Case Study: German Integration of the Telegraph and Railroad (new technologies) within Auftragstaktik (Mission Command)

How evolving technology emerges with the greatest command culture. Can the same occur happen today? The answer is yes if you have the right culture?

Helmuth von Moltke was the crucial figure in late 19th century European warfare. Following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815), technology, such as the telegraph, railroads and new weaponry, grew rapidly and complicated military operations. In particular, offensives became increasingly difficult, as experienced in the Crimean War (1854–56) and the American Civil War (1861–65). This new technology coincided with the dramatic rise of mass armies.

More than any other individual, Moltke balanced the new technology and mass armies with the unchanging characteristics of war. He guided Prussia to victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870–71). Prussia became the leader of a new, unified German Empire. Moltke’s art of war was not based on a strict set of rules but rather followed general outlines that allowed for flexibility. Most important, however, it was practiced by highly developed professionals.

Moltke was a follower of Carl Maria von Clausewitz, one of the most influential military writers of the modern age. Clausewitz argued that war was too unpredictable to be explained by specific theories. In his book On War, he stated that “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,” and “No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance.” He went on to declare, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”

Moltke believed that war was too uncertain to be guided by a strict set of rules. He also followed Clausewitz’s belief that probabilities would determine each encounter while an army adapted to each circumstance as it arose. Moltke served as chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1888. He almost immediately expanded the General Staff’s influence, developing it into a permanent, peacetime war planning organization.

To achieve this, he divided the General Staff into several planning divisions. These departments included a Geographical–Statistical Section, a Military History Section and a Mobilization Section. The Geographical–Statistical Section estimated numerous aspects of specific theaters of war. Some items analyzed included cartography, weather charts and opposing armies. The Military History Section studied past campaigns, such as the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) and the Franco–Austrian War (1859), distilling important lessons of operational combat.

Finally, there was the Mobilization Section, which organized detailed plans for initial deployments of the military in future conflicts. Within this section, a Railway Section was created to prepare timetables for the quick mobilization of troops toward the front lines via railroads. It is interesting to note that while these departments operated under strict timelines and mobilization tables, they did not diminish the impact of Auftragstaktik on the culture. Strict adherence to mobilization and rail tables enabled rapid gathering of troops weeks ahead of the Austrians and later the French. Once, the armies were massed, then decentralization of operations occurred. This was a mark of a very professional Army.

Moltke’s consistent use of rapid mobilization was a key ingredient of his art of war. Besides reorganizing the General Staff, Moltke issued a series of guidelines—1869 Instructions for Large Unit Commander—for its training. He organized these teachings into maneuvers and free-play force-on-force war games. Maneuvers, which often included entire divisions, involved simulated war exercises on realistic terrain; war games primarily featured theoretical war situations in huge sandboxes.

The most important exercise was the annual staff ride. It included both maneuvers and war games and involved intimate contact between the chief umpire and a small group of officers chosen for combat. These games often resulted in promotions and provided strategy for future wars. Since the purpose of maneuvers, war games and staff rides was to form leaders of one mind, these exercises were taken very seriously. A unique characteristic of warfare quickly developed.

The Prussian General Staff was the first organization to formulate a “common body of military doctrine.” Beyond the vast Prussian military reforms, Moltke is historically significant for his great accomplishments as a field commander. Although a Clausewitz disciple, he exhibited definite beliefs on military strategy, operations and tactics. He balanced the strategic offensive with the rise of technology, which usually favored the tactical defensive.

Moltke’s art of war can be organized into three distinct characteristics: the importance of the Aufmarsch (initial deployment); a preference for the Kesselschlacht (cauldron or envelopment battle); and the use of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics).

Moltke’s first constant in war was Aufmarsch, the initial deployment of the army. Efficient orders via the telegraph, as well as proper assemblage of troops, would result in a rapid mobilization of forces. He emphasized that if these demands were not strictly adhered to, the entire campaign could be ruined:

“Even the first deployment of the army—assembling the fighting means in readiness— cannot be planned without a previous plan of operations, at least in a very general sketch. One must consider in advance what one intends in the defense, just as for the attack. The first deployment of the army is inseparably connected with the operations themselves. . . . If the views shaping original deployment are incorrect, the work is completely without value. Even a single error in the original assembly of the armies can hardly ever be made good again during the entire course of the campaign.”

