A Positive and Forward-Looking Analysis: Evolving Urban Combat in the Shadow of Tomorrow’s Stalingrads

Thanks to this great work from Special Tactics Institute. They now have a 79 acre facility in SE Virginia 40 miles se of Petersburg. Please visit their website at https://www.specialtactics.me/

Vandergriff Forward to the Warfare Mastery Institute of the Special Tactics University and Institute:

By Donald E. Vandergriff November 7, 2025

As a longtime advocate for military reform and the infusion of maneuver warfare principles into our armed forces, I applaud the Warfare Mastery Institute’s of Special Tactics Institute and University (STI)’s timely and incisive article, “High Intensity Urban Combat Part 1: How is it Different? Will urban tactics of the GWOT change when we must fight the ‘next Stalingrad?’” published just three days ago on November 3, 2025.

This piece, aligns with several recent releases by a number of experts on this type of warfare to include my series on Substack, as well as a forthcoming military fiction series *Reforging the Sword* (publication TBD) arrives at a pivotal moment for the U.S. military and our Republic. It not only dissects the stark contrasts between the precision-driven close-quarters battle (CQB) tactics honed in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the brutal realities of high-intensity conventional urban warfare against peer adversaries like Russia, China, or North Korea.

More importantly STI’s article serves as a clarion call for deeper institutional transformation as we see the US Democratic party move to the far left through recent elections in NYC, NJ and VA where leftist candidates won up and down the ballets despite the recent successes of President Trump’s electoral mandate. They won due to almost total dominance of major institutions such as Mains Stream Media (MSM), public schools, while elite Democrats brilliantly used the Cultural Marxist playbook that embraces 4th and 5th Generation Warfare, while Republicans remain in the 2nd Generation War culture.

Special Tactics Institute’s (STI) six critical factors—ranging from the unleashed potential of heavy firepower to the subterranean nightmares of sewer combat—provide a pragmatic roadmap that honors the sacrifices of your deployed team members while challenging us all to think beyond the rubble. In an era where urban landscapes will define future battlefields, this analysis is not just useful; it’s essential, fostering the constructive discussions you invite in the comments.

It reminds me of the gritty wisdom in David H. Hackworth’s About Face, where he recounts the chaotic house-to-house fighting in Korea, and dealing with 4th Generation enemies in Vietnam. It underscoring that survival in urban hellscapes demands adaptability over rigid checklists—a theme STI article echoes with modern urgency.

What elevates this work, in my view, is its unapologetic pivot from GWOT-era delicacy to the unforgiving calculus of combined-arms attrition. Your point on “greater freedom for heavy weapons and firepower” resonates deeply with the lessons LTC Asad “Genghis” Khan draws from his operational experiences in Afghanistan in 2002-2004, and outlined in detail in his forthcoming book *Betrayal of Command* (November 2025). More importantly Genghis goes into detail how to prepare your unit for a 3rd Generation in order to understand, fight and win 4th Generation Warfare fights.

Another reference that STI’s cadre, Hack and Genghis as well as myself learned from was the book Street Without Joy—inspired by Bernard Fall’s Vietnam chronicle—where he illustrates how insurgents exploit urban density for sanctuary, only to crumble when conventional forces embrace overwhelming, discriminate fire. Khan’s after-action reviews of ambushes in Urban-like environments highlight how grenade volleys through windows and airburst munitions can shatter enemy cohesion without the GWOT’s handcuffs of collateral minimization.

Similarly, STI’s warning on the “increased danger for room and building clearing” aligns with Hackworth’s vivid tales from the Battle of Pork Chop Hill, where booby-trapped structures claimed lives not in the breach but in the aftermath, teaching us that true mastery lies in knowing when not to enter—opting instead for standoff neutralization. These anecdotes, paired with your forward-leaning gaze toward a “next Stalingrad,” inject historical vitality into what could otherwise be a dry doctrinal exercise, making the article a beacon for tacticians weary of post-9/11 complacency.

Yet, as insightful as these tactical differentiators are, they compel us to confront a broader imperative: the U.S. Department of War—yes, I revert to the original nomenclature to evoke its revolutionary roots—must decisively shift from a 2nd Generation Warfare (2GW) culture to a 3rd Generation Warfare (3GW) paradigm. Drawing from William S. Lind’s seminal Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985), and New Maneuver Handbook (2023, this evolution demands we jettison the centralized, top-down attrition mindset that Lind critiques as a relic of linear, industrial-age battles, where massed firepower and predictable logistics reigned supreme.

