Answering SES Stuart Scheller's first question in social media about combating careerism...
In his 30 April 2025 announcement on social media, the new senior executive to DoDs Personnel and Readiness challenges ideas to combat careerism in the military.
A personnel/manpower system that supports Maneuver Warfare and a culture of Mission Command would look far different than the one we have now, which evolved from lessons learned from mobilization for World War II, and the impact of the corporate culture and Industrial age learning system from World War I and II. Most of my work addresses these issues: moving the personnel system to the Industrial age to one that supports and sets the culture for Maneuver Warfare and Mission Command.
First, evaluating military officers while minimizing careerism requires focusing on objective performance, mission-oriented metrics, and cultural incentives that prioritize service over self-promotion. Also, Professional Military Education or PME needs to be completely changed from process to Outcomes Based Learning (OBL), but that will be covered in a future article. Here’s a concise framework:
Reduce the size of the officer corps: We have one of the largest officer corps in the world. Reduce it from the current 18 percent down to 2-3 percent over several years. This means toughening officer accessions, as well as completely changing cadet education from the Industrial age to the information age, and not with technology. The foundation of teaching is adaptability, critical thinking and problem solving revolving around Outcomes Based Learning (OBL) learning methodology.
Reduce the number of headquarters: Since World War II, in order to support the up or out promotion system as well as the mass mobilization doctrine adapted in 1947, more and more headquarters were added to the force structure in order to house these officers. This occurred both inside the force and the supporting forces. There is a beginning with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s 30 April 25 memorandum consolidating larger headquarters. Much remains to be done. These headquarters require large staffs of both Officers and NCOs, that constantly demand information from below, while sending tasks and requests downward. They force the culture to focus inward on process instead of outward on the evolving threats and way of war.
Mission-Centric Metrics: Assess officers based on tangible contributions to unit readiness, mission success, and team cohesion. Use specific, measurable outcomes (e.g., operational success rates, training completion, or crisis response effectiveness) rather than subjective or bureaucratic checklists.
360-Degree Feedback: Incorporate anonymous input from peers, subordinates, and superiors to gauge leadership, integrity, and teamwork. This reduces reliance on self-reported achievements and highlights genuine impact.
Long-Term Evaluation Windows: Extend evaluation periods to focus on sustained performance rather than short-term wins. This discourages gaming the system for quick promotions and rewards consistent excellence.
De-emphasize Networking: Limit the weight of endorsements or connections in evaluations. Standardize assessments to prioritize documented results over political maneuvering.
Ethical Stress Tests: Include scenarios or simulations that test decision-making under pressure, emphasizing adherence to values like duty and honor over personal gain.
Transparent Criteria: Clearly define and communicate evaluation standards to all officers. Transparency reduces ambiguity and the temptation to manipulate impressions.
Cap Promotion Rates: Slow the promotion treadmill to reduce pressure for constant upward mobility. Emphasize mastery in current roles over chasing rank.
Cultural Reinforcement: Foster a culture that stigmatizes careerism. Reward selflessness, mentorship, and risk-taking for the mission, and publicly recognize officers who embody these traits.
Eliminate Up or Out with Perform or Out: (See below expanded recommendation)
This approach aligns evaluations with the military’s core purpose, sidelining incentives for self-serving behavior.
Next, the “up or out” promotion system must be replaced. The "up or out" promotion system in the military, where personnel must advance in rank within a certain timeframe or face separation, has strengths like maintaining a lean, career-driven force but also drawbacks like discouraging specialization, fostering competition over collaboration, and losing experienced talent. A better system could address these while preserving meritocracy and readiness. Here’s a proposed alternative from several of my books and articles:
Proposed System: Merit-Based Track Promotion (MBTP)
Dual Tracks: Career and Technical (See my 2002/2013 book Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs and the ARCIC Officer Bloat Study for more details)
Career Track: For leadership-focused roles (e.g., command positions), emphasizing strategic and managerial skills. Progression requires meeting time-in-grade and leadership benchmarks, similar to the current system but with more flexibility for late bloomers.