Moltke’s second constant in war was Kesselschlacht, the envelopment of the enemy army. Here, he applied his doctrine that preached the strategic offensive and the tactical defensive. Utilizing this formula, one army pinned the enemy in place while another army hit him in the flank and rear:

“Another means is to fix the enemy’s front with part of our strength and to envelop his flank with the other part. In that case it is necessary for us to remain strong enough opposite the hostile front so as not to be overpowered before the flank attack can become effective. We must also be very active in his front to prevent the opponent from throwing himself with superior numbers on our flank attack.”

He stressed that the goal of Kesselschlacht was the complete destruction of the enemy army:

“Victory alone breaks the will of the enemy and forces him to submit to our will. Neither the possession of a tract of land nor the conquest of a fortified position will suffice. On the contrary, only the destruction of the enemy’s fighting power will, as a rule, be decisive. This is therefore the foremost object of operations.”

Moltke’s third constant in war was the use of Auftragstaktik, mission tactics for army officers. The supreme commander gave his subordinate commanders a general mission. The application of these orders was left to the field officers. In other words, Moltke’s officers carried out his plan, as general headquarters played a secondary role. He devised a simple plan and then trusted his General Staff, which had undergone vast reforms, by placing well-developed staff officers alongside the large unit commanders to advise them on the higher’s intent.

Moltke also stressed that orders must be direct, clear and concise. Otherwise, the main objective might be misunderstood or even forgotten. Moltke stated “strategy is a system of expedients” and “no plan survives contact with the enemy’s main body.” As Clausewitz had already stated, Moltke understood that war was completely unpredictable. Therefore, planning the entire campaign in immense detail was senseless:

“One does well to order no more than is absolutely necessary and to avoid planning beyond the situations one can foresee. These change very rapidly in war. Seldom will orders that anticipate far in advance and in detail succeed completely to execution. This shakes the confidence of the subordinate commander and it gives the units a feeling of uncertainty when things develop differently than what the high command’s order had presumed. Moreover, it must be pointed out that if one orders much, then the important thing that needs to be carried out unconditionally will be carried out only incidentally or not at all because it is obscured by the mass of secondary things and those which are valid only under the circumstances.”

The classic example of Moltke’s art of war was Prussia’s 1866 campaign against Austria. The Austro–Prussian War began in June, and Moltke was eager to mobilize the Prussian army as soon as possible. However, Prussian King Wilhelm I delayed mobilization orders. Wilhelm finally unleashed Moltke on 2 June, empowering him with complete control of Prussian forces. But he was already behind the Austrians, who had begun troop deployment weeks earlier. Fortunately, he had already finished Prussian mobilization plans. Austria had only one railroad leading into Bohemia, the main theater of war, as opposed to Prussia’s five. When the demands for efficiency under mobilization ended, the German army began to be effective as German subordinate commanders operated under the philosophy of Auftragstaktik.

Consequently, efficiency and effectiveness under Auftragstaktik prevailed as Prussia mobilized in three weeks, while Austria took twice as long. On 22 June, Moltke ordered the concentric advance of two Prussian armies into Bohemia. The 2nd Army was commanded by the Crown Prince; the 1st Army was led by Friedrich Karl (the “Red Prince”). Thus began the initial stage of Moltke’s planned Kesselschlacht. His armies, widely separated by several days’ marches, were to converge near the town of Sadowa and link up only during battle. One army, whichever was closest to the Austrians, would pin the enemy in place, while the other was to attack from the flank and rear. In the next two weeks, Prussian armies won a series of engagements and were within a day’s march of each other on 2 July.

