Beyond Terrain: Revolutionizing Army Training for Tomorrow's Wars by Donald E. Vandergriff
My analysis and proposal to the Army Times article, "Army training sites don’t simulate future battlefields: Analysis" https://share.google/cjmzYEOEztTErycMo.
In a recent examination of U.S. Army preparedness, experts have pointed out a critical shortfall: the nation's premier training sites, such as the vast desert expanses of the National Training Center, fail to mirror the environments where soldiers are most likely to engage in combat.
Landscapes like the dense forests and marshy bogs of Eastern Europe, the rugged mountains and agricultural fields of the Korean Peninsula, or the coastal beaches and flooded rice paddies of potential Pacific hotspots remain largely unrepresented in routine exercises.
This mismatch isn't just a logistical oversight—it's a strategic vulnerability that could lead to tactics ill-suited for real-world demands, where concealment, mobility, and fortification vary dramatically by locale. But the issue runs deeper than geography alone.
To truly prepare for future battlefields, the Army must embrace a fundamental shift in doctrine, emphasizing agility, decentralized decision-making, and adaptive scenarios that foster innovative leadership at all levels.
The Limitations of Current Training Environments
The core critique is straightforward: training in arid, open terrains encourages habits that may prove disastrous elsewhere. For instance, units often relocate command posts frequently to evade detection in desert settings, a practice that disrupts coordination and exposes movements in vegetated or urban areas where static concealment under foliage or structures might be more effective.
In conflicts observed in recent years, such as those involving drone-heavy surveillance, staying put and blending into the environment has often trumped constant repositioning. Yet, without exposure to these varied conditions, soldiers develop standard operating procedures optimized for the wrong fight.
This problem extends beyond physical terrain to the scale and nature of operations. Historical precedents, like massive maneuvers involving hundreds of thousands of troops in the lead-up to major 20th-century conflicts, prepared forces for grand-scale engagements.
Today, however, brigade-level drills dominate, with higher echelons relying on digital simulations that prioritize centralized control over the chaos of actual warfare. These virtual exercises, while useful for logistics, often resemble scripted games rather than the unpredictable, human-driven dynamics of battle.
Future conflicts—potentially against near-peer adversaries in contested domains—will demand operations across vast, multifaceted landscapes, where electronic warfare, anti-drone operations, civilian intermingling, and rapid environmental changes play pivotal roles. This will demand constant dispersal of everything from maneuver, logistics and command systems to levels we are not used to in the past.
Moreover, the Army's standardized approach treats units as interchangeable components, ignoring the specialized adaptations needed for specific theaters. Vehicles that maneuver effortlessly in deserts may bog down in mud or be funneled onto exposed roads in hilly terrains, forcing reevaluations of infantry tactics, artillery placement, and supply lines.
Without tailored preparation, the early phases of a conflict could devolve into costly trial-and-error, eroding advantages against adaptive foes.
Embracing Maneuver and Adaptability in Doctrine
To address these gaps, the Army should draw from evolving military thought that prioritizes fluid, initiative-driven warfare over rigid, attrition-based models. Traditional training often follows predictable scripts, where outcomes are predetermined and subordinates execute orders without deviation. Instead, exercises should incorporate free-play elements, pitting units against thinking, evolving opposing forces that exploit weaknesses in real time.
This approach cultivates leaders who thrive in ambiguity, empowering junior officers and non-commissioned officers to make on-the-spot decisions based on mission intent rather than micromanagement from above.
Such reforms align with the realities of modern combat, where battles unfold not in isolated vacuums but amid complex human terrains—urban sprawls, cultural intersections, and irregular threats blended with conventional forces.
Future battlefields may involve megacities where non-state actors operate alongside civilians, requiring soldiers to navigate ethical dilemmas, build local alliances, and adapt tactics on the fly. Training must simulate these layers, integrating role-players who embody diverse cultural perspectives and unpredictable behaviors, rather than relying solely on physical mock-ups.
Structurally, this means rethinking force composition. Heavy, mechanized formations suited to open plains may hinder operations in constrained environments like islands or forested borders. Lighter, modular units—capable of rapid reconfiguration for reconnaissance, strike, or sustainment—would better suit the demands of dispersed, high-tempo engagements.
By decentralizing command and fostering trust down the chain, the Army can create resilient forces that turn terrain challenges into opportunities for outmaneuvering adversaries.
Practical Steps Toward Realistic Preparation
Several actionable recommendations emerge from this analysis. First, leverage international partnerships to conduct exercises on authentic terrains. Allied nations in potential hotspots offer ideal venues for immersive training, overcoming domestic constraints like environmental regulations and land scarcity that have shrunk available training acres over decades. For example, joint drills in Baltic-like settings could test mobility in wetlands, while Pacific collaborations simulate amphibious assaults on varied coastlines.
Domestically, revive underutilized sites with diverse features, such as coastal areas with hills, farmlands, and abandoned urban structures, to mimic Pacific scenarios. Augment these with advanced technologies like augmented reality overlays, which can digitally impose foreign landscapes onto existing facilities, allowing cost-effective experimentation without full relocation.
Critically, overhaul leader development programs to emphasize adaptive thinking. Incorporate after-action reviews that reward innovation and calculated risk-taking, rather than penalizing deviations from the plan. This cultural shift—from a bureaucracy-heavy model to one of empowered autonomy—will ensure that tactics evolve organically to fit any battlefield.
Conclusion: Adapting Now to Win Later
The warning is clear: overconfidence in mismatched training could spell defeat in the opening salvos of future wars. By integrating principles of maneuver, decentralization, and realistic simulation, the Army can transform these vulnerabilities into strengths. The goal isn't merely to replicate terrain but to forge a force capable of thriving in uncertainty, outthinking opponents across any domain.
In an era of rapid technological and geopolitical change, such reforms are not optional—they are essential for maintaining dominance on the battlefields of tomorrow.
Notes:
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 3–15; Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2006), 1–20.
Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 45–67.
William S. Lind and Gregory A. Thiele, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook ( Kouvola, Finland: Castalia House, 2015), 25–40.
Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 100–120.
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 50–70; Donald E. Vandergriff, Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019), 30–50.
Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 150–175; William S. Lind, The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Special Tactics Institute, 2024), chap. 3.
Donald E. Vandergriff, Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002), 200–220.
Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2006), 80–100; Douglas A. Macgregor, Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 250–270.
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 120–140; Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), conclusion.
Fayetteville? Kileen county, Chi-raq, DC, LA…
The problem with NTC is they just need to get off base more…
On a more professional note- large scale logistics exercises with fast moving command posts might be more productive in shaking off the cobwebs of garrison, simulations. They must be strictly disciplined not to bring garrison to war.
They.Must.Be.Strictly.
Disciplined. Not.To.Bring.Garrison.to.War.
(Please imagine Jack Nicholson typing “They must be strictly disciplined not to bring garrison to war” ala
The Shining. )
> a large field logistics exercise to shake out the cobwebs. This was done in 1919 - 1919 Motor Transport Corps Convoy (First Transcontinental Motor Convoy). Covered 3250 miles DC to Oakland, ferry to San Francisco in 60 days. Many lessons learned, including by a young Brevet LTC Eisenhower, which influenced him decades later on the Interstate Transport System.