Lind’s framework, echoed in my own Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (2002 and 2013), and Adapting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture (2019) as well as the Hack’s and Genghis’s works argues that 3GW thrives on speed, initiative, and decentralized decision-making—precisely the antidotes to the urban quagmires STI article foresees.

Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson’s On Infantry and Storm Trupp-Tactics: Innovation in the Germany Army, 1914-1918 further bolsters this, portraying urban combat not as a siege of walls but a fluid ballet of combined arms, where infantry, armor, and artillery dance in Schwerpunkt-focused maneuvers rather than grinding frontal assaults. Gudmundsson’s dissection of Stalingrad itself reveals how the Soviets’ ad hoc 3GW adaptations—mouse-holing through walls, as you astutely revive—outflanked the Germans’ rigid 2GW playbook.

This is a lesson John Spencer, the preeminent urban warfare scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute, reinforces in his analyses of Mosul and Mariupol as well as his recent work in Gaza tunnel network below a Urban fortress. Spencer’s work on “urban canvases” emphasizes that cities amplify complexity, demanding mission-oriented tactics over prescriptive checklists, much like your call to study Ukraine’s ongoing meat grinder for “dirty tricks” long forgotten.

This tactical renaissance, however, cannot flourish without systemic overhaul. Our Industrial Age personnel management system—obsessed with metrics like promotion boards and billet-filling—chokes initiative, producing officers more adept at PowerPoint than platoon-level audacity. In my writings, I’ve long advocated replacing this with talent-based models that prioritize adaptive leaders, much as Hackworth lamented in About Face and Hazardous Duty the post-Vietnam bureaucracy that stifled the “grunts” who won battles.

Professional Military Education (PME) must undergo complete reform, ditching seminar-style navel-gazing for immersive wargaming and red-teaming, as Lind proposes in his 4GW essays. Acquisition and doctrine, too, require top-down disruption: from techno-centric wonders like over-reliant drones to maneuver-centric systems that empower junior leaders under Mission Command.

The Army’s own FM 6-0 nods to this, but as Spencer critiques in his urban warfare primers, it’s lip service without the cultural buy-in. STI’s emphasis on rubble navigation and casualty surges—evoking Khan’s casualty evacuation debacles in dense alleys—exposes how our current 2GW inertia leaves us vulnerable, unprepared for the “dramatic increase in casualties” where body-armored wounded strain logistics beyond historical norms.

Lurking beneath these conventional horizons, however, are the shadows of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW), where urban areas metastasize into hives for non-state opponents fueled by Cultural Marxism’s insidious rot within our Republic. Lind’s prescient warnings in Victoria and his 4GW theory depict a crumbling social fabric—eroded by ideological fragmentation and elite detachment—that breeds insurgents who weaponize cities as cultural battlegrounds, blending irregular tactics with global narratives.

Spencer’s urban studies extend this, noting how megacities like Lagos or future American metropolises become 4GW petri dishes, where enemies exploit grievances to turn civilians into shields or spotters. To prevail, we cannot merely bolt 3GW onto our forces; we must infuse the entire national security ecosystem—military, first responders, and especially law enforcement at federal, state, and local levels—with a 3GW culture attuned to 4GW threats. Imagine SWAT teams in Chicago or FBI HRT units employing Mission Command’s decentralized trust, as Gudmundsson advocates for light infantry, to counter hybrid swarms in derelict high-rises.

Hackworth’s Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts offers a blueprint: his turnaround of the 4/39th Infantry in Vietnam through empowered NCOs shows how 3GW resilience crushes 4GW entropy. Your underground combat factor, with its flamethrower deathtraps, eerily mirrors 4GW tunnels in Gaza or hypothetical U.S. subways, demanding cross-domain training where cops and soldiers learn to “mouse-hole” together, breaking 2GW silos.

In sum, the Warfare Mastery Institute’s of the Special Tactics Institute article is a masterstroke—positive in its optimism for adaptation, detailed in its dissection of urban evolution, and profoundly American in its call to arms. It honors the GWOT’s precision legacy while urging us toward a bolder, more human-centric future, where leaders like your volunteers turn feedback into foresight.

