Intent
Lind and I emphasize that crafting and executing Commander's Intent requires robust developing. Outcomes-Based Learning (OBL) encourages leaders to focus on results, not processes, fostering the creativity needed for 3GW and 4GW. For example, my case study of the 4th Armored Division under General John Wood shows how trust and minimal direction enabled rapid adaptation. Lind’s New Maneuver Warfare Handbook introduces Tactical Decision Exercises (TDEs), which simulate chaotic scenarios to train leaders in articulating intent and adapting to uncertainty.
Example Training Scenario:
Setup: A squad leader is given a TDE where insurgents ambush a convoy in a 4GW setting. The intent is to “secure the convoy’s route and maintain civilian trust.”
Execution: The squad leader, trained in OBT&E, prioritizes escorting the convoy to safety while engaging locals to counter insurgent propaganda, rather than solely pursuing the attackers.
Outcome: The exercise reinforces the squad leader’s ability to interpret intent and make decisions under pressure, aligning with Vandergriff’s and Lind’s methodologies.
Challenges and Considerations
While Commander's Intent is powerful, Lind and I note challenges:
Cultural Resistance: Lind (Maneuver Warfare Handbook) and I warn that militaries obsessed with order resist the chaos-embracing nature of maneuver warfare. Training must shift cultural norms.
Leadership Balance: Adopting Mission Command highlights the need for leaders who are neither overly aggressive nor overly cautious, as excessive introspection can paralyze 3GW’s rapid decision cycles.
4GW Complexity: Lind’s 4GW framework requires intent to address non-military factors (e.g., culture, politics), demanding broader training than traditional warfare.
What Does It All Mean:
Commander's Intent, as articulated in Lind’s and my work, is the cornerstone of mission command and maneuver warfare in 3rd and 4th Generation Warfare. By providing clear purpose and end states, it empowers leaders at all levels to adapt to the speed of 3GW and the complexity of 4GW. The examples above—platoon patrols, battalion stabilization, and strategic counterinsurgency—demonstrate how intent fosters initiative and cohesion. Through training models like OBL, military leaders can master this approach, ensuring success in modern combat’s unpredictable landscapes.
References:
I am also indebted to the work of Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson through his numerous books, articles, specifically the Tactical Notebook where he constantly talks about good and bad examples of good OPORDs and commander’s intents.
John Schmitt has also done much work on this subject starting as the author behind the original FM FM 1 Warfighting, 1989. He now has a Substack column that deals with Tactical Decision Games, at ShadowBox Decision Games: Warfighters
Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Westview Press, 1985.
Lind, William S. The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Special Tactics Institute, 2023.
Vandergriff, Donald E. Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture. Naval Institute Press, 2019.
