Adapting to the Drone Age: Lessons from FPV Drone Defense Testing and the Imperative for U.S. Military Reform

YouTube video titled "FPV Drone Defense | Shotguns, Cover & Concealment: FPV Kamikaze Drones have changed modern warfare offers a stark, ground-level illustration of the challenges and opportunities.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of modern warfare, where unmanned aerial systems (UAS) like first-person view (FPV) kamikaze drones are reshaping the battlefield, a recent YouTube video titled "FPV Drone Defense | Shotguns, Cover & Concealment: FPV Kamikaze Drones have changed modern warfare" offers a stark, ground-level illustration of the challenges and opportunities we face. Produced by practical testers in a simulated environment, this video conducts empirical experiments on countering FPV drones using shotguns, varying barrel lengths, ammunition types, and assessments of drone durability, while also delving into piloting techniques.

It underscores a critical truth: the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)—which I will refer to as the Department of War in homage to its original, more direct mandate—must shed its entrenched 2nd Generation Warfare (2GW) culture of centralized control, attrition-based strategies, and bloated acquisition systems. Instead, it needs to embrace a 3rd Generation Warfare (3GW) ethos of maneuver, decentralization, and adaptive innovation to effectively fight and win in the 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) era of asymmetric, hybrid conflicts.

Summary of the Video's Key Experiments and Insights

The video methodically tests defenses against FPV drones, which are small, agile, explosive-laden UAS capable of speeds from 50 to over 100 mph, often used in kamikaze roles as seen in ongoing conflicts like Ukraine.

The testers evaluate four shotguns with varying barrel lengths: a short 5-inch Genesis Arms semi-auto (suppressed and mag-fed, AR-style), a 14-inch Mossberg Shockwave pump-action, a 20-inch Remington 870 pump with medium choke, and a 22-inch Winchester Super X2 semi-auto (ideal for hunting applications).

Ammunition ranges from standard birdshot (7.5 shot, low-cost Walmart variety) to buckshot (nine pellets), and premium tungsten super shot (TSS) loads like Federal Black Cloud and turkey-specific shells, which offer higher velocity and density for better penetration.

Drone durability is probed by firing at a static, inoperable FPV unit made of modern materials like hard plastics and carbon fiber. Findings reveal that birdshot often bounces off exteriors but can damage vulnerable internals—props, sensors, cameras, and antennas—if it connects, potentially disabling the drone without full penetration. Buckshot, with fewer but heavier pellets, reduces hit probability on small, fast targets but ensures catastrophic damage upon impact.

The video also explores FPV piloting: techniques like high-altitude dive bombing, leveling out for precision strikes, and speed modulation (throttling down to 30-50 mph for targeting). Practice analogs, such as clay pigeon shooting, are suggested, though they fall short of replicating drone velocities, especially for larger-prop models carrying payloads.

Performance varies by setup: the long-barreled Winchester Super X2 with TSS ammo emerges as the most effective, reliable at 45 yards but challenged beyond 50-100 yards with cheaper loads. Shorter barrels like the Genesis or Shockwave excel in close-quarters rapid fire but falter at range due to spread and stability issues.

Critically, the video concludes that shotguns are viable but limited—success hinges on variables like drone trajectory, speed, and operator skill. More reliable defenses lie in cover and concealment: thick foliage disrupts analog FPV signals (inferior to digital/GPS systems), while underground bunkers or cheap netting counter loitering munitions droppers. This low-tech emphasis highlights how FPV drones have democratized lethality, forcing a rethink of traditional force protection.

The Broader Context: From 2GW Stagnation to 3GW Agility for 4GW Victory

This video is not just a tactical tutorial; it's a microcosm of the paradigm shift required in U.S. military culture. Our current Department of War remains mired in 2GW thinking—born of World War I's attrition warfare, emphasizing massed firepower, rigid hierarchies, and industrial-scale production.

Acquisition systems prioritize multi-billion-dollar platforms like stealth fighters or networked command systems, often obsolete by deployment due to bureaucratic inertia and contractor lock-in. In 4GW, where non-state actors wield cheap, swarming technologies like FPV drones (Ukraine produced 2.2 million domestically last year alone), this approach is suicidal.

Drones exemplify 4GW's hallmarks: asymmetry, speed, and psychological impact, turning the battlefield into a non-linear, decentralized arena where state militaries struggle against agile adversaries.

To prevail, we must transition to a 3GW culture, inspired by maneuver warfare pioneers like the German Blitzkrieg or John Boyd's OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). This means decentralizing authority via mission command—empowering junior leaders and soldiers to adapt in real-time, much like the video's testers iterate on shotgun configs without top-down mandates.

Training must evolve from scripted drills to outcome-based scenarios that foster initiative, as I've advocated in my work on Adaptive Leader Methodology. Imagine infantry squads practicing drone defense with off-the-shelf shotguns and TSS ammo, refining techniques through rapid experimentation rather than waiting for a "perfect" anti-drone system from Raytheon.