Detailed Recommendations for the Republic’s Success in High-Intensity Urban Combat

To operationalize these insights and secure victory in the urban wars ahead—be they against peer states or 4GW phantoms—the Republic must act decisively across four pillars: personnel, education, systems, and partnerships. These are not abstract; they are battle-tested imperatives drawn from the thinkers and warriors cited herein.

1. Reform Industrial Personnel Management to Foster 3GW Leaders: Dismantle the up-or-out promotion mill with a talent marketplace, as I detail in several of my books and articles, particularly in Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. Implement multi-year assignments based on aptitude assessments, not seniority, to retain adaptive “door-kickers” like Khan’s raiders. Mandate 3GW immersion for all ranks, with metrics tied to initiative in exercises rather than compliance. For law enforcement, federalize incentives via DHS grants to prioritize street-savvy sergeants over desk-bound managers, ensuring urban response teams embody Hackworth’s “grunts-first” ethos. Timeline: Pilot in FY2027, full rollout by 2030.

2. Overhaul Professional Military Education (PME) for Maneuver Mastery: Transform PME into maneuver warfare academies, per Lind’s New Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Replace lectures with Spencer-inspired urban simulations—VR Stalingrads, rubble live-fires, and 4GW red-teams pitting students against Cultural Marxist-inspired insurgents. Integrate first responders via joint curricula at the FBI Academy and state police colleges, teaching underground breaching and casualty pyramids. Gudmundsson’s infantry principles should anchor texts, with Hackworth’s and Genghis’s memoirs as required reading for resilience. Invest $500M annually in PME tech, yielding leaders who wield Mission Command like a scalpel in city canyons.

3. Revamp Acquisition and Doctrine for Decentralized Dominance: Shift DoD budgeting from centralized tech behemoths to modular, scalable kits—exosuits for rubble traversal, AI-augmented spotters for mouse-holing, and drone swarms for sewer recon—as Spencer recommends for urban multiplicity. Doctrine must enshrine 3GW via a new FM 3-06 (Urban Operations), incorporating Ukraine’s lessons and your six factors, with appendices on 4GW urban hives. For responders, equip local PD with interagency kits, funded through a National Urban Defense Fund, to counter domestic 4GW rot. Audit every program for Mission Command alignment, pruning attrition relics.

4. Forge Cross-Domain Partnerships and Cultural Safeguards: Establish a National Urban Warfare Consortium, linking DoD, DHS, and NGOs to simulate “next Stalingrads” quarterly, drawing Khan’s real-time tactics. To stem Cultural Marxism’s erosion—Lind’s “internal 4GW”—launch civic-military outreach in at-risk cities, blending Spencer’s community mapping with Hackworth’s soldier-Genghis’s Marine-citizen bonds. Measure success by reduced urban vulnerability indices, targeting 50% improvement by 2028.

At the heart of this foundation lies Outcomes Based Learning (OBL), the training analog to Mission Command’s operational freedom. OBL—stressing measurable, adaptive outcomes over rote processes—mirrors how Mission Command empowers subordinates to seize fleeting opportunities. In urban prep, OBL would certify teams not by cleared rooms but by integrated effects: firepower suppression, rubble mobility, and 4GW disruption.

No entity embodies this better than the Special Tactics Institute and University, whose offerings are tailor-made for the reforms above. Their Urban Combat Mastery Course integrates your article’s six factors with live-fire mouse-holing, underground CQB, and casualty management drills, all under OBL frameworks that produce 3GW warriors ready for 4GW shadows.

The STI’s Mission Command Leadership Program, infused with Lind and Gudmundsson readings, trains officers and first responders in decentralized command, while their 3GW programs—drawing Spencer’s and Lind’s models—prepares for Cultural Marxist insurgencies in American streets. Enroll now: these classes, from tactical weekends to executive seminars, offer the Republic’s fastest path to reform, with alumni already deploying your volunteers’ insights. The Special Tactics Institute isn’t just training; it’s the forge for a renewed Department of War.

Let us heed this article’s wisdom, embrace the grind, and build a force that doesn’t just survive the next Stalingrad—it defines victory on our terms. The Republic endures through such bold visions. Onward.

Begin STI’s Article:

Warfare Mastery Institute

High Intensity Urban Combat Part 1: How is it Different?

Will urban tactics of the GWOT change when we must fight the “next Stalingrad?”

Warfare Mastery Institute

Nov 03, 2025

---

Photo by Lekendrick Stallworth, identified by DVIDS

This article is adapted from our High Intensity Military Urban Combat book which we plan to publish here on Substack in serial form. We offer special thanks to the courageous members of our team who have volunteered to deploy overseas to current conflict zones. Their real-time feedback has proven invaluable for our analysis.