Technical Track: For specialists (e.g., cyber, medical, engineering), allowing personnel to advance in pay and responsibility without mandatory command roles. Promotion is based on expertise, certifications, and mission impact, not time-in-grade alone.
Why it’s better: Retains highly skilled specialists who may not want or suit leadership roles, reducing talent loss. Encourages deep expertise critical for modern warfare (e.g., cyber operations).
Merit Over Time
Replace rigid "up or out" timelines with a points-based system. Points are earned via:
Mission performance (evaluations, combat/service contributions).
Professional development (education, training, certifications).
Leadership or technical achievements (e.g., leading a project, developing a new system).
Thresholds for promotion are set, but no fixed deadlines force separation. Personnel can stay at a rank longer if they remain effective, with periodic reviews to ensure contribution.
Why it’s better: Rewards performance over arbitrary timelines, allowing late bloomers and steady contributors to thrive. Reduces pressure to game the system for promotions.
Flexible Exit and Retention
Instead of forcing separation, offer voluntary exit incentives (e.g., severance, transition support) for those not advancing but still competent. High performers can stay longer in roles where they excel, with options for lateral moves (e.g., to civilian contractor roles or reserves).
Introduce "sabbatical" programs for retraining or education to keep personnel relevant.
Why it’s better: Preserves experience, reduces resentment from forced exits, and aligns with modern workforce trends valuing flexibility.
Holistic Evaluations
Use 360-degree feedback (peers, subordinates, superiors) and objective metrics (e.g., mission outcomes, innovation contributions) to assess promotion readiness. Incorporate aptitude tests for leadership or technical tracks.
Why it’s better: Reduces bias and favoritism, ensuring promotions reflect true ability and contribution.
Advantages Over Up or Out
Retention of Talent: Keeps specialists and experienced personnel who might otherwise be forced out.
Flexibility: Accommodates diverse career paths and modern military needs (e.g., tech-heavy roles).
Morale and Collaboration: Reduces cutthroat competition by valuing varied contributions.
Adaptability: Aligns with private-sector trends, making military careers more appealing to younger generations.
Challenges and Mitigations
Risk of Stagnation: Periodic reviews and mandatory retraining ensure personnel stay relevant.
Complexity: Requires robust evaluation systems, but AI-driven analytics (already used in military logistics) can streamline point tracking and assessments.
Cultural Resistance: Gradual implementation, starting with high-tech or non-combat roles, can ease transition.
Real-World Precedents
Private Sector: Tech companies like Google use dual-track systems (management vs. technical) to retain engineers without forcing them into leadership.
Allied Militaries: The Australian Defence Force allows longer tenure in technical roles, with merit-based progression, reducing forced exits.
Historical examples: See Officer Bloat study for good and bad historical study.
This system balances the military’s need for leadership with the growing demand for specialized skills, retaining talent while maintaining a dynamic force that embraces a doctrine of Maneuver Warfare as well as a culture of Mission Command.
Next: “More reforms needed?”
Notes:
Donald E. Vandergriff, Path to Victory: America’s Army and the revolution in Human Affairs (Presidio Press 2002/Create Space 2013 2nd Edition).
Also, based on a briefing to Army of Chief of Staff General Jack Keane 28 June 2002. General Keane then instructed me to go and brief a list of 30 personnel, both General Officers, members of Congress, as well as think tanks. I received no support other than verbal guidance from the acting Chief of Staff.
Briefing to Secretary of the Army Thomas White, 20 July 2002. Secretary White declared that Path to Victory was the blueprint for the future of the Army at a Press Round Table in July 2002.
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting (MCDP1), Washington, DC: HQMC, June 20, 1997, p. 73.
Donald E. Vandergriff, Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs, Forward by COL Douglas MacGregor, PhD, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, April, 5 2002, p. 315.