The 1866 campaign effectively illustrated Moltke’s art of war. He solved the problems of mass armies and new technology by formulating a simple yet well constructed plan. In achieving this, he enacted his Kesselschlacht doctrine, the ultimate goal of the Prussian army. When the 1866 operations began, Moltke’s Aufmarsch gave Prussia a tremendous advantage over Austria. Furthermore, he utilized Auftragstaktik, allowing his subordinates to carry out his general orders. Most important, his consistent use of flexibility saved the Prussian army from several possible disasters. When all else failed, his iron will thrived amid great adversity.

The best way to summarize Moltke’s art of war is Clausewitz’s famous dictum: “What genius does is the best rule.” Although he emphasized war’s uncertainty, Clausewitz believed great commanders could rise above this “fog of war.” The past is filled with striking examples, from Alexander in ancient Greece to Napoleon in revolutionary France. Whether Moltke belongs in this tiny, elite group of military geniuses is open to question.

In any case, he had undoubtedly placed his mark on the modern German army. He did this specifically in changing the leadership culture of the Prussian Army to the German Army from one of top down control, to one of bottom up decision making guided by well written but concise guidance. This would be significantly seen in the Franco Prussian War of 1870, where the Prussian Army won a decisive victory over the French in the month of August. However, it remained to be seen if Moltke’s successors could duplicate his astonishing victories. This would only be ensured by linking German professional education with the culture of Auftragstaktik.

Next article: “Practicing Mission Command in the Institutional Setting”

Notes:

1. For a comprehensive understanding of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, a highly regarded book is "Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings". It offers insights into his military theory and strategic thinking, and serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army. Here's a more detailed look at the book and other related resources:

   "Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings":

   • Content: This book compiles Moltke's key writings, providing access to his views on military strategy and tactics.

   • Significance: It's considered a valuable resource for understanding Moltke's enduring theoretical legacy.

   • Author: Helmuth von Moltke, with an introduction by Daniel Hughes.

   • Availability: You can find it on Amazon and Penguin Random House.

   Other Notable Books and Resources:

   • "The Road to Königgrätz: Helmuth von Moltke and the Austro-Prussian War 1866" : This book focuses on Moltke's role in the Austro-Prussian War.

   • "Moltke and his Generals: A Study in Leadership" : This book explores Moltke's leadership style and his relationship with his generals.

   • "Moltke's Tactical Problems From 1858 to 1882 (Classic Reprint)" : This book delves into Moltke's tactical thinking during a specific period.

   • "Last Letters: The Prison Correspondence between Helmuth James and Freya von Moltke, 1944-45" : This book contains the prison correspondence between Helmuth James and Freya von Moltke.

   • "Letters to Freya: 1939-1945" : This book contains letters between Helmuth James and Freya von Moltke.

   • Helmuth von Moltke's Biography on Britannica: For a concise overview of his life and career, you can consult the Britannica entry.

   • Helmuth von Moltke the Younger: It's important to note that there is also Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, who was the Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak of World War I.

2. Again, I must highlight all that I have learned from Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, the premier expert on the use of Case Method in learning, as well as a mentor and friend. Additionally, Dr. Jorg Muth, William S. Lind, Dr. Eric Sibul, Dr. Martin Samuels, Dr. Martin van Creveld and Dr. Eitan Shamir have had significant and a positive impact on my own work.

3. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 178–179.

4. Morgen Witzel, “Where Scientific Management Went Awry,” European Business Forum, no. 21, Spring 2005, p. 91.

5. Dr. Eric A. Sibul, “The Military and the Management Movement,” Baltic Security and Defence Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 2012, pp. 156–159, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/ Detail/?lng=en&id=156768.

6. James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Administration and Organization (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1975), p. 14.

7. Steven M. Sanders, “Is egoism morally defensible?” Philosophia, vol. 18, no. 2–3, July 1988, pp. 191–209.

8. Maturin M. Ballou, Treasury of Thought (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1899), p. 407.

9. Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 62.

10. Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957), pp. 9–19. Trevor Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (Annandale, VA: The Dupuy Institute, 1991), p. 62.

11. Kessel, Moltke, pp. 210–224. 41 Walter Gorlitz, Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes von 1650–1945 (Augsburg, Germany: Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997), p. 27.

12. Author’s correspondence with Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, April 2012.