How must urban combat tactics change if the United States and its allies find themselves in a high-intensity conventional war against a modern, combined arms force like Russia, China or North Korea? While many tactics and general principles will remain the same, there are some very important differences between high-intensity conventional urban combat and the sort of precision Close Quarters Battle (CQB) that the U.S. military adopted while fighting low-intensity conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Modern military doctrine for CQB and Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) traces its origin to hostage rescue tactics. Beginning with the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), counterterrorist units became the experts in room clearing and CQB. Because their focus was hostage rescue, their tactics demanded a very high degree of precision and target discrimination.

After September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies found themselves embroiled in numerous counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflicts around the globe. Because these conflicts also demanded tactics that focused on precision and target discrimination, conventional military units were able to adapt counterterrorist CQB tactics (and in some cases law enforcement tactics) to the new battlefield. However, in the event of a conventional war, urban tactics may need to evolve once again. Below are six critical factors that military units will need to consider when preparing for high-intensity conventional urban combat:

1) Greater Freedom for Heavy Weapons and Firepower:

In a combined-arms urban fight, it is likely that civilians will either have evacuated prior to the battle or will be doing everything they can to stay out of the way. Even if civilians remain on the battlefield, accidental civilian deaths are often accepted as a tragic but unavoidable reality of high-intensity warfare. As a result, military commanders on both sides will have much more freedom in their application of heavy weapons and firepower. Tactics like tossing fragmentation grenades through windows, firing machineguns through walls and using airburst artillery to clear rooftops will suddenly become both acceptable and necessary. This will require breaking many habits learned during the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

2) Increased Danger for Room and Building Clearing:

When facing an adversary armed with machine guns, mines, booby traps, high explosives and artillery, the task of clearing an enemy-held room or building becomes much more dangerous. A platoon or company-sized element might clear a building successfully, only to die in a massive explosion as the enemy detonates pre-positioned demolition charges, bringing the entire building down. In many cases, units will want to avoid going into a room or building at all and instead use firepower to neutralize threats from a distance.

3) Effects of Building Damage and Rubble:

The intense employment of machine guns, artillery and explosives will greatly change the urban landscape. Military units used to clearing normal rooms in a counterinsurgency fight will be surprised when they open a door and almost fall multiple stories down because half of the building is gone. Buildings may be damaged, unstable, on fire, or filled with smoke. When buildings are completely destroyed, the tangled mass of rubble can provide even more effective defensive positions. Military units might benefit from talking with firefighters about how to move and operate in heavily damaged buildings.

4) Mouse-holes and New Clearing Challenges:

Enemy defensive measures will make the urban terrain even more complex. Enemies might create holes in the floor so they can drop grenades into the rooms below or cut holes in the walls to use as firing/observation ports. Enemies might booby-trap stairwells or rip out the stairs completely and instead rely on retractable rope ladders. Both sides will also avoid using doors if possible and instead use explosives, heavy shells or armored vehicles to “mouse-hole” through walls. Military units might want to study World War II battles to relearn many “dirty tricks” of urban combat that have not been used for decades. Studying contemporary high-intensity conflicts like Ukraine can also prove useful.

5) Increased Importance of Underground Combat:

Photo by SSG Jake SeaWolf, identified by DVIDS

Sewers and subway tunnels will become much more important in conventional urban warfare since they offer hidden routes to move around the city without being exposed to direct fire and artillery. However, these narrow passages can also become deathtraps if the enemy clears them using explosives or flamethrowers. Both sides will need to learn new techniques for fighting and surviving underground.

6) Dramatic Increase in Casualties:

Casualties in an urban fight are typically very high. Units must prepare mentally, physically and tactically to absorb a large number of casualties and keep fighting. More importantly, on the modern battlefield, combatants on both sides may wear highly effective, modern body armor. This will save more lives but it may also mean that a much higher percentage of casualties will be wounded (WIA) as opposed to killed (KIA). A large number of WIA presents a far more difficult logistical challenge for evacuation than an equal number of KIA. Military forces might need to reorganize and augment their MEDEVAC and medical treatment capabilities to deal with numbers of WIA that could exceed any historical precedent.