Donald E. Vandergriff, “Raising the Bar.” Briefing to Major General Alan Thrasher USA. Slides available online.
Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management: Comprising Management, The Principles of Scientific Management and Testimony before the Special House Committee (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 4-6.
Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1878, p. 219.
Richard C. Brown, "General Emory Upton: The Army's Mahan," Military Affairs 17, No. 3, Fall 1953, p. 16.
Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution In American Business, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 45-56.
Weigley "Elihu Root Reforms," 24; Frederick W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper Brother 1911), 10-16.
James H. Hayes, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study with Parallels from Industry, San Monica, CA: Rand, 1978, 80.
John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 81-82.
Weigley "Elihu Root Reforms," 24; Frederick W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper Brother 1911), 10-16.
Walter Willis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History reprint, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986, pp. 158-162. See also John M. Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late 19fh Century," Parameters 10, no. 3, Autumn 1980, p. 14.
Each military service has distinctly different Officer Evaluation Systems. Generalizations don’t work. Each has different requirements. I reviewed them all when I was the Head of Officer Evaluation and Career Planning at HQMC 1990-1992. Anything that deals with specific metrics is doomed to failure as is a grading process that rewards the measurable but not the intangibles. The key in a system of determining the most highly qualified from the highly qualified rests on reporting on the character of the individual in a narrative fashion. The longer an officer serves the more a full picture of his service, performance and potential emerges. Promotion boards are not idiots. They can read between the lines. I am opposed to a 360 evaluation process. Too cumbersome and filled with pitfalls of every imaginable sort. The immediate supervisor or commander evaluates and his senior reviews to place the report in a larger context.
The promotion systems of each service work fairly well as do the time in grade set points for each service. Start promoting water walkers too fast and you create many more problems than you solve.
That said, the systems work fairly well through Colonel/Captain (USN). All bets are off at that point.
There is an officer bloat. Far too much bloat in the AF, Navy and too much in the Army. From my perspective at the time I would estimate too many 0-4 to O-6 in the AF and Navy by 35%. The Army by 20% and the USMC by 7%. Many of these billets could be filled by limited duty Officers and Chief Warrant Officers.
The Flag Officers bloat is obscene. Probably 50% too many is every service except the Marines where it is about 20%. Many Flag Officer billets could be filled by senior Colonels/Captains. The real problem is at the three and four star level. These are highly talented and intelligent individuals. The political influences at these levels are not for the better. This is where the well is often polluted. Our Republic did not want the military intruding into politics but overlooked politics intruding too far into the military.
Where the nation has really gone off of the rails is in the selection of the Secretaries of Defense and the Service Secretaries. The exceptional ones are far too rare. Most have been nothing short of mediocre at best. The truly terrible out numbered the exceptional at least three to one.
Very Interesting Piece. A few thoughts came to mind:
1. How do you envision controlling the natural impulse to promote similar people at local boards with the impulse for everything to be merit-based? I see those as two competing priorities. Humans will naturally want to bring their tribe along, so any system with local promotion will have that bias. I'm not saying it's better or worse; I am just saying we will have different problems with this new system I am trying to extrapolate out.
2. Did you look at the percentage of Officers in the Army in the 1930s during the buildup, or did the Army of the 40s feel it was short on officers? I wonder if the 5% number is appropriate during a war when everyone is mobilized, but was slightly larger in the interwar period. How do you deal with the Old Officer issue the corps of the 1930s had, with an average age of around 47?
3. How much larger does the officer corps become with a sabbatical? A 5% officer corps is 5% "on the line," I assume.
The good news is that in one of your previous calls to action on manpower (link in this piece was broken), CGSC spends about 1/3 of its time studying military history, and the coursework was pretty good. The staff work includes force-on-force wargaming to test courses of action like you wanted. So, one positive note is that PME is doing some of the things you requested in your earlier work on the same topic.
-Edited: because I was on my phone and fat-fingered.