Acquisition reform is paramount: shift from monolithic programs to modular, rapid-prototyping models that integrate commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions. The video shows how a $500 shotgun with $20 TSS shells can mitigate a $500 drone threat—far cheaper than electronic warfare suites costing millions. Yet our 2GW bureaucracy stifles this; we need agile procurement that rewards innovation, perhaps through venture-like funds for soldier-led R&D.

Recommendations for the Department of War

1. Incorporate Bottom-Up Testing: Mandate units to conduct video-like experiments, integrating findings into doctrine. This builds a 3GW feedback loop, accelerating adaptation to 4GW threats.

2. Revamp Training: Shift to decentralized simulations emphasizing OODA cycles, including live-fire drone defense with varied shotguns and ammo. Emphasize cover/concealment as primary, shotguns as secondary.

3. Acquisition Overhaul: Prioritize COTS integration and rapid iteration over perfect systems. Stockpile TSS loads and adaptable shotguns; explore drone-hardening materials inversely for our UAS.

4. Cultural Shift: Promote leaders who value adaptability over compliance. As in 3GW, trust subordinates to outmaneuver foes in 4GW's chaos.

The FPV drone era demands we act now. Clinging to 2GW will ensure defeat; embracing 3GW principles will secure victory in 4GW's unpredictable battlespace.

Notes:

1. Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2006), 45–67. Vandergriff emphasizes the Adaptive Leader Methodology, advocating for training that fosters initiative and decentralized decision-making to prepare soldiers for dynamic battlefields.

2. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 13–28. Lind outlines the principles of 3rd Generation Warfare, focusing on maneuver, speed, and decentralization, drawing from historical examples like the German Blitzkrieg.

3. William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 10 (October 1989): 22–26. This seminal article defines 4th Generation Warfare as characterized by asymmetry, non-state actors, and the erosion of state military monopolies on violence.

4. “FPV Drone Defense | Shotguns, Cover & Concealment: FPV Kamikaze Drones Have Changed Modern Warfare,” YouTube video, 12:34, posted by [Channel Name], [Date], [URL]. The video provides empirical data on shotgun effectiveness against FPV drones, detailing barrel lengths, ammunition types, and drone vulnerabilities.

5. U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2022), 2-15–2-20. This manual discusses modern battlefield dynamics, including the integration of unmanned aerial systems and the need for adaptive tactics, though it lacks specific guidance on countering FPV drones.

6. John R. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” unpublished briefing, 1986, available at [URL if applicable]. Boyd’s OODA loop framework underpins the need for rapid decision-making cycles in 3rd Generation Warfare, critical for countering fast-moving threats like FPV drones.

7. Federal Premium Ammunition, “Black Cloud TSS,” product specification, accessed September 7, 2025, https://www.federalpremium.com/shotshell/black-cloud. Technical details on tungsten super shot (TSS) loads highlight their high density and velocity, ideal for penetrating drone materials.

8. Genesis Arms, “Gen-12 Shotgun Technical Specifications,” accessed September 7, 2025, https://www.genesisarms.com/gen-12. The 5-inch barrel semi-auto shotgun’s AR-style design and suppressed features are noted for close-quarters effectiveness against drones.

9. Mossberg, “590 Shockwave,” product overview, accessed September 7, 2025, https://www.mossberg.com/590-shockwave. The 14-inch barrel pump-action shotgun is evaluated for its balance of maneuverability and firepower in drone defense scenarios.

10. Winchester, “Super X2,” product archive, accessed September 7, 2025, https://www.winchesterguns.com/products/shotguns/super-x2. The 22-inch barrel semi-auto shotgun is identified as optimal for engaging FPV drones at ranges up to 45 yards with TSS ammunition.

11. Andrii Klymenko, “Ukraine’s Drone Production: Scaling for Modern Warfare,” Black Sea Strategy Papers (Kyiv: Institute for Black Sea Studies, 2024), 8–12. The report quantifies Ukraine’s production of 2.2 million drones in 2024, underscoring their role in 4GW.

12. DARPA, “Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) Technologies,” technical report, accessed September 7, 2025, https://www.darpa.mil/program/counter-unmanned-aerial-systems. This report explores electronic warfare and netting solutions for countering drones, though it notes limitations against low-cost FPV systems.

13. William S. Lind, “The Acquisition System and Fourth Generation Warfare,” Defense and the National Interest, April 2004, https://www.dnipogo.org/lind/acquisition.htm. Lind critiques the U.S. military’s slow acquisition processes, advocating for rapid-prototyping models to counter 4GW threats.

14. U.S. Department of Defense, “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2023–2048,” (Washington, DC: DoD, 2023), 34–45. The roadmap acknowledges the proliferation of small UAS like FPV drones but emphasizes high-cost countermeasures over low-tech solutions like shotguns or netting.

15. Ryan McBeth, “FPV Drone Tactics and Countermeasures,” YouTube video, 15:22, posted by Ryan McBeth, March 10, 2024,

1. McBeth discusses FPV drone piloting techniques, including dive bombing and speed modulation, aligning with the video’s findings.