The six points above are only a few of the many new urban warfare challenges that will emerge in the event of a high-intensity conventional conflict. Special Tactics staff members continue to study both historical and contemporary cases to predict what urban warfare will look like should the U.S. and/or NATO become involved in a major conflict. In future High-Intensity Urban Warfare articles we will share some specific tactics that have proven and are currently proving effective.

We hope you found the short article useful and once again we welcome your reactions, comments or suggestions below in the chat area. We want to promote constructive discussions on tactics with people from various tactical backgrounds and experience levels.

https://www.specialtactics.me/

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Fall, Bernard B. Street Without Joy. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Company, 1961. (Revised edition, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1964.)

Hackworth, David H. About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.

Hackworth, David H. Hazardous Duty: America’s Most Decorated Living Soldier Reports from the Front and Tells It the Way It Is. New York: William Morrow, 1996.

Hackworth, David H. Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts: The Hopeless to Hardcore Transformation of U.S. Army, 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, Vietnam. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

Khan, Asad “Genghis.” Betrayal of Command. Forthcoming, November 2025.

Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

Lind, William S. The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Special Tactics Institute, 2023.

Lind, William S. Victoria: A Novel of 4th Generation War. Arktos Media, 2015. (Originally published under the pseudonym Thomas Hobbes.)

Special Tactics Institute. “High Intensity Urban Combat Part 1: How is it Different? Will urban tactics of the GWOT change when we must fight the ‘next Stalingrad?’” Warfare Mastery Institute (Substack), November 3, 2025. https://www.specialtactics.me/

Special Tactics Institute. High-Intensity Military Urban Combat: Close Quarters Battle and Street Combat in Conventional Urban War. Independently published, 2022. (Adapted from Squad-Level Military Urban Combat, Special Tactics Institute, 2017.)

United States Army. Field Manual (FM) 6-0: Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2022.

United States Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-06: Urban Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2012.

Vandergriff, Donald E. The Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002. (Revised edition, independently published, 2013.)

Vandergriff, Donald E. Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019.

Vandergriff, Donald E. “Forward to the Warfare Mastery Institute of the Special Tactics University and Institute.” Unpublished foreword, November 7, 2025.

Vandergriff, Donald E. Reforging the Sword. Forthcoming military fiction series, publication date TBD.

Secondary Sources

Collins, Liam, and John Spencer, eds. Understanding Urban Warfare. London: Howgate Publishing, 2022.

English, John A., and Bruce I. Gudmundsson. On Infantry. Rev. ed. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

Gudmundsson, Bruce I. Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918. New York: Praeger, 1989.

Lind, William S. “Understanding Fourth Generation War.” Military Review 84, no. 5 (September-October 2004): 12–16.

Lind, William S. “Strategic Defense Initiative.” On War (blog), November 2004. http://www.d-n-i.net

Lind, William S. “4GW Is Alive and Well.” On War (blog), May 2013. http://www.d-n-i.net

Lind, William S., and Gregory A. Thiele. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Independently published, 2015.

Spencer, John. “The Mini-Manual for the Urban Defender: A Guide to the Strategies and Tactics of Defending a City.” Self-published, March 2022.

Spencer, John. “The City Is Not Neutral: Why Urban Warfare Is So Hard.” Modern War Institute at West Point, March 4, 2020. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-city-is-not-neutral-why-urban-warfare-is-so-hard/.

Spencer, John. “War Books: Preparing for Urban Warfare.” Modern War Institute at West Point, April 30, 2018. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/war-books-preparing-urban-warfare/.

Vandergriff, Donald E. “The Unyielding Sentinel: Lt. Col. Asad ‘Genghis’ Khan – A True Combat Leader Forged in Fire.” Donald Vandergriff (Substack), October 28, 2025. https://donvandergriff.substack.com/p/the-unyielding-sentinel-lt-col-asad.

Vandergriff, Donald E. “Preface to BG Bob Krumm’s (ret.) RealClear Defense Article, ‘War Is a Young Man’s Game.’” Donald Vandergriff (Substack), October 17, 2025. https://donvandergriff.substack.com/p/preface-to-bg-bob-krumms-ret-realclear.

Vandergriff, Donald E., ed. Mission Command: The Who, What, Where, When and Why: An Anthology. Independently published, 2017.

Vandergriff, Donald E. “Theirs Is to Reason Why: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture.” Donald Vandergriff (Substack), July 15, 2010. https://donvandergriff.substack.com/p/theirs-is-to-reason-why-developing-leaders.